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INTRODUCTION 
 
The dismal state of the world’s poor can hardly be overstated, despite decades of 
development strategies on the part of the world’s rich.  According to the 2008 UNICEF 
report on The State of the World’s Children, for example, the infant mortality rate of 
children in industrialized countries is about 4 per 1,000, while in the least developed 
countries the figure is around 90 per 1,000; in Sub-Saharan Africa 2,000,000 of the 
world’s 2,300,000 children are living with HIV/AIDS; South Asians earn an average 
income of 777 USD, while industrialized countries enjoy 37,217 USD; the lifetime risk 
of maternal death of women living in the least developed countries is 1 in 24 and 1 in 
8,000 in the most developed; 29% of children in the least developed countries work; 41% 
of people world-wide do not have access to adequate sanitation facilities.  Statistics like 
these are easily overwhelming, and asking if the numbers are improving, declining, or 
exaggerated seems beside the point.  They represent human rights issues of the highest 
order. 
Faith in the free market and international aid, whether publicly or privately 
financed, have been two primary ways of dealing with these problems, and institutions 
like the World Bank have been at the center of debates surrounding development 
strategies.  Economic theorists have struggled with the question of what can be done, or 
perhaps, what is wrong with the ways things have been done (Easterly 2006; Evans 2004; 
Stiglitz 2003, 2006).  William Easterly, Senior Advisor for the Development Research 
Group of the World Bank, for example, argues that a “slowdown in developing country 
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per capita income growth from 2.5% in 1960 to 1979 to zero over 1980–98” can be seen 
when the countries of the South are weighted equally, despite major initiatives by the 
Bank (2001, 211).  If “necessary” investment, education, population control, and debt 
forgiveness have proven ineffective, these theorists have been concerned to find different 
means of achieving more equitable living standards. 
When confronted with questions about the place of international institutions like 
the World Bank, many moral and political philosophers have tried to assess what should 
be done.  While few argue that we live in the best possible world, it is unclear what moral 
obligations, if any, citizens in industrialized countries have, or what the grounds of such 
obligations might be.  Aristotelian (Nussbaum 2000), Utilitarian (Singer 2004), and 
Kantian (Pogge 2002) arguments have been used to tackle issues of globalization on a 
private level (see also Appiah 2007).  But the inequalities of the global world can be 
addressed on a public, or institutional, level as well.  Global democratic theorists are 
concerned with exploring the ends, if any, global institutions ought to express.  However 
indirectly, they suggest that the World Bank should promote rights (Held 1995), 
autonomy (Bohman 2007), or ends determined by some kind of impartial procedure 
(Benhabib 2006, Rawls 1999).  Or they argue that there are no such ends and that 
international institutions cannot be legitimate, though they may be useful (Dahl 1999).  
Since these philosophers aim to help make global institutions like the World Bank 
more legitimate, a natural question to ask is: do they?  This is a difficult question for a 
number of reasons, but, by looking at the kinds of questions that such theorists ask, we 
may move towards a way of answering it.  A major orienting concern of global 
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democratic theory is the problem of legitimacy, which can be stated in many ways:  What 
ends must international institutions express so that their decisions and actions are binding 
on those affected by them?  What are the shared moral beliefs, if any, which, if 
institutionalized, could foster lasting peace and stability?  What values define the limits 
of moral obligation to legitimate international institutions and when do the later become 
coercive?  Although global institutions may not seem to face legitimation issues like 
nation states do, since they do not often have as much coercive power, they still have 
great social, political, and economic consequences for which they must be held 
accountable. 
Despite much consensus about the problems global democratic theorists should 
answer, there is no agreement about the ends or the procedures providing the ends that 
define legitimate global institutions.  Since this theoretical standoff has practical effects, 
it raises a few issues regarding the goal of defining universal ends for international 
institutions.  1) Is it the case that different contexts all require the same ends?  Should the 
ends of the World Bank, the United Nations, and various Non-Governmental 
Organizations be the same?  Might not different people have different, legitimate 
purposes for making use of such institutions?  2) Is it the case that the conditions and 
effects of institutionalizing such ends should not affect their validity?  If, for example, the 
World Bank cannot be reformed to create conditions of autonomy, is the value of 
autonomy affected?  3) Is it the case that political philosophers could determine these 
ends apart from questions 1 and 2 without working with people trying to take control 
over their lives?  Questions like these are not new, yet they are difficult to take seriously, 
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as it is unclear how investigations into conditions, effects, and purposes could lead to 
anything but a relativistic legitimation of war, coercion, and rebellion.  I believe, 
however, that it is possible to raise such concrete concerns and still talk about 
legitimacy—though the meaning of legitimacy may have to be modified. 
This reconstruction of legitimacy I undertake in this dissertation continues many 
recent attempts to pluralize political inquiry, such as those based upon Rawls’s “fact of 
reasonable pluralism.”  However, I suggest that a truly pluralistic investigation of the 
legitimacy of global institutions may involve an experimental methodology in which 
philosophers and other intellectuals are co-investigators of public problems rather than 
definers of ends to be instantiated by laypeople.  If institutions are to be criticized 
according to their conformity to universal ends, it is far from clear how disagreements 
between experts and laypeople could be resolved.  Furthermore, philosophers or other 
experts can easily become entangled in endless disputes over which universal ends are 
valid, since, in the abstract, many ends are plausible.  For these reasons, I suggest that for 
whom a set of ends is legitimate should depend upon the conditions and effects of 
realizing them for specific purposes, such as those defined by a public problem.  Such an 
experimental methodology does not assume any connection between values and their 
validity nor any experts’ claims to representativeness. 
To develop an experimental political methodology and reconstruction of 
legitimacy I will draw upon John Dewey and Michel Foucault.  I make this seemingly 
unlikely pairing for more reasons than personal preference.  First, both thinkers attempted 
to engage in experimental political inquiry and describe the ways in which their work 
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might be different from expert-centric political theory and practice—Marxism or Neo-
Liberalism in both cases.  While many political philosophers begin with contemporary 
problems, Dewey and Foucault worry that their inattention to the effects their theories 
make possible and the purposes for which they are made is likely to lead to endless 
debates and uncritically exclusionary application.  Marxist or Neo-Liberal solutions could 
work for a variety of problems; the question is: for whom do they actually work?  Dewey 
and Foucault did not think that this could be answered by experts or laypeople alone.  
Instead, in the reconstruction of institutions, norms, and practices, the differential effects 
of such theories could be evaluated by all those involved in their use for ameliorating 
public problems. 
The second reason I have chosen Dewey and Foucault in a reconstruction of 
legitimacy—a concept neither used—is to put pragmatic and post-structural traditions 
into dialog with questions they often eschew, such as those of post-Rawlsian political 
theory.  In this way, the contributions to and differences between methodologies which 
become manifest might be productive for all three sides and provide new avenues of 
inquiry.  Without trying to turn Rawls into Dewey or Foucault into Rawls, I would like to 
explore a possible space between these three important thinkers in which each has 
something to offer.  There are, of course, many theorists who have explored some aspects 
of such an engagement already.  I hope to add to and perhaps shed light on such work, 
rather than theoretically disprove previous attempts.  Of course, this will be a selective 
reading and some aspects of each thinker will be overlooked in favor of those more 
salient to my project.  Instead of giving a definitive interpretation of Rawls, Dewey, or 
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Foucault, I aim to use some of their ideas to aid in the alignment of global democratic 
theory and practice.  To the extent that they do this can my interpretations be said to be 
correct. 
This dissertation does not seek to refute anyone, since the value of the ideas put 
forward here should themselves be evaluated by those seeking to ameliorate their 
situations.  However, I will try to show a space in which an experimental approach to 
global democratic theory and practice could be compared to one committed to universal 
legitimacy.  I do not believe that theorists who accept the universal framework of 
legitimacy commit a logical fallacy or make bad assumptions, though I believe that 
expert-centric and insoluble questions global democratic theory undertakes shows that 
other avenues of inquiry should be attempted.  My main task is simply to show that other 
assumptions, questions, goals, and methodologies are possible.  There are many ways that 
theory and practice could be better aligned, but I believe that a major blockage to 
experimental inquiry is theoretical.  The alternative to universal legitimacy is 
illegitimacy, whim, and infinite coercion only if certain premises are assumed.  Rather 
than refuting these assumptions and proving the universal value of experimental political 
inquiry, I hope to show the potential value of this framework for a specific problem. 
In Chapter One, I will outline the theory and practice of a universal framework of 
legitimacy.  John Locke makes clear its goals, questions, and assumptions, while Karl 
Marx, Carole Pateman, and Michael Sandel indicate some of its effects.  If theorists try to 
define a set of ends that represent everyone's interests and could thus provide a manifest 
limitation of the coercive power of governments, which, if instituted, would foster 
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stability and moral obligation, they must draw upon philosophical arguments like the 
description of human nature Locke provides.  Since Locke's ends do not seem to 
represent everyone universally, John Rawls suggests that, if universal ends legitimate 
states must express are to be found, it will be by an overlap of political arguments made 
in abstraction from plural moral doctrines.  In practice, however, reflective equilibrium 
places a heavy burden on philosophers to invent an overlapping consensus, since 
universal ends do not actually exist.  Reflective equilibrium does not explain who could 
arbitrate a difference between laypeople and experts nor what should be done when no 
consensus can be obtained.  If experts are still to define universal ends so that certain 
effects, like a decrease in coercion or increase in obligation, can occur, political 
liberalism may not be as pluralistic as Rawls intends. 
A less expert-centric and more pluralistic attempt to criticize and transform 
institutions might be possible if, as I suggest in Chapter Two, one does not assume that 
universal ends are universally valid.  Drawing upon Dewey, I will develop an 
experimental methodology that does not assume any particular relationship between ends, 
means, conditions, or effects, such as that institutionalization of a specific end will reduce 
coercion, create stability, or foster moral obligation.  On an experimental account, the 
validity of a value or institution, such as negative freedom or the judiciary, depends upon 
its conditions and effects for specific purposes.  In political matters, conditions, effects, 
and purposes themselves are defined by public problems.  Whether or not an expert's 
hypothesized set of ends is legitimate, then, will depend upon the conditions and effects 
of reconstructing an institution, norm, or practice according to such an end for the sake of 
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a ameliorating a publicly-determined problem.  Similarly, an institution's legitimacy 
depends upon its conditions and effects for dealing with the same.  This experimental 
account of legitimacy is not radically agonistic or relativistic because previous 
legitimacies will inform current courses of action and the legitimacy of certain choices 
will depend on their effects for certain people.  Creating more legitimate institutions, 
norms, or practices will often depend on allowing new voices to be heard, producing new 
names for problems, or creating new means of change. 
In Chapter Three, I will use Foucault to indicate a number of ways in which 
experts might contribute to such attempts to increase possibilities for communication, 
imagination, and transformation and reconstruct typical practices of criticism.  If 
philosophers are not to define ends which are then to be applied by laypeople, they, like 
other experts, might be understood as fellow problem-solvers.  Though there are different 
tasks for different kinds of experts within experimental political inquiry, political 
philosophers may be able to effectively problematize or re-problematize political 
problems so that different ways of thinking about and acting upon problems are possible.  
Other peoples, events, or technologies could produce new problematizations, but 
philosophers may be best able to understand the differential histories of certain problem 
frameworks and their effects so that they can suggest new reconstructions.  A 
problematization—such as negative rights vs. positive rights or prison reform vs. 
increased incarceration—is not an answer to a problem; rather it is a framework in which 
people can understand and address their problems.  On an experimental account, criticism 
is not the application of valid values.  Instead, to the extent that a problematization or re-
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problematization makes better effects possible can it be said to be critical. 
Once I have juxtaposed the theory and likely practices of universal and 
experimental accounts of legitimacy, in Chapter Four I will be able to bring this 
distinction to bear on the problem for which it was made.  First, I will show how many 
global democratic theorists accept the universal framework of legitimacy and thus 
attempt to define a set of universal ends which could represent the entire world so that 
global institutions could be criticized and reformed accordingly.  The different ends and 
arguments they suggest have no clear solution nor means of arbitrating between them.  
Though there are many forms it could take, an experimental account of global legitimacy, 
however, would ask: for whom are any such ends legitimate?  What are their conditions 
and effects for specific purposes?  These methodological questions might entail new 
ways of reconstructing existing institutions, norms, and practices that affect large 
numbers of people.  For example, one could ask, in what ways do they cut off 
possibilities for other interests to be communicated?  How might other problematizations 
be imagined?  What means exist for appropriate transformation?  These are concrete, 
pluralistic, and experimental questions which cannot be answered by theorists alone.  For 
this reason, I cannot guarantee any value or use of the framework that orients them.  I end 
this dissertation with an invitation to experiment with the different possibilities this 
intersection of theories, questions, and goals might make possible. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
UNIVERSAL LEGITIMACY 
 
Few issues have been as central to political philosophy as the problem of political 
legitimacy.  Historically, theories of political legitimacy have defined the ends that limit 
the coercive force of the state by reference to a shared human nature or universal moral 
law.  For instance, we can judge if a government is legitimate if it maximizes the greatest 
happiness, is directed by public reason, expresses the general will, or protects certain 
rights as trumps.1  The validity of these ends is shown by philosophical argumentation 
                                                 
1 The search for a universal criterion for the criticism of the state can be found in many traditions in 
political philosophy.  I will show how some of these lines of thought could be understood as taking part 
in what I call the “universal problematic of legitimacy” in footnotes throughout this chapter.  I will 
leave discussion of communitarianism, feminism, and deliberative democracy until Chapter Four.  
Whether through appeals to human nature, to reason, or to both, the social contract tradition has 
attempted to define universally-accessible criteria or principles that set limits to the state.  Though not 
everyone may hold these principles, they only need to reflect upon human nature or the requirements of 
reason to understand them and carry out their own criticisms of widespread institutions.  These 
definitions of legitimacy provide a guide for creating stable governments and limit what could be a 
valid ground for dissent or rebellion.  They show us when the government justly or unjustly coerces 
people.  Finally, they show us our moral obligations, since a legitimate state's laws would be those we 
have, or could have, authored ourselves.   
 
Besides Locke and Rawls, whom I will discuss in some detail, other canonical social contract theorists 
are also involved in universal definitions of legitimacy.  Thomas Hobbes seeks to understand the art by 
which the artificial man—the state—could be created by inquiring into the passions of man in his 
Leviathan (1996 [1651]).  The fear of death is the basis upon which the prudential state could be 
legitimated, and anyone who disagrees can but consult themselves to see the same thing.  Immanuel 
Kant reasons that, since man is an end in himself, the state must provide a place for public discussion 
about the state's laws, even though we must obey them privately (1991).  The monarch should only 
make laws that no one could reasonably reject—those that increase enlightenment or are the means by 
which such augmentation could occur.  Anyone who consults their own reason can see that certain 
stipulations on reason may be required for greater reason in the long run.  Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 
Social Contract argues that the legitimacy of the state rests not in any account of human nature or 
reason, but whether or not it expresses the will of the people (1997 [1762]).  If anyone doubts if the 
state represents their best interests, they need but consult whether the will of the government represents 
the general will.  When the general will goes a certain way, those who dissent may have to correct their 
opinions accordingly.  Finally, in On Liberty, John Stuart Mill claims that self-protection limits 
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and not public participation, except insofar as the public is able to participate in 
philosophical argumentation.  According to these thinkers, people can be shown to value 
certain ends over all others, no matter what they believe.  The greatest happiness ought to 
be maximized, because humans are pain-avoiding and pleasure-seeking creatures; the 
state can only enforce what all people could agree to, since people are ends-in-
themselves.  If these criteria are not met or are overstepped, a government can be judged 
illegitimate.  Politicians, social critics, and activists may then work to reform the 
government or take part in a revolution, but people do not have any moral obligation to 
continue to live under such conditions. 
Answering the question of political legitimacy helps to deal with a set of related 
questions:  How can coercion be minimized?  How much should people have in common 
in order to form a common will?  How can stability be ensured?  When can people revolt 
or conscientiously object?  In short, defining the legitimacy of the state goes a long way 
towards defining the space of politics—the government's decisions, laws, and judgments 
as well as citizens' demands and obligations—though each criterion of legitimacy does so 
in different ways.  For instance, civic republicans tend to demand much of citizenship and 
require the state to have a formative role in civic education, while liberals often believe 
                                                 
legitimate interference in both morality and politics, since it is of the greatest utility (1989 [1851]).  Our 
human nature as pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding makes both the criterion of utility and the harm 
principle evident. 
 
All of these thinkers have made important contributions to how we might think about the state, the 
space of politics, and the rights and duties of citizens.  However, I will suggest that, as the many 
definitions they give shows, no one criterion is universally right.  Each and any may be useful for 
certain purposes.  The question, then, is to understand what these purposes are and when they are 
served.  As I will explain in more detail in this chapter, Locke's critics give reason to think that this 
cannot occur without reference to the conditions and effects of theoretical tools.  In the second and third 
chapters, I will give some examples of the ways in which the validity of a definition of legitimacy might 
be determined for specific purposes. 
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that individuals should be able to define the good in their own ways, as long as they do 
not infringe upon the rights of others.  In fact, as coherent, comprehensive, and critical as 
existing criteria of legitimacy may be, the multiplicity of definitions shows no clear 
consensus and no way to decide between them.  Such theories may have paradoxically 
led to a decrease in legitimacy, since one criterion of justice often seems just as good as 
any other in the abstract.  Even recent endeavors to provide procedural definitions of 
legitimacy are no less divided than substantive accounts and are far less clear about what 
must be done to reconstruct our institutions. 
Though new developments in political philosophy have recognized the limitations 
of theories based in moral, philosophical, or metaphysical doctrine, I would like to 
suggest that they face similar difficulties if they do not rethink the traditional problematic 
or framework of legitimacy itself—that is, its assumptions, goals, questions, and 
practices.  The multitude of different solutions that have been provided may show that the 
attempt to find one definition of the legitimate state in theory is a mistake.  If the concept 
of legitimacy is to be a critical tool for the betterment of human conditions and not 
simply a site of abstract disputes having unpredictable effects, it may need to be 
reconstructed.  I will argue that, though the need for a radically different political theory 
has been widely recognized—beginning with what John Rawls calls the “fact of 
reasonable pluralism’’—there is good reason to think that the universal framework of 
legitimacy itself is one of the largest hindrances to the realization of a political practice 
that takes pluralism seriously. 
Before developing such an alternative, I should clarify some of the goals, 
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questions, assumptions, and practices that typically define what I call the universal 
framework of legitimacy.  No one of its aspects can be said to be primary, for I will try to 
show that each reinforces the others and that, together, they all form a particular image of 
political theory and practice.  John Locke, who was instrumental in constructing this 
framework, tried to set limits to government by appeal to a state of nature that defined 
men's moral ends.  This theoretical innovation is motivated by and allows him to answer 
a set of questions regarding the limits of the coercive power of the state, the possibility of 
avoiding modus vivendi, and the moral obligations of citizens.  I will argue that this goal 
and set of questions are themselves funded by an unspoken assumption that political and 
moral questions can be answered without political or public engagement.  Locke believes 
that philosophers have to define the shape of politics before politics could occur in the 
right ways.  However, Karl Marx, Carole Pateman, and Michael Sandel give good reason 
to think that the formulation of a theory should not be disconnected from practice, for the 
conditions and effects of putting a theory into practice constitute its meaning; they cannot 
be said to be mere contingencies of its application.  These criticisms suggest that people 
themselves should be involved in defining the legitimacy of their institutions, which, 
despite his emphasis on consent, Locke is far from allowing. 
Recognizing that theories claiming universal legitimacy are often legitimate for 
only a particular group of people, John Rawls epitomizes the procedural attempt to take 
account of reasonable pluralism.2  If a shared conception of constitutional essentials 
could be discovered in a given country, this might happen by appeal to political reasons, 
                                                 
2 Though Locke and Rawls are often considered liberals, it is not their liberalism that concerns me here.  
As I will suggest throughout, though cannot demonstrate in any detail, many political philosophers have 
undertaken the universal framework. 
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rather than substantive intuitions.  The process of reason-giving replaces an appeal to 
moral intuitions or human nature.  However, someone must first determine what counts 
as a reasonable reason, and Rawls does not make it clear how reflective equilibrium 
allows conflicting people to define the space of reason themselves.  Further, he does not 
explain how people could evaluate the entire framework of political liberalism.  Dealing 
with these serious issues thus falls to philosophers, experts, or those in power, since 
universal consensus does not exist.  Though Rawls gives an inventive procedural answer 
to a question that has often been substantively addressed, he still assumes that legitimacy 
must precede politics.  While he may not beg any substantive questions in theory, those 
who actually determine what counts as legitimate, in practice, will. 
In short, the assumption that legitimacy can be defined apart from politics is likely 
to take laypeople out of such definition and itself requires justification.  Given the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, one cannot assume that philosophers or any other expert could 
represent the people of a country without their actual consent.  Because people do not 
universally agree, however, legitimacy may need to be reconstructed to take pluralism 
into account.  This cannot be achieved by making minor adjustments to the universal 
conception of legitimacy.  If political theory's plural effects for plural peoples are to be 
addressed, we will have to rethink its theory and practice.  Embracing pluralism does not 
mean that we must turn to strategy, propaganda, and the affirmation of “our” values, for 
the “realist” rejection of legitimacy maintains the same terms of the debate.3  Just as 
                                                 
3 Though I cannot make an extended defense of the claim, I would like to suggest that the “realist” 
attempt to abandon claims of legitimacy is problematic for two reasons.  First, it maintains the 
framework of legitimacy as a search for a universal criterion by which states and other wide-spread 
institutions could be judged.  And, second, it takes part in the same question-begging practice—which I 
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epistemological realism is simply the other side of the coin of idealism, since both accept 
truth as correspondence, many doctrines that reject legitimacy accept its definition.  To 
undercut this dichotomy and form a third path that is neither skeptical nor dogmatic, I 
will propose an alternative framework of legitimacy, though it is first necessary to 
understand what it will be an alternative to. 
 
The “Original of Political Power ...  and knowing the Persons that have It” 
 
John Locke presents one of the clearest pictures of the universal framework of 
legitimacy in his Second Treatise of Government.  By solving the problem of rightful 
rule, he hopes to avoid the coercive and unstable rejection of legitimacy espoused by 
Thomas Hobbes.  Like Hobbes, however, he attempts to define legitimacy through a 
                                                 
will later term the appeal to “prior consent”—by putting forward a criterion of illegitimacy which is not 
to be validated by any actual people.  Thus, for instance, in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
(1942), Joseph Schumpeter appeals to markets instead of a coercive “common good.”  If people are to 
decide how they are to be ruled, the ability to choose should trump anyone's particular preferences—one 
may get one's way at the next vote.  Judge Richard Posner, in Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003, 
cp 2004), makes a similar claim that society is composed of rulers and ruled—or, perhaps, wolves and 
sheep.  If the ruled do not like their rulers, then they should do something about it.  Democracy at least 
allows that.  Requiring deliberation about the common good is likely to increase discord rather than 
created a more just society as a whole.  Finally, Richard Rorty has argued that democracy does not need 
any universal foundations (1989, 1996).  If democracy is legitimate for some people, it is because they 
have inherited certain beliefs about the importance of the split between the public and the private, for 
example (1987).  Increasing the legitimacy of democracy is more a task of spreading democratic 
language games than criticizing any institutions—for on what basis could such criticisms be grounded? 
 
Though often making refreshing critiques of universal standpoints that are clearly not universal, realist 
rejections of legitimacy often fall into the same kinds of practices.  Are there not other ways to structure 
choices besides markets, especially given well-known criticisms about choice ordering?  Are there no 
guidelines for the ways that the wolves rule the sheep which might transcend any ideologies the sheep 
might hold?  Are there no other social ontologies than agonistic language games?  To avoid both 
idealist and realist accounts of legitimacy, I suggest that a different practice of political inquiry may 
help evaluate the multiplicity of criteria that have been proposed.  In Chapter Two, I will suggest that 
the value of political philosophies—be they market-based, utilitarian, Marxist, etc.—can be judged 
concretely by their value for people working through public problems.  In theory, any of these accounts 
might be useful.  To see how these hypotheses are actually legitimate, a different theory and practice of 
legitimacy might be useful. 
 16 
political treatise by appeal to a state of nature to which actual people do not consent.  The 
state of nature provides the criterion by which a political state can be judged and forms 
the space within which actual consent might occur.  The concrete effects of instituting a 
Lockean state, however, have not been the freedom and equality to which all people 
could have consented.  Locke's account requires a contract prior to the consent of the 
original contracting parties that limits who is allowed to contract and what their ends are 
supposed to be.  The exclusive definition of the state as a protector of universal goods 
like life, liberty, and property is legitimate for only a particular group of people, i..e, 
enlightened, white, male, property owners.  That such a prior consent and its exclusionary 
effects cannot be contested to by actual people, I will suggest, is due to the very 
problematic that defines legitimacy by universally shared ends. 
The Second Treatise begins with a problem: If, as the First Treatise showed, 
monarchs cannot be known to be rightful rulers by being descendants of Adam, how 
could any rule be said to be legitimate?  If God does not legitimate our rulers, doesn't 
might make right?  Locke sets himself the task of showing the possibility of right rule, 
writing, “he that will not give just occasion, to think that all Government in the World is 
the product of only Force and Violence, and that Men live together by no other Rules but 
that of Beasts [...] should of necessity find out another rise of Government, another 
Original of Political Power, and another way of designing and knowing the Persons that 
have it” (§1.1; 267-8).  If we are not to live like “beasts” and are to understand what 
rightful authority is and who has it, we should uncover the shape and origin of just power.  
We are invited to ask two related questions:  On what basis do legitimate governments 
 17 
arise, and how do we know when a government is legitimate? 
To understand the origin of political power, we may first note that it is only 
governments that have the “power of a Magistrate over a Subject” (§1.3; 268).  We are 
here embarking on an inquiry into a very specific kind of relation, one that is not the 
same as that of a “Master over his Servant, a Man over his Wife, [or] a Lord over his 
Slave” (§1.3; 268).  What differentiates political power from these others?  Perhaps the 
first thing to notice in the special relation between sovereign and subject is the 
juxtaposition of force and right.  The difference is not characterized by the presence or 
absence of force but of an improper use of violence and a proper one.  Anticipating Max 
Weber,4 Locke explains that governments have the “Right of making Laws with Penalties 
of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of 
Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, 
and in the defense of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the 
Publick Good” (§1.4; 268).  Political power involves legislative, executive, and, as is 
elsewhere made clear, judicial institutions that may use force against members of the 
state, but only so long as this is exercised for the sake of the public good.  The difference 
between rightful power and mere power is, at the very least, the ends involved. 
To identify the common good, or the origin and end of political power, Locke 
provides his well-known account of human nature.  People are, by nature, free and equal, 
limited only by natural laws.  These are not simply the laws of physics but are primarily 
moral obligations.  Locke explains that “Reason, which is that Law, teaches Mankind, 
                                                 
4 I refer to Weber's classic definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate us of physical force within a given territory” (1946, 78). 
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who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions” (§2.6; 271).  Our human reasoning 
gives us access to a moral imperative to respect the life, liberty, and property of others.  
These moral laws can also be deduced from the omnipotence of God, “For Men being all 
the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants of one 
Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his business, they are his 
Property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one anothers 
Pleasure” (§2.6; 271).  We, being the property of God, should not injure anyone else, 
including affronts to their property.  This demand proscribes not only homicide and 
suicide but many lesser thefts as well. 
Unlike a physical law that cannot be broken, however, the laws Locke is 
interested in describing often do not describe reality.  All humans should obey the natural 
law that God's omnipotence entails, but human imperfection makes this so difficult that 
our default natural state is one of war.  In a just state, “there lies open the remedy of 
appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as in 
the State of Nature, for want of positive Laws, and Judges with Authority to appeal to, 
the State of War once begun, continues” (§3.20; 281).  The state of nature then describes 
both the moral ideal of freedom and equality as well as the unequal and unfree existence 
of humans before states existed—and even now continues, particularly in absolute 
monarchies (§7.90; 326).  Humans may naturally know what is right, but, as imperfect 
creatures, they need institutions to make such ideals into reality.  However, even if the 
state creates the most just conditions possible, it will never be a guarantee against human 
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nature. 
That war is the natural state of affairs when there is no stable power to enforce the 
rights entailed by our nature as God's property provides “one great reason of Mens 
putting themselves into Society and quitting the state of nature” (§3.21; 282).  Unlike 
Hobbes's prudential conception of law, Locke explains that “Law in its true notion, is not 
so much the Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper 
Interest, and prescribes no further than is for the general Good of those under the Law.”  
A true government's laws are never coercive but are in fact extensions of our moral 
nature.  The law is created for the sake of the good, “So that, however it may be 
mistaken, the end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge 
Freedom: For in all the states of created beings capable of Laws, where there is no Law, 
there is no Freedom” (§6.58; 305-6).  True freedom is only lasting under law, because 
our natural state is subject to the contingencies of might and trickery.  However, the ends 
of the law—i.e., the protection of life, liberty, and property—are not a matter of 
deliberation or whim, but are instead shared obligations due to our true nature. 
The moral law that defines our shared ends makes possible the critique of political 
or “Civil Society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of Property” (§7.85; 323, cp.  
§9.124; 351).  Because political power is different from other forms of domination in that 
its ends are held in common, the “Publick Good” that the government is supposed to 
forward is defined only by the protection of property—life and liberty being subsumed 
under this term.  Locke explains that “the power of Society, or Legislative constituted by 
them, can never be suppos'd to extend farther than the common good” (§9.131; 353).  
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Thus, the protection of natural rights is both an upper and lower limit on state action, and 
the sovereign's knowledge of these limits is “the best fence against Rebellion” (§19.226; 
415).  A stable government is one that expresses the ends of its people, and since anyone 
who consults natural law can criticize public institutions, there is no reason why the 
government should not do so—or at least be on its way towards doing so. 
Though the ends of a just government are universally known, people still need to 
consent to form a community that enforces them.  However unlikely or short-lived, it is 
possible that a multitude, or a group of unrepresented people in the state of nature, could 
have no need for a government.  Locke assures us that “no one can be put out of this 
[natural] Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own 
Consent.  The only way whereby any one divests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts 
on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a 
Community” (§8.95; 330-1).  We cannot be subject to the laws, judgments, or 
punishments of a particular state unless we have actually agreed to them—even if they do 
express what must be the common good.  If this consent has not occurred, we risk 
infringing upon others' natural rights of freedom and equality, since “Where-ever 
therefore any number of Men are so united into one Society, as to quit every one his 
Executive Power of the Law of nature, and to resign it to the publick, there and there only 
is a Political, or Civil Society” (§7.89; 325). 
We have now answered the two questions Locke posed for himself concerning the 
origin and recognition of just rule: how do legitimate governments arise and how do we 
know when they are legitimate?  First, political power is distinguished from other uses of 
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force when it carries out the shared ends of the community, which are delimited by the 
natural moral law that God's omnipotence entails.  Second, just political power can be 
recognized when people consent to the enforcement of their common ends by a particular 
government.  If these two conditions exist, not only is the state's power not coercive but 
people should be morally obligated to follow its laws.  The protection of life, liberty, and 
property, as philosophically justified by the state of nature, provide criteria that define the 
space of politics by limiting the actions of the state and the reasons people could give for 
dissenting to it.  If a government protects property, and nothing else, its people should 
enjoy lasting peace, for, when it has to use force against its people, it only does so to 
enforce the moral laws that people already accept.  There would be no reason for people 
to revolt. 
 
Prior Consent 
 
Locke limits public activity to the consent or dissent to an original contract, 
though the ends that any legitimate government should express are defined by natural 
law.  This definition of the common good without common participation demonstrates 
what I will call a prior consent, or a contract prior to that of the original parties that 
preconstitutes the people and their ends.  In this way, “the people” could be said to 
consent to a state that expresses those ends, since, in any modern society, they do not 
actually agree on any common ends.  That the original party is composed of British, 
property owning, enlightened, males allows one to assume their “tacit consent” if the 
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government already protects property.  In defining the “common” good prior to any 
contestation of it, Locke avoids asking for whom his natural law is actually legitimate.  I 
would like to suggest that this is not simply an oversight on his part, for a project that 
seeks universal legitimacy cannot allow actual people with plural interests to determine 
what is really legitimate for them.  A particular people and set of ends must then be 
presupposed.  This logic can be seen throughout the social contract tradition, for such 
theorists emphasize consent even as they reduce it to a hypothetical construct.  The goal 
of universally defining legitimacy provides a strong disincentive for inquiry into concrete 
values and legitimacies, as well as whether or not people actually consent to the 
“common” good that these philosophers define. 
The negligible role that concrete consent plays for Locke is shown by his recourse 
to “tacit consent.”  Each individual should consent to submit to the state “as each comes 
to be of Age” (§8.117; 346), as is in accord with freedom and equality.  But since the 
protection of property is the common good and end of political power, we consent when 
we have benefited from the institutions that express these aims.  Locke explains that 
“every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any 
Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent” (§8.119; 348).  Since this agreement is 
tacit and is carried out by each in solitude—not in some kind of national assembly—
“People take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude 
they are naturally Subjects as they are Men” (§8.117; 346).  In reality, however, this 
silence could mean many things.  It could show that the state is legitimate, or it could be 
evidence that many peoples and interests have been silenced, either through physical 
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intimidation or through ideological conditioning.  Locke could argue that people have 
every right to dissent if conditions are unsatisfactory, but the protection of property has 
already limited what counts as legitimate grounds for protest. 
Hobbes makes the logic of prior consent particularly clear when explaining the 
mechanism of representation: “A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are 
by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one 
of that Multitude in particular.  For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the 
Represented, that maketh the Person One.  And it is the Representer that beareth the 
Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude” (L 
114).  A multitude becomes a people (or person) only when represented by a sovereign—
this requiring the consent of each individual of that multitude.  Nonetheless, it is only 
through that sovereign that the multitude could become a people that could consent in the 
first place.  If the sovereign is temporally and ontologically prior, this seems to assume 
that the multitude is already a people, yet if the unity of the people is first, this seems to 
assume that they are somehow already united by a form of representation.  Hobbes breaks 
the circularity of this argument through his psychology, which guarantees that a 
multitude is unified by their common passions.  Those “that encline men to Peace” and 
thus ensure that a multitude is a people “are Fear of Death; desire of such things as are 
necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them.  And 
Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace” (90).  The articles reason suggests, of 
course, are expressed by the form of sovereignty that Hobbes describes.  The prior 
consent which determines the people and their ends, and thus the shape of sovereignty as 
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well, is the human nature described in the first part of Leviathan, “Of Man.” 
This practice is no different when a neutral procedure replaces a substantive set of 
ends defined by human nature.  Kant explicitly states that majority rule requires a prior 
consent, for an “entire people cannot ... be expected to reach unanimity, but only to show 
a majority of votes....  Thus the actual principle of being content with majority decisions 
should be accepted unanimously and embodied in a contract; and this itself should be the 
ultimate basis on which a civil constitution is established.”  That this contract never 
actually occurs, being “merely an idea of reason,” does not affect its bindingness.  For, 
“so long as it is not self-contradictory to say that an entire people could agree to such a 
law [or contract], however painful it might seem, then the law [or contract] is in harmony 
with right” (my emphasis).  It is “beyond reproach” and “carries with it the authority to 
coerce those to whom it applies, and conversely, it forbids them to resist the will of the 
legislator by violent means” (PW 79, 80-1).  Kant is clear that since the people cannot 
come to agreement about the shape of sovereignty—or even concrete laws—the 
sovereign should make use of the subjunctive mood and decide what they could accept.  
Since the minority can always be imagined to endorse majority rule expressing their own 
interests, all the terrors that a tyrannical majority might author are to be considered 
legitimate, binding, and enforceable.   
These examples give reason to believe that, if legitimacy must be universal, some 
prior consent will have to ground its definition.  Since people do not unanimously agree, 
knowing what people might have in common requires a deduction of a shared human 
nature or a demonstration of fair procedures to which people never actually consent.  In 
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the end, it is philosophers who define the common will, and, as history shows, many 
conceptions of legitimacy are possible.  Majoritarianism is not the only sensible way of 
counting votes, as Kant seems to assume, nor is Hobbes’ psychology the only way to 
describe human nature.  Thus, a prior consent has to define the ends and the people who 
could be said to consent to one such criterion of legitimacy or another.  It requires the 
multitude—and the sovereign—to have certain ends not determined by the multitude 
itself so that its consent can be assumed.  Subsequent chapters will outline how people 
themselves could determine the legitimacy of states, but it will be useful to first see what 
some of the concrete effects of specific prior consents are, as well as the limitations of 
procedural attempts to minimize such exclusionary consequences. 
 
Whose Ends? 
 
Locke’s formulation of and answer to the problematic of legitimacy has allowed 
for powerful critiques of human institutions if only the founding fathers of the American 
Revolution are to be counted among its inheritors.  Nonetheless, the ends that appeared so 
obvious to him have lost their naturalness.  The priority of life, liberty, and property is 
neither universal nor self-evident, and while few could opt out of God's moral law in 
Locke's time, this seems to be a distinct possibility today.  The protection of property is 
not only an implausible common good, but it also has the effect of legitimating the ends 
of a certain group of people to the exclusion of everything and everyone else.  Who has 
been given political autonomy and who has been made invisible through confinement to 
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the private sphere has been demonstrated by much careful work.  Karl Marx, Carole 
Pateman, and Michael Sandel, amongst others, show these prior consents in Locke's 
thought and give us reason to doubt that the ideal of universal legitimacy can avoid 
particular exclusions which cannot be justified universally.  It is, of course, possible that 
legitimacy might be defined without reference to actual peoples and their interests, but, as 
the history of the critiques of Locke and other liberals shows, this option looks less and 
less likely. 
 
The Dispossessed 
Among the many contributions Marx made to the critique of human institutions 
was his polemic against natural law theorists.  Though Hegel and the Young Hegelians as 
well as political economists like Smith, Say, and Ricardo bore the brunt of many of his 
critiques, it was often because they took for granted key concepts developed by Locke.  
Those who accepted bourgeois society at face value did not see that existing 
relationships, ideas, and values, like the state of nature, were effects of an historical 
injustice and thus could therefore not form the basis of justice.  The details of this critique 
developed from Marx's early engagement with Hegel's Philosophy of Right—which 
showed how, instead of grounding the state, civil society presupposed it morally and 
practically5—to his mature Capital.  The thread that ties these works together is the 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that Hegel too saw that the supposedly autonomous man of civil society required the 
state for its existence (1991).  The atomistic association of individuals is not natural but is produced and 
maintained by organizing structures and the habits they engender.  For instance, Hegel argues that, 
instead of being guided by an invisible hand, the relationship between producers and consumers may 
require adjustment due to the fact that products are marketed, not to individuals, but to the public.  Yet 
“the main reason why some universal provision and direction is necessary is that large branches of 
industry are dependent on external circumstances and remote combinations whose full implications 
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attempt to show both the false universality of liberal ideals and their historical causes. 
Political economists and bourgeois intellectuals like Locke do not question private 
property's existence, let alone its good.  While they “assume as a fact, in historical form, 
what has to be explained,” Marx proposes that we should “proceed from an actual 
economic fact”—namely that the “worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he 
produces” (1844 71).  Despite the promises of liberation by thinkers like Locke and 
Smith, actual conditions belie the particularity of Locke's common good.  Marx writes, 
“You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property.  But in your 
existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the 
population....  In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your 
property.  Precisely so; that is just what we intend” (MCP 486, my emphasis).  If political 
emancipation has been achieved, if the universal has become actual, why are so many 
still in chains?  When so many have been deprived of a life worth living, does the 
protection of life do much good? 
This could be the case only if we rigidly accept what has come to be defined as 
good.  Despite concern over the years about Marx's scientism, it is clear that, above all, 
his dialectical materialism tries to show the historicity of social formations, ideas, and 
even language.  We cannot become too comfortable with our theories and values if it is 
                                                 
cannot be grasped by the individuals who are tied to the spheres by their occupation” (§236; 262).  
Market intervention is one way that it conditions civil society and its laws of supply and demand, but 
the state—in the broadest sense of the term—is also needed to ensure the proper education of its 
constituents.  “[T]heoretical thought often imagines that the state is held together by force; but what 
holds it together is simply the basic sense of order which everyone possesses.”  In fact, the entirety of 
the Philosophy of Right can be seen as an attempt to logically demonstrate the dependence of all moral 
concepts, such as the atomistic man of the state of nature, upon a state's social constitution.  This has 
been hitherto unrecognized, for “habit blinds us to the basis for our entire existence” (§268 addition; 
289).  This logic opens the door to Marx's more material analyses of multiple social forms, based in 
historically-determined means of production, rather than an ideal of sociality (Hegel's state) as such. 
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the case that the “ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (GI 172).  
Life, liberty, and property, though perhaps noble ends in theory, have led in practice to 
unbelievable inequity and serve only to ideologically legitimize the bourgeoisie.  
Prefiguring his critique of liberal ideals, Marx writes, “This state, this society, produce 
religion which is an inverted world consciousness, because they are an inverted world” 
(CC:I 53).  Locke's ends, which have only partially emancipated a part of the population, 
result from and reinstate an existing partiality in the state of society.  True human 
emancipation would require the abolishment of the relations that make bourgeois private 
property possible as well as the universalization of access to the means of production. 
By assuming the universality of the ends of life, liberty, and property, Locke 
conflated civil and political society.6  Marx, however, tries to show an essential 
difference between the two.  Civil society names the relations of producer and consumer, 
worker and manager, but political society only represents the interests of the bourgeoisie.  
Though the latter may act only to protect life, liberty, and property, civil society is based 
upon a relationship of inequality that ensures that this action works in favor of only the 
managing class.  By positing life, liberty, and property as the only legitimate political 
ends, the “state abolishes, after its fashion, the distinctions established by birth, social 
rank, education, occupation, when it decrees that birth, social rank, education, occupation 
are non-political distinctions...  But the state, none the less, allows private property, 
education, occupation, to act after their own fashion....  Far from abolishing these 
effective differences, it only exists so far as they are presupposed” (JQ 33).  If life, 
liberty, and property define the space of the political, the unequal relations that are thus 
                                                 
6 For instance, see the Second Treatise, chapter seven, “Of Political or Civil Society.” 
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deemed private are left out of common control.  Perhaps these ends would be sufficient in 
a society of equals, but the state legitimates these differences by ignoring the inequalities 
of labor, birth, and education.  It thus acts in the name of a particular and not common 
good.7 
 
The Other Sex 
Besides birth, social rank, education, and occupation, Marx omits sex, gender, 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that, though Marx launched powerful critiques against natural law theorists, he faces 
similar problems in grounding political critique in an historical law.  There are more and less charitable 
readings of Marx, but many have understood his work as having a scientific intent which could uncover 
the false consciousnesses of the both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.  The German Ideology and the 
Communist Manifesto most easily lend themselves to this reading, particularly when Marx and Engels 
seem to explain the stages of society as having some kind of inevitable logic.  The question then 
becomes: how can those proletariat who do not experience themselves as oppressed, even after reading 
all of Marx's work, contradict those bourgeoisie who claim to be able to detach themselves from the 
ideas of the ruling class via their knowledge of dialectical materialism?  The difficulties in answering 
this question have led theorists indebted to Marx into a variety of different directions and no clear 
solution (see Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001) for a 
helpful summary.  They, however, reject legitimacy and in favor of an antagonistic realism (see 
footnote 2)). 
 
In History and Class Consciousness (1971 [1923]), György  Lukács, for instance, argues that theory and 
practice are united when the social structure can be viewed from a totality.  The proletariat provide this 
point of view because the reification of social relations by and for the means of production objectively 
produces their subjectivization.  Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization (1955) uses a Freudian 
account of human nature to understand the concept of alienation as repression.  This objective 
standpoint provides a way of distinguishing repression from surplus-repression, which might be 
avoided—surprisingly—by  increased control over production.  After trying to find a standpoint for the 
criticism of the state as a steering mechanism of private interest in the institution of the public sphere 
(1989 [1962]), Jürgen Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action (1984 [1981]) develops an account 
of reason that transcends cultures.  Communicative action would show that the purposive rationalization 
of the life-world is irrational from the standpoint of communicative reason. 
 
There are great differences among these thinkers, and they have different projects from those of Locke 
and Rawls, as, for instance, they tend not to be as concerned about moral obligation and the threat of 
moral obligation.  They do, however attempt to find a universal standpoint from which the state or the 
basic structure of society could be criticized so that coercion could be justified (as Weber makes so 
clear).  For this reason, they face many of the same problems of defending a universal criterion that is 
not experienced universally.  Marxists and post-Marxists would argue, of course, that this is the very 
point.  Since many do not realize that they are living reified lives, we need a standpoint from which we 
can transform their lives for the better.  Despite—or perhaps because of—the number of attempts to 
provide such a criterion, however, such a project has not ceased to be problematic.  I believe that a 
major reason for continued efforts in this vein is due to a an inability to understand non-universal 
critique.  I will develop such an account in Chapter Three. 
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race and many other distinctions that have been marginalized in thought while being 
essential in actuality.8  Carole Pateman has extensively shown that all of the classical 
contract theorists have rested their social contracts on a sexual contract that requires the 
subordination of women while giving men exclusive access to the realm of the public.  
She explains, “Once the original contract is entered into, the relevant dichotomy is 
between the private sphere and the civil, public sphere—a dichotomy that reflects the 
order of sexual difference in the natural condition, which is also a political difference” 
(SC 11).  The very possibility of the split between public and private required by contract 
theorists, the classical theorists in particular, is conditioned upon a sexual consent.  To 
protect the patriarchal system of property and to table things that might concern 
women—being propertyless and the property of their husbands—women had to be 
relegated from the public sphere.  By defining women's issues as non-political, Locke and 
others make an essentially political distinction. 
Demonstrating this hidden assumption and exclusion in the form of the marriage 
contract is difficult, since it was a matter of common sense—assuming we only listen to 
those who were thought capable of reason.  As Pateman argues, “The natural subjection 
of women, which entails their exclusion from the category of 'individual,' is irrelevant to 
Locke's investigation.”  To make this subjection more visible, she suggests that when “he 
states that he will consider 'what State all Men are naturally in', in order to arrive at a 
proper understanding of the character of (civil) political power, 'men' should be read 
literally” (11).  The Second Treatise's qualification of political power on the basis of 
natural freedom and equality is predicated upon a “natural” inequality of the sexes. 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (1999). 
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Yet this inequality should be consented to if it is to be legitimate.  Such a consent 
is circular,9 for, if women “naturally lack the capacities of 'individuals,' they also lack the 
standing and capacities necessary to enter into the original contract.  Yet the social 
contract theorists insist that women are capable of entering, indeed, should enter, into one 
contract, namely the marriage contract” (54).  Women should consent to their 
subordination, yet it is only men who are to have the capacity to make such an 
autonomous decision, and are thus the only ones who should own property.  The prior 
contract is also problematic practically, for it obviously does not happen in reality, as the 
consent to marriage, even if this rarely occurred, was not the same as an agreement to 
political irrelevance.  The effect of the theory and practice of assuming Locke’s common 
good is the perpetuation of existing property relations and the guarantee that women can 
have no voice. 
 
The Moral Minority 
Recently, civic republicans and communitarians like Michael Sandel have argued 
that not only the ends of life, liberty, and property but even the very idea of neutrality or 
universality that liberal projects like Locke's assume is misguided.  Sandel has famously 
criticized Rawls’ theory of the self in his Theory of Justice, suggesting that it requires an 
ability to shrug off moral, personal, and historical factors.10  Since then, he has shown in 
countless other cases how the ideal of neutrality and the attempt to find a minimal and 
                                                 
9 This circular argument is, of course, based upon the faulty generalization that only white, property-
owning males were rational and autonomous.  For more detail on this and similar common logical 
errors, see Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich's Transforming Knowledge (2005). 
10 See Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1998). 
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universal foundation for politics has had disparate moral impact in practice as well.  
Locke, of course, does begin with a substantive moral appeal to a higher law, yet this 
characterization decidedly sidesteps many religious issues of his time.  Political power is 
only legitimate if it protects life, liberty, property, and nothing else, for everything else is 
subject to contestation.  Locke believed that Catholics and Protestants could both agree 
that we are God's property, yet his search for universal legitimacy discounted any attempt 
to ask if they actually would. 
In practice, the protection of life, liberty, and property faces monumental 
difficulties of implementation.  For instance, whose lives ought we protect?  What kinds 
of life?  Where, when, and how?  Do we care about criminals, animals, detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay, or the global poor?  What happens to our standards during times of 
war?  Are patients in a persistent vegetative state, like Terry Schiavo, really alive?  
Questions like these abound in contemporary debate about abortion, which Sandel spends 
some time discussing.  The Supreme Court deciding Roe v.  Wade attempted to take a 
stance that was not grounded in any moral view, since there is a “wide divergence of 
thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question.”  Instead of appealing to moral 
doctrine, the court applied the precedent that “the unborn have never been recognized in 
the law as persons in the whole sense” (Roe, 410 US at 159-60).  Sandel argues that, 
“contrary to its professions of neutrality, the Court's decision presupposed a particular 
answer to the question it claimed to bracket” (101).  Even if moral reasons are not given, 
this and similar rulings have moral impact.  We might decide to bracket moral claims, but 
“what counts as bracketing may remain controversial,” requiring “substantive evaluation 
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of the interests at stake” (102).  To distinguish who is to be included in the political 
process and who is beyond the pale requires a moral judgment subject to contestation.  
The appeal to universal norms simply cover over this fact. 
Sandel argues that, in the end, liberalism is self-defeating, as its minimal political 
space “cannot secure the liberty it promises because it cannot inspire the moral and civic 
engagements self-government requires” (DD 323).  In ignoring substantive effects, it is 
unable to account for the kind of education that would be necessary for its own practices.  
His examples suggest that we ought to accept the substantive import of our legal, 
political, and social practices, though we need not take up the task of forming a virtuous 
populus, as Sandel believes.  He, Pateman, and Marx show how the instantiation of 
Locke’s universal norms could only have been consented to by particular peoples—that 
is, that any contract to them would have required a prior consent limiting the people 
constituting the original parties to property owning, enlightened males—but we need not 
assume that politics must then be an agonistic struggle over state power.  Still, John 
Rawls’s proceduralism, the major alternative to modus vivendi politics, may not be a 
satisfying option, as I will show in the following sections of this chapter.  This is because, 
like agonistic skeptics, proceduralism works within the universal framework of 
legitimacy, a conception that I will later reconstruct. 
 
The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism 
 
Given the exclusionary theory and practice that we have seen in Locke, some 
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theorists have sought to avoid the pitfalls of universalizing a particular moral law by 
turning to procedures.  John Rawls's mature work attempts to define political legitimacy 
in a way that is neither question-begging nor exclusionary by avoiding substantive 
argument altogether.  He explains that “the question the dominant tradition has tried to 
answer has no answer: no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception 
for a constitutional regime” (PL 135).  Philosophers should stop trying to “prove” that 
everyone else shares the same ends (PL xlv).  A Theory of Justice, for example, provided 
a number of powerful concepts for thinking about politics, yet it did not adequately take 
into account the plural ends or visions of the good life that people have.11  The history of 
philosophical disagreement about the ends of the state seems to indicate that there may be 
a number of valid moral doctrines.  Instead of endlessly arguing about such ends, it may 
be best to define legitimacy in a different way. 
Rather than trying to show how all moral systems could be grounded in the theory 
of his choice, Rawls marks a new project and a new approach to legitimacy by assuming 
moral pluralism as a fact, and not as something to be overcome (PL xvi-ii).  Arriving 
upon a common good without smuggling in a moral doctrine might seem to be an 
impossible task, but Rawls thinks that there may be a way to take moral conflicts 
seriously and define the basic structure of society via a political, not metaphysical, 
procedure.  Briefly stated, the problem of political liberalism is, “How is it possible that 
there may exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens profoundly 
                                                 
11 There is some debate about whether or not A Theory of Justice was in fact about legitimacy or if it 
simply gave an account of justice which one could accept or not.  Though it is unclear whether or not he 
sought an Archimedean point or an entry point into the task of reflective equilibrium, the later Rawls 
has tried to undercut this debate by his account of political liberalism. 
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divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines” 
(4)?  Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, is there any procedure by which people 
might affirm the same constitutional essentials and the basic structure of society? 
There might not be, Rawls cautions.  Whether or not a shared conception of 
justice is possible hinges upon whether or not competing moral doctrines can reach an 
overlapping consensus about the features of the basic structure of society.  Philosophers 
cannot guarantee that this occurs, for an “overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines 
may not be possible under many historical conditions, as the efforts to achieve it may be 
overwhelmed by unreasonable and even irrational (and sometimes mad) comprehensive 
doctrines” (126).  Instead of proving everyone's moral obligations to the state, “the aim of 
political liberalism is to uncover the conditions of the possibility of a reasonable public 
basis of justification on fundamental political questions” (xix).  It may be possible that 
comprehensive moral doctrines could, through the right procedure, reach shared political 
(not moral) ends.  Rawls thus changes the nature of the traditional liberal deduction of 
shared ends into a hypothesis of the conditions for the possibility of justice. 
To provide a procedure by which we might come to define justice, instead of 
simply drawing up a list of supposedly shared ends, Rawls suggests a framework 
centered around the concept of “reasonableness.”  The first thing to note is that 
reasonable people may believe conflicting, even contradictory things about moral goods.  
This discord is not due to faulty reasoning, for reasonable pluralism is a caused by the 
burdens of judgment.  Rawls affirms that the “evident consequence of the burdens of 
judgment is that reasonable persons do not all affirm the same comprehensive doctrine” 
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(60).  Our human fallibility regarding, for instance, the evidence, weighting, and values 
involved in moral issues ensures that moral pluralism will continue for the foreseeable 
future.  Not all beliefs are reasonable, but many moral problems allow for multiple 
reasonable answers. 
Because reasons themselves will differ amongst peoples, cultures, and histories, 
there is no way to test whether or not a reason is reasonable in itself.  Nor can there be an 
external criterion by which the content of reasons can be deemed reasonable, such as that 
they are formulated in terms of the greatest good or that they take into account life, 
liberty, and property.  Instead, reasonableness defines the procedures and conditions in 
which reasons are presented and generated.  For terms to be reasonable, “citizens offering 
them should reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms are offered might 
also reasonable accept them” (xlii).  People are reasonable if they “are ready to propose 
principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, 
given the assurance that others will likewise do so” (49), and if they are willing to 
“recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public 
reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime” 
(54).  That is, people are reasonable if they recognize the limits of their own reasoning 
capacity and thus are willing to listen to and abide by others' fallible reasons as well.  
Again, reasonable reasons have no determined content but are only defined by their form.  
Reasonable people thus exhibit the idea of a fair society as defined primarily by 
reciprocity, since they rule themselves by reasons and expect others to do so as well. 
The moral psychology bound up with the concept of reasonableness, like many of 
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the concepts constituting political liberalism, does not derive from any comprehensive 
doctrine or contestable view of human nature.  It is “philosophical not psychological,” 
because it is defined by the needs of political liberalism itself.  The claims about 
reasonableness and rationality are not based upon psychological research but can only be 
affirmed according to their political results.  If this account actually aids in the creation of 
an overlapping consensus, it is a reasonable assumption to make.  We cannot invent just 
any account of human nature, and science may have some import, but the limits on what 
can be said are constituted by “the practical needs of political life and reasoned thought 
about it” (87).  If Rawls began his account with a psychological moral psychology, as did 
Hobbes, this would beg the question, for there are always competing scientific accounts.  
However, whether or not this particular philosophical psychology “is correct for our 
purposes depends on whether we can learn and understand it, on whether we can apply 
and affirm its principles and ideals in political life, and on whether we find the political 
conception of justice to which it belongs acceptable on due reflection” (87). 
As the example of Rawls's moral psychology shows, the mechanism of political 
liberalism and the overlapping consensus it makes possible work on three distinct levels.  
There is the framework of political liberalism which sets the form or procedure for the 
determination of justice, i.e., the reasonable give and take of reasons; the actual content 
of justice determined by the parties in the original position, e.g., the two principles of 
justice; and “you and me,” actual citizens giving reasons and reflecting upon our 
intuitions, the political conception, and the framework of political liberalism (28).  In the 
process of reflective equilibrium, we can modify either the form or the content of the 
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procedure if it does not match our considered judgments.  We might need to change part 
of our framework, for example, the philosophical moral psychology.  Or we may need to 
try a different political conception, since the two principles retained from Theory of 
Justice are not the only possible ones.  The malleability of both political liberalism and 
our political conception allows us to take into account new developments and any 
disparate impact the constitutional essentials may engender.  In Rawls's words, 
“reflective equilibrium continues indefinitely” (97), though, of course, political liberalism 
can only produce a conception of legitimacy if an overlapping consensus obtains. 
Rawls recognizes that the framework of political liberalism, though revisable, 
does delimit the content of the political construction to a large extent.  Defined as it is by 
reasonableness, his proceduralism provides us with a political conception of justice that is 
“broadly liberal in character,” since it “specifies certain basic rights,” “assigns a special 
priority to these rights,” and “affirms measures assuring all citizens adequate all-purpose 
means to make effective use of their basic liberties and opportunities” (223).  Though the 
details of the content depend upon specific political cultures, there will be some general 
family of resemblances between political conceptions across cultures.  For instance, the 
“criterion of reciprocity is normally violated whenever basic liberties are denied” (xlix).  
If people are to give and accept reasons, they should be able to speak their minds, have 
means of subsistence, and the right to fair trials.  These stipulations do not mitigate the 
pluralism of this process but are simply the result of a procedure that is not value-neutral.  
Pluralism does not mean that anything goes, and the specific content of the political 
construction, though having some general characteristics, still depends upon the 
 39 
overlapping consensus of actual comprehensive doctrines. 
 
Whose Reasons? 
 
Though Rawls recognizes that people should be able to evaluate their institutions 
and refuses to ground his theory in any substantive comprehensive doctrine, there is 
reason to think that the universal framework of legitimacy he assumes greatly limits lay 
participation in practice.  This cannot be proven without looking to the actual effects of 
proceduralism, and I will give some indication of these in the final chapter.  Nonetheless, 
Locke and his critics point to the danger of allowing philosophers to determine the 
legitimacy of institutions, and I will suggest that Rawls provides few tools for anything 
else.  Though many have attempted to show how political liberalism is itself a moral 
doctrine and imports substantive baggage, I will not take this route.  Such criticisms miss 
the bigger picture of the expert-driven practices that political liberalism shares with 
substantive theories that accept the same goal of universal legitimacy.  Even if Rawls 
himself does not assume contestable ends, the universal question political liberalism tries 
to answer requires just such prior consents in its application, since people do not actually 
agree universally.  Because the fact of reasonable pluralism entails that overlapping 
consensus does not actually exist, experts must decide what could be said to be 
legitimate, and it is far from clear what could prove them wrong. 
To show how political liberalism is likely to leave people out of discussions of 
legitimacy in practice, it may be helpful to see just a couple of the ways that Rawls 
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suggests limiting the space of reason exchange.  First, he presupposes that inquiries into 
legitimacy should begin with the basic structure of society and could be answered apart 
from other concerns.  Rawls writes, “our exercise of political power is fully proper only 
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and 
ideals acceptable to their common human reason.  This is the liberal principle of 
legitimacy” (PL 137).  This principle continues Locke’s goal of defining right rule via 
some criterion that could then set limits to the coercive force of the state and the demands 
citizens could place upon it.  There are intuitive grounds for thinking that determining the 
legitimacy of the state or the structure of society could help create more legitimate 
conditions, but this must be itself demonstrated.  Not only must the value of terms like 
“state” or “society” be shown, but so must the assumption that such a criterion could lead 
to greater legitimacy than, for instance, a bottom-up approach.12 
Second, Rawls limits reasonableness by defining moral pluralism by 
comprehensive doctrines.  He succinctly states, “I assume all citizens to affirm a 
comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception they accept is in some way 
related” (PL 12).  Yet is far from obvious that people are Thomists, Utilitarians, Kantians, 
or Aristotelians—that is, that the only reasonable beliefs are the ones philosophers have 
defended.  It is one thing to say that people may reasonably differ on various moral 
questions and quite another to say that they hold systems of belief that determine what 
counts as a reasonable reason, and thus what might form an overlapping consensus.  
                                                 
12  Though it is difficult to trace directly, Bernard Williams, especially Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(1985) has been very helpful for my thinking in this vein. 
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Moral beliefs could also be understood, for example, as forms of habits whose value 
should be determined in particular contexts.  Beliefs would then be hypotheses whose 
validity has yet to be shown rather than judgments that can determine reasonable reasons 
like premises to an argument.13  Of course, we need not assume this either.  The point is 
that any assumption about the shape of morality or the relationship between morality and 
politics may itself be a political concern requiring demonstration. 
These examples of Rawls’s definition of reasonableness are not refutations.  They 
only show that his framework is not self-evident and must be open to contestation by 
philosophical laypeople—something that he himself would accept.  However, the only 
place Rawls gives laypeople is in the hermeneutic inquiry between intuitions and the 
general judgments constituting the political conception.  This process, which he calls 
reflective equilibrium, begins with collecting such “convictions as the belief in religious 
toleration and the rejection of slavery and try[ing] to organize the basic ideas and 
principles implicit in these convictions into a coherent political conception of justice.”  
By going back and forth between the general concept of justice and our provisional 
beliefs, we may find a political conception of justice that accords “with our considered 
convictions, at all levels of generality, on due reflection, or in what I have called 
elsewhere ‘reflective equilibrium’” (8).  If this public reasoning process, involving the 
reasonable reason-giving of experts and laypeople, reaches a shared political conception, 
“this conception provides a publicly recognized point of view from which all citizens can 
                                                 
13  This pragmatic account is not the position I will take.  I merely want to cite another possibility.  Rawls 
does say, as we have seen, that our account of moral psychology depends on its use in political matters.  
However, a radically different account of morality, or of the relationship between morality and politics 
might undermine his project as a whole. 
 42 
examine before one another whether their political and social institutions are just” (9).  
Without a political conception, the criticism of public institutions could only be grounded 
in private, philosophical, or religious standpoints. 
While this account attempts to bring laypeople into the philosophical project of 
defining political legitimacy, it faces a number of theoretical and practical issues, in 
particular, regarding the stipulation that moral beliefs and public reasons must be 
reasonable. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, actual people should take part in 
determining the ends of their institutions, yet, as Rawls asserts, they must do so in the 
right way.  That is, what counts as a reasonable reason has to be determined prior to any 
reason-giving process.  But, since racists and religious fundamentalists do not share “our” 
settled convictions, what counts as “our” reasonable reasons is exactly what needs to be 
shown, for it is not at all self-evident who “we” are.  Rawls argues that, “if we are to 
succeed in finding a basis for public agreement, we must find a way of organizing 
familiar ideas and principles into a conception of political justice that expresses those 
ideas and principles in a somewhat different way than before” (9).  The problem is that, 
since people do not agree, it is far from clear who has the authority to decide which ideas 
are reasonable enough be organized as well as whether or not the organized political 
conception actually represents people's intuitions.  
Moral pluralism, which Rawls uses as a reason to rethink legitimacy, threatens the 
possibility of achieving an overlapping consensus.  Because there is no clear moral 
consensus, someone will have to order moral beliefs to define a political conception.  
Yet, since it is highly likely that people will not all agree with such a conception—even 
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those deemed reasonable—it is unclear why those who order “our” beliefs have the 
authority to do so.  Reflection must begin somewhere, with a specific group of people's 
intuitions, but Rawls gives no indication about how any of the tough decisions between 
competing conceptions should be made nor how those who do not agree could become 
convinced.  Do philosophers have the authority to represent the people, since the people 
hold comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines, and philosophers’ domain of 
expertise is the analysis of such systematized intuitions?  If this is the practical 
consequence of Rawls’s views, it cannot simply be assumed, given the fact of reasonable 
pluralism.  He thus needs to say more about how the differences between a plural people 
and a universal political conception could be addressed. 
Similar questions arise at the more general level of the framework of political 
liberalism.  Rawls assures us that determining the validity of the framework “cannot be 
decided in the abstract independent of actual cases.”  To decide if a political conception, 
justice, and criticism are possible, “we should find pressing questions of constitutional 
essentials or matters of basic justice that cannot be reasonably resolved by political 
values expressed by any of the existing reasonable political conceptions, nor also by any 
such conception that could be worked out” (li, my emphasis).  The possibility of 
overlapping consensus can only be disproved if a political conception cannot and could 
not take into account conflicting values.  This test is problematic for two reasons.  First, 
Rawls assumes that the question of the validity of political liberalism comes down to 
whether or not a political conception can be formed.  Either justice is possible, or it is not.  
He provides no suggestion for how the conditions for the conditions of the possibility of 
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justice might be created if one lives in a political culture with “mad” comprehensive 
doctrines.  Nor is there any indication of what a other accounts of justice or political 
legitimacy might be.  The only alternative Rawls suggests is the Holocaust (lx). 
Rawls's propositions for the ways that political liberalism might be evaluated are 
problematic in a second way, since it seems that it could only be philosophers who could 
determine whether or not justice is possible.  How could laypeople be expected to decide 
if there might eventually be a political conception that “reasonable and rational persons ...  
would eventually endorse” (119, my emphasis) if they cannot even agree upon what a 
reasonable reason is?  Though Rawls is concerned to let plural peoples define justice for 
themselves, his project may paradoxically take the determination of legitimacy even 
farther away from laypeople.  This is due to the fact that he is concerned with the 
conditions for the possibility of justice and has little to say about the conditions for the 
actuality of justice.  In the end, perhaps Rawls is right to admit that the purpose of 
Political Liberalism is above all “the defense of reasonable faith in the possibility of a 
just constitutional regime” (172, cp.  lx).  It is hard to argue with faith, and perhaps even 
harder to glean practical tools from it. 
Despite the call for a conception of justice that takes account of pluralism, Rawls 
provides few resources for showing the ways in which people might be involved in the 
determination of the basic structure of society nor what should be done when they 
disagree.  I would like to suggest that this oversight is not due to a logical error.  It is a 
result of the problem he seeks to address.  As Kant began with the postulate that 
experience is unified and then demonstrated the conditions for the possibility of its 
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unification, Rawls starts with the assumption that justice requires universal moral consent 
and shows the conditions of its possibility.  He faces the same difficulties in connecting 
actual experience with the conditions of universality, for universality is never actually 
experienced.  People do not agree.  That is the problem.  Thus, in practice, philosophers 
have to show what could be universally assented to, what should be a way of reconciling 
different beliefs, what must be the case if justice is to exist.  If we assume that reasonable 
pluralism is a fact, can we avoid giving philosophers the responsibility of determining 
which beliefs are legitimate? 
 
Whose Framework of Legitimacy? 
 
Recognizing that, in a pluralistic society, people should be involved in 
determining the legitimacy of widespread institutions, Rawls turns to a procedure 
wherein people and experts try to order their confused and conflicting intuitions in the 
hope that an overlapping consensus, strong enough to form a set of constitutional 
essentials, might be found.  In practice, however, there is good reason to think that his 
proceduralism will lead to effects very much like those of Locke’s substantive account.  I 
have tried to suggest that this is due, in part, to a problematic of legitimacy that they both 
share.  The goal of this framework is intuitive: the coercive power of the state could be 
considered legitimate only if it expresses the common will of its constituents.  If such a 
common will were found, either because people consented to a set of norms or reasoned 
until they came upon a set of constitutional essentials, related questions could be 
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answered: accusations of coercion could be evaluated, stability would be ensured, and our 
political obligations could be defined.  If we know what ends our institutions should 
express, we can criticize them from a point of view that everyone should be able to 
understand.  Though this project may seem idealistic, it is unclear what alternative there 
might be that would not lead to coercion, instability, and prudential agreement. 
As Marx, Pateman, and Sandel show, however, it is difficult to arrive upon a 
universal criterion that does not have particular consequences, and it is surely noteworthy 
that Locke’s most recent defenders appeal to purely universal arguments and ignore the 
consequences of institutionalizing the protection of property as the sole task of the state 
(e.g., Nozick 1974).  The former’s criticisms show that even Rawls’s proceduralism is 
likely to lead to unreflectively exclusionary effects for the simple fact that reasonable 
pluralism means that there is no consensus on the common good, be it moral or political.  
A political conception could be said to arise from the overlap of moral beliefs, but the 
results of this interpretive and reflective process would have to be evaluated by actual 
people, and Rawls makes it far from clear how disagreement between laypeople and 
experts could be addressed.  Without explaining how value conflicts might be 
ameliorated or how the procedure itself could be appraised, he risks leaving it to 
philosophers to repeat Locke’s mistake of defining legitimacy in advance of an analysis 
into the conditions and effects of criticizing institutions from such a perspective.  It does 
not seem to be enough to say that all people should be involved in discussions about 
justice, since the very question has to do with the ways in which different people’s voices 
can be heard. 
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In sharing the goal of forming a universal conception of legitimacy, Locke and 
Rawls assume that, once the ends of the state are defined, other things will fall into place.  
It is presupposed that the state is the site of politics par excellence, and that having a 
conception of justice is the best way to alter the basic structure of society.  These points 
require justification.  The value of an abstraction like “the state” or “the structure of 
society” has to be shown, and this would have to be determined by actual people.  It very 
well may be the case that more local discussions of legitimacy would often be more 
effective, for instance, since they might be more easily comprehended, evaluated, or 
enacted.  Contextual improvements might be the best way to create a more just society, 
and not necessarily because they have the whole in view.  The assumption that having a 
criterion which could qualify the ends of the state, the space of politics, or the obligations 
of people is the best way to create more legitimate conditions is far from obvious.  Given 
the consequences of a universal criterion like the one Locke provides, criteria whose 
particularity is affirmed might often be more useful. 
To try to take stock of the assumptions of the universal framework of legitimacy 
and its critics, in the remainder of this dissertation I will suggest a few ways that political 
theory and practice might better address the fact of reasonable pluralism in a way that 
brings actual people into the evaluation of their institutions, in the broadest sense of the 
term.  The first step in doing so is to reconstruct legitimacy pluralistically—which, I will 
argue, also means experimentally.  The multiple ways that the ends of states have been 
defined, and the criticisms of each, suggests that a universal conception of legitimacy is 
not necessary for creating more legitimate institutions and practices.  Which definition is 
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useful will depend on the purposes we have, and since no “we” can be assumed, this will 
require concrete and experimental inquiry.  If political philosophy begins with actual 
people in their multifarious associations, their existing values and ends, and their real 
consents and dissents, it might be more attuned to people’s actual legitimacies and 
illegitimacies.  No methodology could guarantee this, and I will face a difficult challenge 
of providing a framework that says something while allowing itself to be revised and 
contested.  In some ways, the experimental account of legitimacy I will outline is an anti-
methodology, or allows for methodological pluralism, though I will make some 
suggestions for political theory and practice that should themselves be evaluated by those 
theories and practices. 
Multiplying legitimacy also means that politics could include affairs beyond the 
state.  Governments, of course, play a large role in the direction of human affairs, but 
there are many other aspects of life that may require criticism and transformation, since 
they affect people’s lives in common.  Focusing only on the state or other widespread 
institutions may blind us to means that are not bureaucratic and ends that are not 
universal.  There are many institutions that educate, direct, discipline, surveil, and coerce 
besides—and perhaps even more than—the state.  Allowing these other determining 
factors a primary place instead of relegating them to secondary phenomena may even 
change the ways we think about coercion, consent, and autonomy.  To limit ourselves to 
any particular kind of institution would seem to close off inquiry into the multifarious and 
ubiquitous human practices that affect people's lives, labeling as “private” what may need 
to become public.  And, of course, assuming that any institutions, beliefs, or practices are 
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private or a-political is exactly what needs to be demonstrated. 
Like its treatment of politics, an experimental framework of legitimacy would 
also not assume any particular understanding of morality or any necessary connection 
between morality and politics.  In different cases, it may be best to think of moral beliefs 
as judgments, hypotheses, or habits.  Morality need not ground politics, nor must we be 
morally obligated to obey the state when it expresses the common good.  The relation 
between moral beliefs and the existence of coercion, the stability of the state, or our 
moral obligations has to be concretely shown.  Any or all of these may be useful ways of 
thinking, but that should be determined by the actual legitimacies they help create or 
prevent. 
Finally, if no necessary connection can be assumed between universal ends and 
the creation of more legitimate institutions, I will need to outline a new model of 
criticism and expertise.  Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, the suggestions experts 
make can no longer be assumed to be valid apart from their actual effects for plural 
peoples.  Even if people themselves come to a political conception, it is not certain that 
the conditions and effects of transforming institutions accordingly will be legitimate.  
Thus, rather than a top-down model, where experts and critics define valid values, and 
policy-makers, activists, and laypeople apply them, criticism might be reconstructed 
plurally, contextually, and experimentally.  In this way, criticism would be part of a 
process of joint learning, where norms and other hypotheses would be experimentally 
revised in light of their effects in ameliorating concrete problems.  Who is an expert or 
what counts as criticism would be retrospectively determined, though previous cases 
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should provide indications of both. 
The experimental framework of legitimacy, which I juxtapose to the universal 
model, itself has no guarantee of universal applicability.  To provide some indication of 
its value, I will show how it might provide new paths of political theory and practice in 
global democratic theory that are not expert-centric, though the use of this framework 
should itself be determined contextually, plurally, and experimentally. Reconstructing 
central goals, questions, and assumptions of much political philosophy will require 
transformations in practice, and it would contradict the aims of this inquiry to assume that 
I have finally discovered what politics should look like.  Much of my project is negative, 
highlighting concepts and practices that might be avoided, but the greatest part of the 
work to be done is imaginative and experimental.  I hope to contribute to this prophetic 
task by providing practical and theoretical approaches for inquiry into political problems, 
but, as two of the most imaginative political thinkers of our times state, “The greatness of 
a philosophy is measured by the nature of the events to which its concepts summon us or 
that it enables us to release in concepts” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 34). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
POLITICS AS PUBLICS AND PROBLEMS: 
AN EXPERIMENTAL ACCOUNT OF PLURAL LEGITIMACIES 
 
In Chapter One I outlined the theory and practice of what I termed “the universal 
problematic of legitimacy” with reference to Locke and Rawls.  Theorists working within 
this framework aim to define a shared set of ends that limit the coercive power of the 
government and the claims citizens can make upon it.  Anyone who recognizes such ends 
can then legitimately criticize and reform widespread institutions.  Whether the criterion 
of legitimacy is defined by a state of nature or a shared set of political ends found by an 
overlapping consensus of reasons, Locke and Rawls agree that answering macro 
questions about the state or the basic structure of society is essential for effecting 
widespread institutional change.  In practice, however, plural people do not actually agree 
about the ends a state should express.  Finding a universal criterion requires 
interpretation, and Locke and Rawls provide few tools—besides consent and reflective 
equilibrium, respectively—that explain the ways in which people could contest expert 
understanding or deal with disagreement.  This is important because, as Marx, Pateman, 
and Sandel show, ends that look uncontroversial in the abstract may not have universally 
valid effects.  When universals are actually put into practice, they lead to partial 
inclusions and exclusions and, as I have termed it, thus require the prior consent of 
particular peoples and ends.  Rawls’s assumption of the fact of reasonable pluralism is a 
step towards pluralizing the sites of contestation of “the common good,” but I would like 
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to suggest that the further move of pluralizing legitimacy may be even more useful for 
helping people evaluate and transform problematic institutions themselves.  To flesh out 
this proposal, this chapter and the next will sketch an alternative framework of legitimacy 
that is neither universal nor relative but experimental. 
The danger the universal framework of legitimacy manifests might be described 
as a misalignment between theory and practice.  The expert-centric methodology that 
Locke and Rawls share, despite their many differences, assumes that a criterion of 
legitimacy can be defined apart from its application, and historical precedent shows that it 
often leads to effects that are not attuned to the conditions and ends of their realization.  
Of course, the unreflectively exclusionary practices this framework is likely to engender 
could result from any theoretical work, and it is conceivable that universal ends may be 
universally legitimate.  The fact of reasonable pluralism, however, gives us reason to 
think that a methodology that explicitly names the challenge of aligning theories and 
practices may be valuable in many cases, one of which I will examine in Chapter Four.  
That political choices are between different means or ends implies that politics is 
inherently exclusionary, though not all marginalized options are created equal.  I will 
describe a methodology that begins and ends with the fact of exclusion, a consequence of 
the fact of reasonable pluralism.  This may help attune theory to concrete differences and 
foster a more reflectively exclusionary politics. 
A methodological shift could occur in many ways.  Since the universal framework 
of legitimacy has guided much political inquiry and practice, I will reconstruct the goals, 
questions, assumptions, and—hopefully—practices of this account.  An experimental 
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framework of legitimacy may provide a set of theoretical tools and assumptions that help 
align theory and practice in ways that create more legitimacies than universal attempts 
would.  This is because the alternative account I develop is oriented by the premise that, 
given the fact of reasonable pluralism, no theory or set of ends can be assumed to be 
legitimate for anyone without inquiry into their concrete conditions and effects for 
specific purposes.  The goal of the experimental framework, then, cannot be to define 
legitimacy by a set of universal ends.  Instead, it seeks to find ways of letting people 
themselves evaluate their institutions by turning our attention to the conditions and 
effects of meeting their goals.  This methodology should help make the exclusions 
involved in political action explicit and point towards ways of ameliorating conflicts of 
value.  
Highlighting the question of for whom an institution, theory, mean, or end is 
legitimate allows new questions to be raised regarding existing inequalities and power 
differentials while it undercuts other concerns.  It also requires new conceptual tools for 
thinking about politics.  If, in general, the conditions and effects of realizing a value with 
reference to certain interests defines its validity, the value of political ends should be 
understood in relation to the collective action undertaken and institutions created to 
realize them.  Accordingly, John Dewey suggests that politics can be understood as 
shared problem-solving, such that, even though he rarely used the term, political 
legitimacy could be defined by the successes and failures of such undertakings.  If an 
institution is experienced as problematic, either because it does not carry out its designed 
ends or prevents people from carrying out their own ends, it might become more 
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legitimate if its reconstruction helps forward those ends or new ends deemed more 
important.  The legitimacy of an institution like the state or the economy depends upon its 
conditions, effects, and ends, which requires concrete inquiry into the experiences of 
specific people.  These might end up being universal, but this has to be shown. 
The experimental account of legitimacy does not then avoid the problem of prior 
consent raised in Chapter One; it embraces it.  Instead of trying to provide a criterion of 
legitimacy that does not beg any questions, it may be more productive to ask what 
institutions are legitimate for which people in what ways, i.e., which institutions beg the 
right questions.  I turn to John Dewey to help develop this framework of legitimacy 
because of his insights into the experimental evaluation of institutions.  Since those 
seeking answers to universal questions of legitimacy often overlook the radicality of 
Dewey’s approach, he may seem like an odd choice.14  To address the most important 
                                                 
14 When his readers understand legitimacy as a test of the state’s ends, Dewey has been interpreted as 
providing either a normative ground via an account of human nature, i.e., as a communitarian or civic 
republican (Taylor 1989; Festenstein 1997; Green 1999; Rorty 1999; Talisse 2003), or as giving an 
epistemological argument that procedurally structures the definition of ends, i.e., as a proceduralist 
(Putnam 1992; Westbrook 2005).  These interpreters are divided on the grounds upon which Dewey 
defines democracy, whether they agree with such grounds or use them to reject Dewey’s position.  A 
related and more general disagreement arises over whether or not, for Dewey, democracy needs 
philosophical foundations at all.  Rorty and others have tended to think that his politics oriented his 
philosophy (Rorty 1990; Cambpell 1992; Ryan 1995), while many more have tried to show that his 
philosophical grounds directed his political engagements (besides those listed above, see Westbrook 
1991, Savage 2001).  According to this line of questioning, interpreters are often conflicted over 
whether or not Dewey had a political agenda or a philosophical framework of democracy, as well as 
what the relationship between the two might be. 
 
It is not my purpose here to defend my use of Dewey against any and all comers, but I would like to 
suggest that there might be an experimental alternative that funds these radically different questions and 
interpretations.  Dewey was not interested in philosophically grounding democracy nor abandoning 
foundations.  His more theoretical work was not just a means of carrying out his political ends, such as 
the outlaw of war, nor were his more political engagements simply means of advancing out his 
philosophical ends, such as growth or community.   Instead, his philosophy and his politics were to aid 
experiments in ameliorating public problems, which were themselves transformatively understood as a 
result of the former.  As Michael Eldridge suggests, the Public and Its Problem was both a means of 
dealing with a situation and provided a set of ends in light of which situations could be evaluated 
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situations of his day Dewey did provide a number of solutions, such as educational 
reform, the building of communities, the importance of communication between strata of 
society.  Nonetheless, his more theoretical writings show that these should all be 
considered hypotheses for the amelioration of specific problems.  Similar problems will 
recur and general structures must be constructed to deal with them, but Dewey never 
defined legitimacy in advance of contextual experimentation nor reduced democracy to 
inquiry or community or any other catchphrase.  He created new ways of thinking about 
democracy and education that were to be cashed out by those involved in reconstructing 
particular problems.  For my purposes, more important than these specific answers is the 
framework he suggested for aligning theory and practice.   
The methodology Dewey helps outline will not provide yet another definition of 
the legitimate state but will instead show an entirely different framework in which 
legitimacy can be understood and determined.  I will not create a list of norms or 
procedures that legitimate institutions should express in order to compel assent.  In fact, it 
would be contradictory, on the very terms of an experimental account of legitimacy, to 
define what might be legitimate without reference to concrete peoples and problems.  It 
cannot even be said to be a methodology in any traditional sense, for the value of the 
experimental account of legitimacy itself should be shown by its use in ameliorating 
                                                 
(1998).  Whatever political or philosophical suggestions he made, Dewey's methodology—insofar as it 
can be called a methodology—requires that the value of either be contingent upon its concrete 
conditions and effects for specific purposes.  In fact, almost all of his most important key terms, like 
“education” or “experience,” are hypothetical means and ends rather than foundations.  This does not 
mean that we cannot give any grounds for democracy, but that defining democracy in a certain way 
should be sensitive to changing contexts.  The good Dewey / bad Dewey distinction Rorty makes 
between the cultural critic and the metaphysician (1982, 72-89) furnishes two of many possible roles 
experimental political inquiry may take.  Sometimes criticism requires new categories; sometimes 
categories require criticism.  This will depend on present needs, and these should be experimentally 
determined and evaluated. 
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specific problems.  I will not argue for this methodology in this chapter but will instead 
simply outline one of its possible shapes.  I hope to have given some reason to think that 
this account will be helpful in creating more legitimate institutions, because, as we have 
seen in Chapter One, the universal problematic of legitimacy often leads to uncritically 
exclusionary practices and endless theoretical debates.  In Chapter Four, I hope to 
provide even more reason for putting this framework into practice because of how it 
provide tools for rethinking global democratic institutions, though, on the terms of the 
experimental framework itself, this cannot be proven in theory. 
 
Human Nature and Experimental Method 
 
Before looking more specifically at ways of experimentally determining political 
legitimacy, it may be useful to begin with some probable components of experimental 
inquiry by examining Dewey's treatment of the value and meaning of “human nature.”  
Various accounts of human nature have been used to limit the coercive power of the 
legitimate state, because they provide a set of norms that appear to be both universal and 
foundational.  Dewey would be the last to deny that there are common traits of human 
biology or sociology, but the plurality of ways that a set of essential needs can be selected 
shows that labeling as human nature a certain set ends may require a different 
methodology.  Even a universal need does not tell us how, when, where, or even if it 
should be fulfilled, for there are many other competing needs, many of which may have 
little to do with our status as humans.  Since the selection of one set of traits or another is 
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undertaken for a specific purpose, such as criticizing the state, an experimental method 
would suggest that the value of such a selection should be determined by its use for that 
purpose.15  The two moves of embracing purposes and of determining their meaning by 
reference to the conditions and effects of realizing them are two central marks of 
experimental inquiry. 16  On this account, one should not assume any particular 
connection between means and ends, such as that ends are given and means must be 
experimentally sought, as in a vulgar pragmatism, or that ends are completely divorced 
from means, as is the case in much moral philosophy.  Instead, experimental inquiry 
should help explain concrete relations such as: which means are needed to meet what 
ends, what effects are the consequences of those means, and which ends might have 
better means and effects. 
Human nature has been called upon in many ways in order to criticize institutions.  
We have been said to be egoistic atoms, political animals, pleasure-lovers and pain-
avoiders, members of communities, pawns in the clashes that determine the course of 
history, wolves and sheep, particular manifestations of spirit, sociated selves, and friends 
and enemies, to name only a few.  One of the most longstanding debates over the 
definition of human nature has been the “antinomy” (FC; LW 13:111) between liberals 
                                                 
15  Many feminists have recognized that inquiry is purposive and should avow its purposes in order to 
better realize them (e.g., Smith 1987, Hartsock 1983, Harding 1987, and Collins 1990). 
16 Compare this Deweyan account of experimental inquiry to Foucault's response to the question, “What is 
Critique” (2002)?  In this lecture, which anticipates his essay which asks the question, “What is 
Enlightenment” (2006), Foucault suggests that critique may be understood as a process involving 1) 
description of current constellations of discourses and powers (archaeology), 2) description of how 
these practices came to be acceptable (genealogy), and 3) tactics of selection and engagement (strategy).  
These may mirror Dewey’s outline of experimental inquiry, which involves 1) effects, 2) conditions, 
and 3) purposes?  And, perhaps even more provocatively, they may resonate with Nietzsche’s three 
kinds of history—1) monumental, 2) antiquarian, and 3) critical—and Heidegger’s 1) present, 2) past, 
and 3) future ecstasies (Nietzsche 1997; Heidegger 1996). 
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and civic republicans.  If people are essentially self-interested and atomistic, then the 
universal validity of life, liberty, and property as well as small government follow; if 
people are altruistic and social beings, then the right of self-development and large-scale 
government intervention are necessary.  In both cases, once the state has been limited to 
its proper sphere, a number of outcomes are assumed to follow, such as the elimination of 
coercion, the creation of a stable government, or the assurance of a more just society.  In 
short, definitions of human nature are used to set the ends of the state, which, if instituted, 
guarantee certain effects.  
Either liberalism or republicanism may seem useful in the abstract, and 
proponents of each side can give examples of when the other fails, but the sheer number 
of natures people have posited gives good reason to think that we can be legitimately 
described in many ways, depending on our purposes.  This does not mean that any 
account is as good as any other.  It only implies that one account, and even the need for a 
single account, cannot be assumed.  Dewey argues that the interminable theoretical 
disputes between conceptions of human nature show that “isolation of any one factor, no 
matter how strong its workings at a given time, is fatal to understanding and to intelligent 
action” (FC; LW 13:379).  Why should a selection of a set of desires, needs, or beliefs 
have universal applicability, especially if it was created for a particular purpose?  An 
experimental methodology suggests that these purposes should be explicitly stated, to the 
extent that it is possible, if one account is to be evaluated or compared to another.  This is 
the first step towards determining the value of a definition of human nature. 
The assumption that, since many possible ends could be selected—that is, given 
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the fact of reasonable pluralism—the purposes for selecting them have no necessary 
connection to the  value of such ends is one of pragmatism’s most original contributions 
to moral and political theory and practice.  Simply because a set of ends, such as self-
preservation, are selected to limit the state and create a less coercive society does not 
mean that, when the state is so limited, less coercion actually occurs.  This may seem 
obvious but, whether or not this is explicitly assumed, the practice of moral and political 
inquiry on a universal framework often ignores the conditions and effects of fulfilling a 
purpose.  The assumption of a disconnect between facts and values and the assumption 
that universal applicability is necessary are two common causes of such practices.  
Dewey’s distinction between a value and its validity for a specific purpose is a positive 
way of stating the negative assumption that there is no necessary connection or split 
between facts and values.17  Only concrete inquiry could explain the particular 
relationships between certain facts and values.  Moral judgments cannot be assumed to 
be, for example, preferences which can be ordered and evaluated in reflection.  They are 
also “judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects; judgments 
about that which should regulate the formation of our desires, affections and enjoyments” 
(LW 4:212; emphasis and de-emphasis added). 
The second component of an experimental method, then, is to ask if selected ends, 
i.e., accounts of human nature, actually do what they are meant to do.  As Dewey 
                                                 
17  Though this methodology may raise alarm bells for those concerned about committing the “naturalistic 
fallacy,” see Williams (1983) for a skeptical account of this conceptual tool.  See Welchman (1995) and 
Pappas (2008) for an explication of Dewey’s view that, contra much moral philosophy, a moral belief is 
not a moral judgment, since the validity of a set of ends is not the same as the having of such ends.  The 
validity and meaning of a moral belief cannot be assumed and will depend upon its conditions and 
effects. 
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suggests, this involves inquiry into the conditions and effects of the actions undertaken on 
behalf of such ends.  If characterizing people as egoists is supposed to help decrease 
harm, one could investigate into whether or not this actually occurs.  Without concrete 
investigation, “[n]either competition nor cooperation can be judged as traits of human 
nature.  They are names for certain relations among the actions of individuals as the 
relations actually obtain” (FC; LW 13:142).  Instead of asking whether individuals are 
self-serving or altruistic in general, an experimentalist would ask how understanding 
certain people as competitive or cooperative in certain ways helps transform institutions 
that thwart those ends for the better.  Rather than debating if autonomy is naturally 
occurring or socially produced, one could inquire into the ways in which prioritizing 
social autonomy helps create conditions that create more social autonomy.  Looking to 
effects is also important because, as Marx, Pateman, and Sandel show, they are rarely 
universally good.  Comparing effects with purposes is a useful tool for avoiding faulty 
universalization. 
The determination of the value of conceptual tools, such as accounts of “human 
nature,” via contextual analysis in reference to specific purposes and their conditions and 
effects is not simply means-ends or instrumental reasoning.18  This is because purposes 
themselves can be evaluated by the means that further them and compared with the 
conditions and effects of realizing other purposes.  For instance, if creating more profits 
                                                 
18 While critical theorists in particular worry about the expansion of empirical methods to more aspects of 
life as Dewey suggests (Horkheimer 2004; Habermas 1983), this concern is due, in part, to the narrow 
interests that experimentalism in the form of science has hitherto served.  Science is not inherently good 
or bad but depends upon the ends served and the consequences achieved.  “The crucial problem,” then, 
“is how intelligence may gain increasing power through incorporation with wants and interests that are 
actually operating.  The very fact that intelligence in the past has operated for narrow ends and in behalf 
of class interests is a reason for putting a high estimate upon its possible role in social control, not a 
reason for disparaging it” (“Intelligence and Power”; LW 9:111). 
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for the “prison industrial complex” requires a diversion of resources that could be used 
for prison reform, the latter ends may trump the former (Davis 2003).  Which courses of 
action should be taken will depend upon a wide variety of purposes and how they may be 
achieved.  Dewey explains, “Ends have to be adjudged (evaluated) on the basis of the 
available means by which they can be attained just as much as existential materials have 
to be adjudged (evaluated) with respect to their functions as material means of effecting a 
resolved situation” (LTI; LW 12:490).  This experimental account of inquiry into ends 
cannot say authoritatively which ends or means ought to be forwarded but only 
hypothesizes that the clearer we are about our ends and means, the better the decisions we 
will be able to make.  No ends, means, or relation between the two is given. 
An experimental methodology should avoid certain common problems associated 
with appeals to human nature that neither affirm the purposes for their appeal nor 
investigate into whether such purposes are met.  First, without owning up to the purposes 
for which a set of ends is selected, one cannot explain when they are valid and when they 
are not.  This is often considered a virtue, for a universal human nature is exactly what is 
sought.   Nonetheless, Dewey suggests that presupposing that social phenomena are 
“predetermined by the constitution of human nature … is the source of serious social ills.  
Intellectually it is a reversion to the type of explanation that governed physical science 
until say, the seventeenth century: a method now seen to have been the chief source of 
the long-continued retardation of natural science.  For this type of theory consists of 
appeal to general forces to 'explain' what happens” (FC; LW 13:143).  General forces, 
instincts, desires, or beliefs—such as self-preservation, the need for security, imitation, or 
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the desire for truth—do not explain when phenomena are caused by one feature, by its 
perversion, or by another cause, for they do not provide any indication of when, where, 
and how they cause anything.  I can claim that we need small government because people 
are egoists; on the contrary, you can say that, since people’s true altruism has been 
corrupted, it is all the more imperative that elites take paternalistic action.  Without some 
kind of scope or purpose delimiting the applicability of the set of ends an account of 
human nature provides, no reason—besides subjective preference—can be given for why 
one is more valid than another. 
Second, an experimental methodology also avoids assuming that selected ends 
necessitate any effects, such as the creation of more legitimate social institutions.  History 
has shown how dangerous such assumptions can be, since they often avoid inquiry into 
the possibilities of other human natures, social institutions, and unintended consequences.  
It may be the case that a set of norms or desires does universally trump all others, but, 
according to an experimental method, this cannot be assumed.  While one form of the 
state or society is taken to be that which accords with our true nature if not perverted by 
“contingent” factors, “reference to components of original human nature, even if they 
actually exist, explains no social occurrence whatever and gives no advice or direction as 
to what policies it is better to adopt” (FC; LW 13:143).  One does not have to assume the 
mutability or permanence of any human needs to admit that they could take many 
different shapes.  This can be demonstrated in the ways that even basic needs like food 
are fulfilled in different parts of the world as well as how more complicated economic 
transactions have occurred in different times.  Human natures thus cannot necessitate any 
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social forms for they are themselves to be evaluated and transformed (“Does Human 
Nature Change?”; LW 13:287-93). 
This method is foreign to many contemporary attempts to define a set of essential 
human needs or capacities.19  Since the value of a list of human capacities will depend 
upon the circumstances in which they are used, the experimental method suggests that 
they explicitly state and are formulated for such purposes.  Which interests should be left 
out and which needs or capacities should be prioritized cannot be determined in the 
abstract from the particular purposes people have.  Any universal list risks leaving out 
some group’s interests, and it cannot determine the ordering of any preferences.  For 
instance, we may decide to decrease our food consumption for a time to increase our 
industrial and production in the future.  A list of universal needs is unlikely to help us 
understand the tradeoffs involved in such a difficult decision.  If it is to help us become 
better human beings, it should be understood as an hypothesis which is to be evaluated by 
its consequences in actually creating better human beings.  The value of such a list will 
                                                 
19  Today human nature is often either embraced in a form of Aristotelian essentialism (Nussbaum 1992; 
Sen 1999), Marxism (Gould 2004), or communitarianism (Taylor 1989).  In “Human Functioning and 
Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism” and other works, Martha Nussbaum presents a 
set of categories of human flourishing in her argument against post-structuralist skepticism about 
human nature, writing, “The idea is that once we identify a group of especially important functions in 
human life, we are then in a position to ask what social and political institutions are doing about them.  
Are they giving people what they need in order to be capable of functioning in all these human ways? 
And are they doing this in a minimal way, or are they making it possible for citizens to function well” 
(214).  It is true that radical skepticism rejects cross-cultural criticism—as if cultures were determinant 
objects—but deconstruction and essentialism need not be our only options.  Dewey combines insights 
import should be decided by reference to the conditions and effects they make possible for specific 
purposes.  An understanding of human relations is often important for coming to terms with a problem, 
but such descriptions can be deemed “essential” only when they have successfully ameliorated a 
problem.  Whether or not a set of categories “will command a very wide consensus, and a consensus 
that is fully international” (223) has yet to be determined and cannot be decided in advance.  Even if 
everyone in the world agreed on a set of ends, rights, or norms, Dewey suggests that the value of such 
agreement could not be determined without experimental inquiry into their uses for dealing with 
concrete purposes or problems.   See Ackerly (2000), Dietz (2003), for other attempts to escape the 
dichotomous uses of human nature. 
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depend upon the concrete experiences of the people involved and their reasons for 
wanting to become better human beings.  How does it help us “differentiate conditions 
into obstructive factors and positive resources … to indicate the intervening activities 
which will give the movement (and hence its consequences) a different form from what it 
would take if it were left to itself” (LTI; LW 12:494)?  Experimental questions about 
purpose, conditions, and effects may change the ways such lists are formed as well as the 
shape they take. 
Since “[h]uman beings combine in behavior as directly and unconsciously as do 
atoms, stellar masses, and cells; as directly and unknowingly as they divide and repel” 
(PP; LW 2:330); since any of the multiplicity of human needs, values, or practices may 
be “essential” depending on one's purposes at hand, an experimental methodology 
suggests that subsequent evaluation of institutions should be made with reference to these 
concrete needs and contexts.  The universal framework of legitimacy, by requiring a 
universal and foundational ground often provided by an “essential human nature,” 
prevents inquiry into the circumstances in which such an account might actually be 
appropriate.  Pluralizing and contextualizing characterizations of human nature does not 
mean that no grounds for criticizing institutions can be given, nor does it mean that just 
any can.  An experimental methodology would assume that it is only concretely and with 
reference to specific purposes that the value of a particular description of human 
relations—as well as other orienting questions, norms, and values—could be evaluated.  
This methodological postulate means that there is no single way of determining the 
legitimacy of any institution, including the state, and that any such determination should 
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occur through contextual inquiries for specific purposes.  How exactly this is to be done 
will now be examined in more detail. 
 
Publics and Problems: Experimental Method and Politics 
 
The example of Dewey’s treatment of human nature helps provide an outline of 
an experimental political methodology.  On such an account, common ends, like those 
defined by an account of human nature, should be evaluated by the concrete conditions 
and effects of realizing them.  Though there are many possibilities of realizing 
experimental methods in political issues, Dewey suggests that theories, ends, and values 
be tested in relation to the problems that publics face.20  The conceptual framework 
defined by publics and problems is a hypothesis about how institutions, beliefs, and 
practices that affect large numbers of people may be more intelligently criticized and 
                                                 
20 I use the terms “publics” and “problems” for a number of reasons.  First, a public is distinguished from 
“people” to indicate that they have some understanding of a problem and their implication in it, 
however vague.  For instance, there is a vague global public concerned about recent economic 
downturns that recognizes, correctly or incorrectly, that only central banks have the ability to fix things.  
Second, publics are ephemeral, fleeting phenomena depending upon the ways in which problems are 
understood and compete with other problems.  Rather than a monolithic public that has an opinion, 
publics are conflicted and in conflict about what is problematic and what should be done about it.  
Third, I use the term “public” to distinguish this account of political action from Habermas’s “public 
sphere” which ideally models the “ideal speech situation.”  In its dealing with a problem, a public may 
go through a wide variety of changes, many of which may not be well characterized by uncoerced 
speech.  I hope to suggest that “For whom was the problem ameliorated?” will often be a better question 
than “Was deliberation about it ideal?” 
 
Publics and problems are also useful because they name the subjective and objective poles of the 
dialectic of political change.  Problems are not “out there” waiting to be solved by technical experts.  
Nor are public values “out there” waiting to be instantiated in political institutions.  Publics have 
interests and purposes that are to be transformed and tested by problems.  Problems have materiality 
and shape that are modified and evaluated by attempts to address them.  For this reason, I want to avoid 
the language of “communities” or even “traditions,” as some thinkers sympathetic to Dewey have 
suggested (e.g., Stout 2004), just as much as I try to steer clear of any perennial problems like coercion, 
modus vivendi, or moral obligation.   
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transformed.  Today, of course, experts or elites often name and frame political problems, 
and publics are inchoate or uninformed, but this framework provides a means of 
criticizing current practices.  The more people, according to ability and need, define 
common problems, determine their purposes, and evaluate the action undertaken to 
address them, the more they take part in an experimental method, and the more valid 
political action is likely to be.21  There are no guarantees of this hypothesis, for problems 
named and directed by experts may sometimes lead to effective change.  However, since 
problems and their attempted solutions affect different peoples in different ways, it is 
unclear how expert practices could be evaluated without taking these perspectives into 
account.  Furthermore, it is uncertain how political action could be evaluated without 
people deciding which purposes are most important to them.  An experimental account of 
political inquiry should help make these purposes and the conditions and effects of 
meeting more determinate. 22 
If institutions, norms, and practices are to be evaluated by concrete conditions and 
                                                 
21  For some explication of the terminology of naming, framing, choicework, action, evaluation and other 
aspects of public action, see Matthews (2006) and Yankelovitch (1991). 
22 The Public and its Problems is not sufficiently clear on this point, perhaps because it dealt with a 
concrete difficulty—advertising, propaganda, and their effects on intelligent inquiry—and was a 
focused response to Walter Lippman's Public Opinion and The Phantom Public.  However, when 
supplemented by Dewey's other works, The Logic in particular, his experimental approach becomes 
clear.  See also William Caspary's Dewey on Democracy, which emphasizes Dewey's emphasis on 
politics as “conflict-resolution” (2000, esp.  Chapter 1), as well as Larry Hickman's John Dewey's 
Pragmatic Technology, which characterizes publics as tools created for the amelioration of problems.  
The latter writes, “many forms of political organization may function so as to exercise effective control 
of the problematic situations that call various publics—and the larger public called the state—into 
existence.”  This means that even the “state is a means of social inquiry by and for its constituents.  It is 
a constructed artifact like other tools and utensils” (1992, 172).  I will make use of these 
characterizations of publics as tools—and the perhaps ungangly plural version of the word—to aid in 
the resolution of conflicts in order to emphasize the experimental nature of social and political practice 
and theory as well as the means and ends of testing them. 
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ends, an important first step23 is to recognize that the problems that shape our purposes 
are not given.  Dewey suggests “[w]e take then our point of departure from the objective 
fact that human acts have consequences upon others, that some of these consequences are 
perceived, and that their perception leads to subsequent effort to control action so as to 
secure some consequences and avoid others” (PP; LW 2:244, cp. LTI; LW 12:491).  Since 
institutions, norms, and practices affect different people in a variety of ways, the naming 
of a problem is a political act.24  No naming of public problems can be assumed valid or 
off limits, for whether or not a set of issues is a matter for public concern should be the 
result of inquiry, not the starting point.  How a problem is first characterized is likely to 
change, as the phenomena that are first included in a description will be understood in a 
new light after further investigation.  They may be concomitants of a deeper cause, or 
they may be unconnected to the undesired consequences we experience.  Still, people's 
concerns, no matter how inchoate, should begin to frame the context within which 
courses of action can be taken and evaluated. 
A great many relationships, institutions, beliefs, and values will not be essential to 
the amelioration of a problem and are thus “private,” though a few will be a matter of 
public concern and will help reconstruct the problematic situation.  We can distinguish 
between those consequences “which affect the persons directly engaged in a transaction, 
                                                 
23  These aspects of public problem solving are inter-penetrating facets rather than parts of a stage theory, 
since, for instance, naming a problem implicates certain courses of action, while taking one path rather 
than another may refine how the problem was or should have been named.  It may not be necessary to 
explicitly carry out any of them, though the hypothesis is that each has its place in realizing more 
experimental politics. 
24  In their distinction between tame and wicked problems, Rittel and Webber (1973) suggest that the 
former can be named and solved by experts, while the very naming of a wicked problem is contestable, 
as the courses of action such naming makes possible lead to exclusions for which reasons must be 
given.  Wicked problems cannot be treated as tame problems, because what would count as a solution 
requires public contestation. 
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and those which affect others beyond those immediately concerned.  In this distinction 
we find the germ of the distinction between the private and the public” (PP; LW 2:244).  
Though whether or not a problem is itself a matter of public concern will later be 
decided, a public can begin to rule out that which is likely to be irrelevant to the problem 
as well as that which might be essential.  It should be noted that the scope of an action or 
group of actions does not necessarily correspond to its publicity.  Many actions with 
relatively widespread effects, such as those of multinational corporations, are not 
regulated to a great extent; some with few consequences, such as non-traditional 
marriages, are.  Selecting certain transactions for further inquiry is thus the first order of a 
public. This is clearly a difficult task, as almost anything could be a matter of public 
concern, and, as situations and consequences are constantly changing, what is to be 
considered a matter of public concern will change as well. 
Just as a public defines a problem, it is itself defined in relation to a problem.  A 
public “consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions 
to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically 
cared for” (PP; LW 2:245-6).    A public does not simply consist of all those affected by 
an institution, for it must first be decided what “being affected” means.  Many problems 
could affect or be caused by billions of people, so who is implicated in what ways will 
have to be more clearly determined.  There is no guarantee that any issue could affect all 
people in the same way or to the same extent.25  As there are a multiplicity of problems, a 
multiplicity of publics may form—in response to neighborhood real estate concerns, 
                                                 
25 Not even global warming is guaranteed to unite us all, for its differential effects and duties may make it 
difficult to call it by one name.  Whether or not climate changes are global has to be shown, not 
assumed. 
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catastrophic natural events, consensual sexual conduct, interstate commerce, celebrity 
fashion, animal extinction, or any other perceived issue.  Given the variety and fluidity of 
human associations and actions, public problems will arise and change as will their 
respective publics.  There is no certain public nor perennial political problems but rather 
a shifting set of issues that are to be addressed by those determined to be affected by 
them. 
In the ongoing definition of a problem and public, possible courses of action will 
arise, for “any problematic situation, when it is analyzed, presents, in connection with the 
idea of operations to be performed, alternative possible ...  consequences” (LTI; LW 
12:495).  What were once isolated occurrences now become related hypothetically so that 
certain means could be taken and ends achieved.  The application of such conceptual 
tools is always an experimental affair with no guarantees, as “genuine problems are set 
only by actual social situations which are themselves conflicting and confused” (LTI; LW 
12:492).  Clarifying these situations will help to define the tools that could ameliorate 
them, and, as courses of action are analyzed, problems themselves will change, so that, 
for example, what was once a matter of international human rights may become primarily 
a trade issue.  The definition of a problem, its possible solutions, and the public each 
determine the other.  New situations should be interpreted in the light of previous ones, 
but, since all problems and publics are different, a reliance on previous solutions may 
limit effective responses to contemporary conditions.  Publics should be careful not to let 
conceptual tools like “utility” or “rights,” the “political” and the “moral” become 
“glittering generalities,” (FC; LW 13:86) so “that the problems which exist are already 
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definite in their main features,” requiring only the application of a set of known norms or 
procedures (LTI; LW 12:487).26  Just as a public and problem are not given, neither 
should a course of action be. 
Evaluation of interpretations of a public, a problem, and potential solutions can 
become more concrete once action is actually taken, though this may involve doing 
nothing at all, constructing more hypotheses, or waiting.  First, however, who decides 
what should be done should be determined by the projected consequences.  A majority 
vote or a decision by representatives may be the best procedure, perhaps due to long-term 
concerns like the formation of citizens or the prevention of corruption, but sometimes 
non-democratic procedures may be necessary in order to achieve democratic results.27  
The distinction between democracy as a way of life and democracy as a form of 
government helps to make this point clear.  Dewey explains that “[t]he political and 
governmental phase of democracy is a means, the best means so far found, for realizing 
ends that lie in the wide domain of human relationships and the development of human 
personality.  [Democracy] is, as we often say, though perhaps without appreciating all 
that is involved in the saying, a way of life, social and individual” (“Democracy and 
                                                 
26 See Ian Shapiro's The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences for a counterpart to Dewey's 
“glittering generalities.”  While political scientists attempt to eschew normative and theoretical 
questions, “[p]olitical theorists often fail to appreciate that any claim about how politics is to be 
organized is bound to be a relational claim involving [actual] agents, actions, legitimacy, and ends” and 
appeal only to “gross concepts” (14).  This split in theory and practice, or this “flight from reality,” “is 
not without consequences for reality as we will see.  At best it marginalizes the potential effects of 
political and social criticism, and sometimes it contributes to the maintenance of oppressive social 
relations—however unwittingly” (2). 
27 This point may appear shocking to those who narrowly associate democracy understood as voting with 
political legitimacy.  Majority rule is often a useful way of dealing with problems, perhaps for the 
simple reason that it is something that everyone understands.  Nonetheless, its value cannot be assumed 
away by a hypothetical a priori, as Kant suggests.  It should be shown by its conditions or effects for 
actual problems.  Hypothesizing when majority rule or minority rule is useful should depend upon 
concrete conditions and effects. 
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Educational Administration”; LW 11:217).  State apparatuses, just like publics, are tools 
designed to deal with common problems.  Every situation is different, but certain rules of 
thumb will arise, such that one kind of problem should go to economic experts while 
another should be relegated to state legislatures.  There will always be new court cases, 
wars, and cultural issues that challenge these structures, but it should be remembered that 
the these decision-making structures are to be tested by these events and not vice versa. 
Judging whether a conflict has been sufficiently ameliorated is the final task of 
the public after action has been taken.  To tell whether or not a successful redirection has 
occurred is difficult even if the problem, course of action, and conditions of success have 
been precisely defined.  A policy put into practice is an experiment, for “(1) it represents 
the adoption of one out of a number of alternative conceptions as possible plans of action, 
and (2) its execution is followed by consequences which, while not as capable of definite 
or exclusive differentiation as in the case of physical experimentation, are none the less 
observable within limits, so they may serve as tests of the validity of the conception acted 
upon” (LTI; LW 12:502).  Any action is going to cause concrete changes, though it may 
be difficult to tell what they are, just as it is difficult to know if a problem has been well 
defined.  Further inquiry, action, and observation are likely to be necessary, for the 
solution of one problem will often create new ones—whether simply in the determination 
of the value of the changes effected or through the new ways of life produced by 
institutional reconstruction.  Though we can aim for universal legitimacy, we are likely to 
achieve far less.  This is not a fact to be lamented but a temper for superficial schemes or 
utopian dreams. 
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The gross outline of politics as publics and problems will be shaded in further, but 
I hope to have begun to clarify what an experimental political practice might look like.  
An experimental methodology for investigating shared means and ends is (1) pluralist (or 
purpose-ive) (2) contextual, and (3) experimental because the validity of public action, 
institutions, norms, or practices is determined by their (2) conditions and (3) effects in 
solving (1) publicly defined problems.  Or, as Dewey explains, “problems with which 
inquiry into social subject-matter is concerned should, if they satisfy the conditions of 
scientific method, (1) grow out of actual social tensions, needs, 'troubles'; (2) have their 
subject-matter determined by the conditions that are material means of bringing about a 
unified situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis, which is a plan and policy for 
existential resolution of the conflicting social situation” (LTI; LW 12:493).  If political 
issues are to be dealt with in their singularity, the ways of dealing with them should be 
tested by the needs at hand.  The definition of the problem and possible courses of action, 
the execution of the experiment, and the judgment of the results are, accordingly, the 
major tasks of the public. 
Before using Dewey's experimental political framework to reconstruct the 
problematic of legitimacy, a word should be said about the use of scientific or 
experimental methods in social concerns.  Though Dewey often said that scientific 
methods ought to be applied to social and political matters, this was more a matter of 
inspiration than the universal application of laboratory procedures.28  It is not the case 
                                                 
28  Even some of Dewey’s most sympathetic readers accuse him of methodological monomania (e.g., 
Boisvert 2003).  Though I believe this is a consistent interpretation, I hope, with the aid of Foucault, to 
temper some of his emphasis on scientific method, harmony, and expertise.  For this reason, I follow 
John Stuhr, who suggests that, a genealogical pragmatism (or experimentalism) should thematize the 
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that all people have to become scientists in order for problematic situations to be 
intelligently reconfigured.  Primarily, experimentalism in political practice is 
characterized by the “belief in the ability of human experience to generate the aims and 
methods by which further experience will grow in ordered richness” (“Creative 
Democracy”; LW 14:229).  Problems, ends, and means are to be defined by conditions 
and effects, and not by any supposed givens, whether they be biblical demands, current 
practices, intuitions, historical precedents, or expert knowledge.  Courses of actions are to 
be measured by their effects in people's lives, but this is far from requiring double-blind 
tests.  In short, while ends and means are usually defined by reference to concrete 
problems or purposes—though perhaps implicitly—experimentalism suggests that their 
value should be as well (EN; LW 1:15-7). 
 
An Experimental Account of Legitimacy 
 
Given the empirical methodology of social inquiry thus outlined, the problematic 
of legitimacy as traditionally understood will have to be extensively reconfigured.  
Universal legitimacy ignores purposes, conditions, and effects in defining a universal 
criterion of the state., and, on an experimental account, political legitimacy might be the 
                                                 
historical and differential conditions of particular inquiries.  “Dewey does not embrace openly these 
sorts of questions in his Logic, and thus ...  pays no explicit attention, for example, to issues of race, 
ethnicity, gender, age, class, sexual orientation, body—to issues of difference and identity and matters 
of power.  The subject of his pattern of inquiry readily appears as an abstract universal self, a subject 
from no place and no time.”  Besides Foucault’s suggestions, which I will develop in the next chapter, I 
believe that Dewey’s language of publics and problems could help foster experimental inquiries that are 
genuinely experimental, that is, attuned to their purposes, conditions, and effects.  A “pragmatism [or 
experimentalism] that refuses to forget that facts are selected rather than self-sufficient should not forget 
to attend to the differences and oppositionalities inherent in all such selection, including its own” (1997, 
113). 
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result of only one kind of valid action undertaken by people.  It might be best, then, to 
pluralize legitimacies, like truths, as “processes of change so directed that they achieve an 
intended consummation” (EN; LW 1:128).  What is just, what is right, what is legitimate, 
would simply be that which meets a public's desired goals.  Different publics will find 
different practices, institutions, or norms legitimate according to their different problems, 
for not only will circumstances and ends vary greatly, but the possible means of 
achieving certain ends will as well.  This evaluation of means, of course, will also 
determine what ends are legitimate for institutional reform, but both ends and means are 
to be evaluated with reference to public problems.  Regularities and general structures 
will arise, but the virtue of this framework of legitimacy, as opposed to the traditional 
view, is that it requires us to always ask for whom a set of practices, norms, or institutions 
are legitimate.  This, in turn, provides means of criticizing current ends and means and 
requires explanation for why certain interests are excluded. 
A number of important consequences follow from an experimental account of 
legitimacy.  First, legitimacy admits of degrees.  Not only may more legitimate courses of 
action always be found, but what is legitimate itself has to be determined in relation to 
other possible options, the past, as well as projected futures.  “To be good is to be better 
than,” not to be good as such (EN; LW 1:57).  Legitimacy is not something that is either 
had or not according to a simple criterion, nor is the answer to illegitimate situations to 
keep applying it.  Instead, a legitimate course of action is one in which the ends and 
means furthered are in some way better than those previously attempted.  This 
“betterness,” of course, is to be contextually defined.  On an experimental framework of 
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social inquiry and action, “[m]istakes are no longer either mere unavoidable accidents to 
be mourned or moral sins to be expiated and forgiven.  They are lessons in wrong 
methods of using intelligence and instructions as to a better course in the future.  They 
are indications of the need of revision, development, readjustment” (RP; MW 12:180).  
Having some degree of legitimacy is not difficult, but expanding the number or quality of 
interests met can take many attempts.  Thus, in addressing one problem, it is often useful 
to understand how the future will be affected as well as what information the past 
provides. 
Second, not only can more legitimate solutions always be found, but changing 
conditions, values, and technologies will require new approaches.  These transformations 
create new problems as well as new courses of action, for, “[w]hen we look back at 
earlier periods, it is evident that certain problems could not have arisen in the context of 
institutions, customs, occupations and interests that then existed, and that even if, per 
impossibile, they had been capable of detection and formulation, there were no means 
available for solving them” (LTI; LW 12:481-2).  New experiences make new ends and 
means possible, as well as new problems and frameworks for understanding them.  
Though many historical institutions and practices would clearly be illegitimate today, 
such as Japanese internment camps and Jim Crow laws, we should recognize that we 
have the benefit of the experience of these events.  Given the circumstances and 
knowledge of the time, internment camps may have been the best option, but the world is 
now different because of this tragic experiment.  The possibility of the widespread 
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legitimacy of any such future action is quite small.29  Rather than being content to label 
the publics of the past as morally depraved, perhaps one should try to understand exactly 
why such courses of action were carried out so that future occurrences may be 
prevented.30 
Third, and as this example shows, drawing attention to the fallible and 
experimental character of political action highlights the great possibility of tragedy.  The 
stakes are high in political matters, though we are accustomed to having the feeling of 
certainty.  An experimental account of legitimacy highlights the question: Why was it 
that such a course of action was seen as legitimate?  Furthermore, for whom was it really 
legitimate?  Despite the best of intentions, an end in actuality “may be indifferently an 
ecstatic culmination, a matter-of-fact consummation, or a deplorable tragedy.  Which of 
these things a closing or terminal object is, has nothing to do with the property of being 
an end” (EN; LW 1:83).  Just because something is desired does not mean that its effects 
will be desirable.  Making legitimacy part of an experimental methodology should at least 
help to define the reasons and conditions for failure, instead of allowing undesired results 
to be blamed on whatever is convenient, such as a minority party.  So that past tragedies 
may not have occurred in vain, a knowledge about the conditions, values, knowledges, 
                                                 
29 Note, however, that this experience can be used to create situations that are legitimate for a minority.  
Though some may draw upon the conditions of these camps and their similarities to concentration 
camps in WWII in order to decry current practices—irrespective of the aims any leaders might have to 
protect national security—others may use this information to perfect similar institutions.  The architects 
of Guantanamo Bay, for instance, were careful both to choose a site outside of U.S.  territory and to 
label the prisoners “enemy combatants,” two measures not taken in the creation of Japanese internment 
camps.  These measures stave off any immediate claims of illegitimacy, since prisoners do not fall 
under the protection of the U.S. Constitution or the Geneva Conventions. 
30  This may seem callous or shocking, but I would suggest that it might be useful to ask what purpose it 
serves to blame previous cultures and peoples.  Such avenues are potentially useful lines of inquiry, but 
they may also serve to cast a blind eye to current practices which should be ameliorated. 
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and possible courses of action of past situations is likely to be essential for intelligently 
dealing with new events. 
Finally, this pluralization and contextualization of legitimacy emphasizes the 
exclusionary character of ends served.  Though internment camps were created for the 
sake of “national security,” this really meant that Japanese immigrants were not part of 
the nation.  Such universal rhetoric often obscures its differential effects.  No matter how 
often these mantras are repeated, exclusion, “[s]elective emphasis, choice, is inevitable 
whenever reflection occurs.  This is not an evil.  Deception comes only when the 
presence and operation of choice is concealed, disguised, denied.  Empirical method finds 
and points to the operation of choice as it does to any other event.  Thus it protects us 
from conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence.”  Ignoring the necessity 
of exclusion and treating certain ends as universally valid is what Dewey calls “the 
philosophic fallacy, whether it be performed in behalf of mathematical subsistences, 
esthetic essences, the purely physical order of nature, or God” (EN; LW 1:34).  Fairness, 
equality, or tolerance may have unfair, unequal, or intolerant consequences, especially 
when they are employed as slogans and not as experimental solutions to concrete 
problems for avowed purposes.31  The dogmatic application of certain ends will blind one 
                                                 
31 In this vein, see, for example, Wendy Brown's enlightening inquiry into the many effects of the 
discourse of tolerance in her book Regulating Aversion.  She finds that this rhetoric often depoliticizes 
political relations, allowing those who are tolerant to act in the name of civilization in order to correct 
the wrongs of the intolerant, for “[a]lmost all objects of tolerance are marked as deviant, marginal, or 
undesirable by virtue of being tolerated, and the action of tolerance inevitably affords some access to 
superiority” (14).  The tolerant are not simply more advanced, but they are also more autonomous, as 
the “division into those who are said to be ruled by culture and those who are said to rule themselves 
but enjoy culture renders culture not simply a dividing line between various peoples or regimes or 
civilizations, and not simply the explanation for political conflict, but itself the problem for which 
liberalism is the solution” (20-1).  By feigning cultural neutrality, liberalism allows for the tolerant to 
make the intolerant civilized and free.  As shown by the deployment of this rhetoric in the current wars 
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to their uncontrollable and unpredictable—but also manipulable and obfuscatory—
effects.  No norm, goal, or procedure can guarantee its own value, for only through 
investigation into the consequences of ends and means can their actual value be 
determined.  To embrace the perhaps ineliminable exclusions of our political institutions, 
one should attempt to be as clear as possible about who is excluded and why. 
In short, a legitimate institution, practice, or norm works provisionally and with 
reference to the amelioration of specific problems for the sake of concrete interests.  
Thus, when taking action, what is legitimate for whom should be stated as explicitly as 
possible, instead of assuming that an expert’s selection of universal norms will have 
universally valid effects when institutionalized.  Tragedy is always possible, but the 
concrete determination of conditions, ends, means, and effects may help avoid 
uncritically exclusionary practices.  Since more legitimate courses of action have to 
improve upon existing situations, though rarely, if ever, achieving universally valid 
results, there is nothing arbitrary or uncritical about this account.  An experimental 
approach undercuts the dichotomy between de facto and de jure definitions of 
legitimacy—i.e., that might makes right or that what is determined in theory is 
legitimate—by making evaluation depend upon transformation for specific purposes.  
Legitimacy should be experimentally demonstrable, but this in no way requires the 
legitimation of the status quo or the denial of legitimacy.  I will say more about how an 
experimental account of legitimacy can provide for the criticism of ends and avoid the 
charge of relativism in the next chapter.  In the subsequent pages of this chapter I will 
                                                 
in Afghanistan and Iraq—by moderates and progressives, no less—a shibboleth like “tolerance” can 
have consequences that greatly outstrip its common sensical value. 
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show how this methodology undercuts many common objections to this account.  But 
before this, I would like to draw out some practical consequences of this framework. 
 
Increasing Legitimacy: Communication, Imagination, Transformation 
 
If institutions, practices, and norms are evaluated in terms of their conditions and 
effects in ameliorating publics' problems, it may seem that an experimental account of 
political inquiry would allow for no general structures or generalizations.  However, this 
framework is not skeptical about the value of states, rights, laws, cultural norms, markets, 
NGO's, or any other widespread contemporary institutions.  It simply suggests that their 
value should not be shown by de facto existence or de jure arguments.  Rather than 
showing how one such institution might be said to be legitimate it may be useful now to 
provide a few criteria by which more legitimacies are likely to arise.  As the experimental 
account of legitimacy I have developed has been defined in terms of publics and 
problems, increasing legitimacies often depends upon transformations of both.  For 
instance, since action can be taken on behalf of only a set number of goals, the greater the 
number of interests that actually come to determine the problem and course of action 
taken, the more legitimate it is likely to be.  Furthermore, as the interests at stake in an 
issue may have contradictory goals, the discovery of new means and ends that might 
change the framework of the problem is often central.  Finally, flexible institutions are 
typically an essential component of change, for reconstruction depends on malleable 
conditions.  Such suggestions might help open up other institutions, norms, and practices 
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to critical inquiry and show the need for reconstructing in order to deal with many 
political problems. 
First, one way of increasing legitimacy is by increasing the number of interests 
represented in the naming and framing of problems, decision-making processes, and the 
evaluation of outcomes.  This often requires reconstructing institutions, norms, and 
practices of communication so that a plurality of voices can be heard which have been 
hitherto marginalized or unrecognized.  Resolving conflicting interests is a question of 
“how conflicting claims are to be settled in the interest of the widest possible contribution 
to the interests of all—or at least of the great majority.  The method of democracy—
inasfar as it is that of organized intelligence—is to bring these conflicts out into the open 
where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they can be discussed and 
judged in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by either of them 
separately” (FC; LW 11:56).  That we rarely achieve such transparency today is often due 
to institutions that are attuned to only one set of interests, such as those of elites or 
experts.  They preclude the recognition of a broader range of values and, thus, do not 
even admit that a value conflict exists.  It is difficult for shared inquiry to occur if 
problems are not recognized, and a great step towards ameliorating issues felt by one 
public may be increasing the number of people who see the same difficulties. 
The expansion of legitimacy thus often requires institutions, norms, and practices 
that foster communication so that concerns, interests, and values can be widely 
recognized.  Much scientific research, for instance, is highly undemocratic, not only 
because its goals are directed and funded by private corporations and war machines, but, 
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more importantly, because institutions that could pluralize the interests that might direct 
them do not exist.32  In part, this may require mediating institutions that communicate and 
synthesize the results of research so that publics can evaluate trade-offs and form their 
own interests.  For this reason Dewey called Walt Whitman the seer of democracy, as he 
realized that “[p]resentation is fundamentally important, and presentation is a question of 
art” (PP; LW 2:349).  In part, there may need to be institutions that communicate public 
interests into researchable topics and funding streams.  While there are now many efforts 
to connect universities to public interests in more aligned ways,33 it is clear that schools 
cannot take all of the responsibility for this communicative work.  For instance, 
traditional and new medias may need to take on a large role as well. 
Besides creating mediating institutions, increasing communication might often 
require making more shared forms of life.  Shared understanding is made possible by 
shared action—and vice versa—for to “understand is to anticipate together, it is to make 
a cross-reference which, when acted upon, brings about a partaking in a common, 
inclusive, undertaking” (EN; LW 1:141).  If two very different people or groups of people 
need to communicate to deal with a problem, their activities often need be transformed.34  
For example, if institutions were created so that geneticists and the elderly could 
                                                 
32 Dewey emphasized that laypeople do not have to have scientific knowledge to engage in debates about 
scientific research.  They only need to understand the consequences of certain courses of action by 
connecting technical information to their lived experiences and activities.  Contrary to the realist 
assertion that laypeople lack such intelligence, the “[p]ossession of the capacity to engage in such 
activity is intelligence” (EN; LW 1:142).  If people are unable to intelligently engage in the direction of 
certain institutions, this may be an indictment of those institutions rather than any people. 
33 The field of community engagement is struggling with the question of aligning the practices of 
universities and publics.  See Boyer (1990) and the Kellogg Foundation report on the Future of State 
and Land-Grant Institutions (1999). 
34 Though many thinkers have drawn upon Wittgenstein’s conception of language games, a few have 
placed equal importance on the forms of life they structure and which are structured by them.  Changed 
practices may come from new linguistic interventions, but they may also be a result of new 
performances (see Bourdieu 1998, Butler 1990, Medina 2006). 
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communicate interests and findings, the goals, meanings, and possibilities of genetic 
research would change for both.  This does not mean that people need to have the same 
values in order to communicate, but it does entail that they should have some shared 
activities or institutions they can draw upon in order to share the same meanings. In this 
example, researchers and elderly people may need to be related as working towards the 
same goals, rather than as producers and consumers of technologies.  Communication 
thus also provides a means of criticizing ways of life that make shared inquiry very 
difficult, such as gated communities, “the bottom line,” or gender norms. 
A second concrete way of increasing legitimacy is imagining and discovering new 
possibilities for thinking and action.35  We are often stuck in old routines simply because 
we cannot conceive of any alternatives.  Communication is one way of discovering new 
potential values and courses of action, for new ways of life can arise in the unpredictable 
events that occur when we try to form bridges between different interests and peoples.  
This is shown by the fact that “[a]ll discourse, oral or written, which is more than a 
routine unrolling of vocal habits, says things that surprise the one that says them.”  When 
impasses occur in dealing with political problems, what is most lacking is often the 
“surprise” of a new way of thinking about a problem.  This may occur simply by 
including voices that have not be heard before, but it also may require expert suggestions 
for reframing issues.  The expert is not the one who knows the right answer to a problem 
but is rather the “one who has skill in making experiments to introduce an old meaning 
into different situations and who has a sensitive ear for detecting resultant harmonies and 
                                                 
35 Caspary (2000) emphasizes this aspect of Dewey’s political methodology as well.  Other thinkers who 
give imagination a central role for the amelioration of public problems include Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987, 1994), Derrida (1994), Laclau and Mouffe (2001), and Kristeva (2002). 
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discords” (EN; LW 1:152).  As I will argue in Chapter Three, Foucault is one of the best 
contemporary examples of this kind of experimental expert who makes attuned 
suggestions to concrete problems in order to imagine new ways of thinking, living, and 
valuing.   
It may seem odd to characterize imagination as a step towards creating more 
legitimate institutions, but a new situation without a concomitant response in thought is 
often highly problematic.  For instance, when industrialization drastically changed the 
ways humans interact while laissez-faire liberalism and Marxist revolution remained the 
only possible ways of construing the situation, this was an example of what Dewey called 
“cultural lag.”  Such failures of imagination “exist on a wide scale when there has been a 
period of rapid change in environment accompanied by change in what men do in 
response and by a change in overt habits, but without corresponding readjustment of the 
basic emotional and moral attitudes formed in the period prior to change of environment” 
(FC; LW 13:97).  Thus, Dewey's project in Individualism Old and New, was to cast off 
old individualistic moral habits and to begin to think of new ways of understanding 
human action in an industrialized world.  Similarly, as this dissertation tries to suggest, 
we face conditions today that do not fit the universal questions of legitimacy that 
continue to dominate much of political thought. 
The need for imagination can also go a long way to explain what is often called 
“ideology.”  Today, “[o]ur prevailing mentality, our 'ideology,' is said to be that of the 
'business mind' which has become so deplorably pervasive.”  Dewey asks, “Are not the 
prevailing standards of value those derived from pecuniary success and economic 
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prosperity” (ION; LW 5:69)?  To the extent that norms like self-interest and conspicuous 
consumption drown out alternative values, they comprise an ideology.  This definition 
separates the traditional understanding of ideology from its reference to material 
interests—which makes the identification of ideological conditions rather 
straightforward—and creates a practical problem of imagining and creating conditions in 
which more people can be involved in imagining alternatives.  Philosophers cannot be 
assumed know what is really in people's best interest, for their constructions should be 
tested by publics and their problems.  Whether or not conditions are “ideological” has to 
be shown after previous values have been demonstrated to be rigidly confining by 
reference to new conceptual frameworks that have been created.  But, as every situation 
is going to involve some reconceptualization, all problematic situations are to some 
extent ideological. 
A third way to increase legitimacy is to create new possibilities for transformation 
or growth.  Sometimes we are so mired in our habits that we cannot even disrupt them 
with sustained reflection, and communication and imagination are useless if behaviors 
cannot actually change.36  Conscious reflection is often not enough to change people's 
attitudes, actions, or beliefs when social institutions have the power to co-opt deviant 
practices or assimilate marginal discourses into their own terms.  Routine, unthinking, or 
bad habits are “so severed from reason that they are opposed to the conclusions of 
conscious deliberation and decision....  Only an environment which secures the full use of 
                                                 
36 See Shannon Sullivan's Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege.  
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.  She argues that, as white people's unconscious attitudes towards 
race show, it is not acts of will but changed environments that might interrupt the ways we think and 
act.  Of course, it is through certain kinds of communication that such working through might occur, as 
Noëlle McAfee argues (2008). 
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intelligence in the process of forming habits can counteract this tendency” (DE; MW 
9:54).  A practical problem thus arises for reconstructing institutions to foster intelligent 
change, for, as individuals are only as flexible as their environments, the possibility of 
creating more legitimate institutions, norms, and practices often hinges upon their ability 
to change. 
Dewey focused a great deal on developing teaching methods that taught children 
to “the habit of learning,” of “learn[ing] to learn” (DE; MW 9:50), but this goal applies to 
other social institutions as well.  One of Dewey's essential insights was that education, 
like Foucault's concept of power, happens constantly and everywhere—not just in the 
schools—so that the creation of environments that allow people to learn and change in 
intelligent ways should take place at many levels and in many areas.  To what degree do 
talk radio, the office cubicle, or the highway system fix habits in unproductive ways, and 
to what degree do they provide opportunities for change and for forming ways of dealing 
with new changes?  If rich blacks and poor whites have difficulty coming to terms on 
political issues, surely media, segregated neighborhoods, and educational materials that 
reinscribe stereotypes and values are often partly to blame for the lack of transformation 
on either side.  We have also seen how some political battles, like the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, have become even more entrenched through religious institutions, because these 
provide such powerful and inflexible ways of interacting with others.  Political battles 
may be won in such situations, but lasting change may require major religious 
reconstruction, a task similar to that Dewey himself attempted in A Common Faith. 
Increasing communication, imagination, and transformation are a few of the many 
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possible ways for creating more legitimate institutions within democratic societies.  
Rights discourse, for example, has been another particularly powerful tool for 
reconstructing problematic situations, though its universal rhetoric may ignore historical 
and structural forces.  Communication, imagination, and transformation place emphasis 
on how existing institutions structure the ways publics can intelligently redirect their 
affairs to a great extent.  In this way, they are “prior” to determining the legitimacy of a 
course of action and therefor allow one to ask questions about the conditions of the 
actuality of legitimacy, such as:  To what extent do specific institutions block recognition 
of certain issues that need to be ameliorated?  Which ideologies fix the terms of debate, 
and how might we imagine other possibilities?  How can a more dynamic populous be 
created through schools or medias?  Though the means of dealing with concrete problems 
will always be different, it is likely that at least one of these three common conditions 
need to be met in order to increase the legitimacy of existing practices.  The existence of 
communication, imagination, and growth, however, cannot guarantee legitimate effects.  
Whatever courses of action are taken may always fail. 
These three criteria additionally show that the creation of more legitimate 
situations often depends on experts and cannot happen simply through “public” 
deliberation or decision-making.  As I will spend much more time showing in the next 
chapter, their expertise is often a prerequisite for decision-making or deliberative 
processes.  Artists or philosophers may be needed to imagine new frameworks in which 
communication might occur or ways of life in which we might take part.  Executive 
decisionmakers might have to make structural changes or limit media representations in 
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order to make shifts that make conscious reflection effective.  Psychoanalysts may need 
to suggest ways of understanding traumas that prevent peoples from engaging in mutual 
education.  The work of experts in all of these cases should be held accountable to people 
in their efforts to deal successfully with problems, but they show that creating legitimate 
conditions sometimes requires actions that are initially illegitimate. 
 
Moral Obligation, Modus Vivendi, and Coercion 
 
Having outlined an alternative account of legitimacy as well as some of the 
practical problems it often entails, it remains to be seen the ways in which questions and 
concerns associated with the traditional problematic might be dealt with on these terms.  
When are people morally obligated to obey the state?  How can stability be ensured?  
When is coercion legitimate?  On an experimental account, these questions cannot be 
answered apart from the conditions and effects of dealings with public problems.  
However, such an approach is unlikely to satisfy those who accept the universal 
framework of legitimacy, for, if there is no one principle that qualifies the legitimate 
state, how can we be sure that people are morally obligated to respect it?  If what is 
legitimate is simply “what works,” why can't I revolt if it doesn't work for me?  How 
does the experimental account of legitimacy prevent the coercion of minorities—or of the 
masses by a minority elite?  Though I do not deny the potential importance of these 
questions, I will suggest that, just as there is no problem of legitimacy in general on the 
experimental view, there is no problem of coercion, modus vivendi, or moral obligation 
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in general.  There are some general ways of increasing legitimacy, as we have seen, but 
their value is to be experimentally evaluated.   
As we saw in Chapter One, the universal framework of legitimacy is often 
motivated by and informs questions of moral obligation, modus vivendi, and coercion.  In 
order to motivate a duty to the state even when we do not get our way, philosophers try to 
find a criterion that distinguishes a legitimate state from one we need not obey.  People 
are morally obligated to obey laws and governments made according to universally valid 
norms or procedures, and the state can coerce those who are confused about what their 
obligations are.  If such norms or procedures cannot be found, the worry is that individual 
action, though perhaps temporarily creating peaceful conditions, will eventually be 
guided by self-interest.  Modus vivendi compromises are the only alternative.  Finally, 
since the state has the authority to coerce dissenters—and indeed, must do so if society is 
to be stable and if people are to live according to laws they made—one must be 
exceedingly careful about the grounds of such coercion.  If the state does not express 
common ends, it is coercive and against its people's true interests, no matter what their 
interests may appear to be. 
On the experimental account of legitimacy, however, these concerns should be 
contextually investigated with reference to concrete purposes.  Instead of assuming that 
we need an account that could compel the assent of a person in general, the experimental 
framework suggests one asks why these people keep breaking that law here and now.  
What is causing those people's experience of illegitimacy, and what, if anything, can be 
done about it?  General questions about moral obligation, modus vivendi, and coercion 
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may help create more legitimate institutions, norms, and procedures, but an experimental 
account would suggest that this should be determined experimentally, that is, with 
reference to concrete purposes, conditions, and effects.  If the concrete purposes for 
asking such questions are not affirmed, it is difficult to understand the differential effects 
of answering them, and it is easy to assume that one's favorite answer has better effects 
than it actually does.  Rather than dealing with a situation on its own terms and doing the 
real work required to reconcile interests, political treatises are often concerned to find 
answers to questions without asking for whom they are actually answers.  And ignoring 
the concrete effects of realizing particular ends often silences alternative interests, as 
Marx, Pateman, and Sandel show. 
For instance, in trying to justify eminent domain to people who do not want their 
property confiscated, it is quite possible that they will not be compelled to be morally 
obligated in actuality.  This does not mean that one can simply say that they are “beyond 
the pale,” since we have theoretically demonstrated the validity of such confiscation.  
Determining the validity of such action is likely to be a complicated process involving 
deliberation, expert knowledge of past situations, mutual education, etc.  Judging them to 
be “beyond the pale” is not as simple as referring to a criterion “we” know to be right.  It 
is possible that the most legitimate course of action is to minimize the number of such 
occurrences.  Experimental legitimacy, being a matter of degrees, can always be 
increased, though such actions may never be morally binding for its victims.  This is a 
reality that should be addressed in concrete ways, such as by creating more 
communicative institutions between people and the government, instead of justified 
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solely by reference to “universal ends.” 
Avoiding general questions about stability does not necessitate prudential 
compromises between incommensurable or irreconcilable communities or interests.  
Compromises are a part of life.  Some are lasting, some are not.  Assuming that all 
compromises will lead to instability makes it difficult to intelligently deal with situations 
in which compromises are the most legitimate course of action.  Opposed parties may 
become less opposed if dialog occurs, or a compromise itself may lead to situations that 
reconcile those interests by creating new forms of life.  Whether or not a compromise is 
problematic has to be determined by the publics affected by that compromise themselves.  
If a compromise is unstable, the only stable option may be to reconstruct the interests of 
both sides, not to demand that they both accept an expert’s favorite interest.  This is not 
an easy task, made even more difficult by religious entrenchment, for example, and may 
require the resources of theoretical analysis of values—such as appeals to fairness, truth, 
or community—but it may not.  Drawing attention to particular effects of religious 
discourse may already begin the task of reevaluating priorities as well as imagining new 
practices and meanings. 
Finally, rejecting the assumption that a universal criterion for limiting the 
coercive power of the state will necessarily create less coercive conditions does not rule 
out reducing coercion in concrete ways.  Many theorists assume that if the state is not 
legitimate for everyone in the same ways and for the same reasons, then unlimited 
violence against minorities may follow.  I have suggested, however, that asking for whom 
specific state actions, laws, or rulings are legitimate may be a more effective way of 
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creating more legitimate institutions.  This is because “universal” criteria often have 
particular conditions and effects.  An experimental account of legitimacy may be best 
able to show when institution, norm, or practices are illegitimate for a group of people, 
and thus point to concrete ways of reconstructing them.  Questions of coercion would 
thus be situationally answered and evaluated, and they need not be centered on the state.  
It may be that be that by creating more flexible institutions that a great deal of coercion 
could be lessened. 
In short, the experimental framework of legitimacy undercuts the questions of 
moral obligation, modus vivendi, and coercion associated with the universal problematic.  
If there is no problem of legitimacy in general, there is also no problem of moral 
obligation, modus vivendi, or coercion in general.  One should thus look to specific 
regions where laws are not being followed, where compromises are being broken, or 
where people are being coerced, and these are certainly not the only, or even primary, 
questions we might have to ask.  I have suggested a provisional general question—i.e., 
why does a certain group of people experience the effects of certain institutions as 
illegitimate, and what can be done about it—but this formulation points inquiry to 
particular concerns so that generalizations and questions are answerable to concrete 
practices.  Whether utilitarian, communitarian, or contractarian, answers to the traditional 
question of legitimacy just like its motivating questions may play a part in solving public 
problems, but this cannot be known or decided without investigation into conditions and 
effects.  Creating more legitimate practices may be better achieved by beginning with 
actual peoples and the ways they are trying to restructure their lives.   
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Beyond the State 
 
The universal framework of legitimacy often ignores the fact of reasonable 
pluralism because, since universal consensus does not exist in practice, it must resort to 
question-begging means of defining common ends.  To pluralize investigation into ends, I 
have used Dewey to suggest a different methodology for evaluating public institutions, 
practices, and norms.  In order to avoid assuming any particular relationship between 
ends and means, an experimental methodology proposes that the purposes for which 
institutions, practices, or norms are created should be tested against the conditions and 
effects of realizing them.  When it comes to political ends and means, Dewey suggests a 
conceptual framework of publics and problems.  Publics begin with a selective naming of 
the causes and effects of a problematic situation, frame certain solutions, carry out some 
action, and then judge the transformations that result, so that what is legitimate will 
depend upon the public and the ends they want to meet.  The value of philosophical tools, 
such as questions about moral obligation or the presumption of incommensurable 
differences, just like artistic creations or scientific hypotheses, are to be judged by publics 
in their engagements with problems. 
One consequence of this account is that it draws attention to the concrete ways in 
which particular institutions are legitimate for specific groups or interests.  These 
questions are not possible on the universal model, since it assumes that legitimacy is 
either universal or non-existant.  Theorists have tried many different ways of inventing 
different universal conceptions of legitimacy, or showing procedures by which such 
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conceptions could be reached, but they have no way of asking how these criteria can be 
evaluated.  An experimental account of legitimacy aims at providing just such a set of 
questions by assuming that legitimacy is not universal and by providing a methodology 
for showing the ways in which legitimacies occur.  This account does not deny that such 
inquiry is exceedingly difficult, yet the plurality of different ways that “universal 
legitimacy” has been defined suggests that an approach that embraces purposes and 
practices may have effects that are more attuned to the plurality of practices and 
purposes. 
An experimental framework is not just a methodology, for it suggests a few 
general ways of increasing legitimacy.  For instance, one could increase the number of 
interests served by trade institutions.  The problem, of course, is bringing these interests 
into the conversation about the legitimacy of such major structuring forces, though I have 
made a few suggestions for some common ways to do so.  If people cannot 
communicate—in the richest sense of the word—it is unlikely that they could come to 
recognize the same problems, let alone agree on any important matters.  Modus vivendi is 
certain to occur when people have nothing in common and have no way to form shared 
experiences, as the topography of many American cities today makes clear.  If people 
cannot imagine any other frameworks—whether due to a lack of conceptual resources or 
the rigidity of existing institutions—increasing legitimacy beyond the status quo will be 
very difficult.  Finally, if institutions and peoples cannot change, they will be unable to 
react to the novel situations, peoples, beliefs, values, and ideas they ought to face.  More 
needs to be said about how conflicts of interest can be solved in practice, of course.  In 
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Chapter Three, I will go into greater detail regarding some ways in which effective 
institutional critique and transformation is likely to occur.  In Chapter Four, I will provide 
a concrete case in which these tools may be of some use. 
It may be objected that my definition of legitimacy is no less universal or abstract 
than any previous accounts.  I readily admit that this may be a possibility but argue that 
this should be judged in terms of its concrete effects, not its dissertation form.  Since the 
problem with the universal problematic of legitimacy is its likely consequences and not 
any logical errors it may have committed, my alternative should not be judged primarily 
in theory either.  I hope that, like other experimental concepts such as “experience” or 
“power,” the experimental understanding of legitimacy will result in changed practices.  
Whether or not abstract definitions are good or bad may not be able to be determined in 
abstraction from particular problems.  It is of course possible that a universal foundation 
for the state will be found, but the endless conflict between these accounts indicates that a 
more contextual and pluralist approach will have better results, as it will allow one to take 
the effects of theory, norm, or procedure into an account of its value.  I hope to have 
given some reason for this approach in Chapter One, though the more concrete analysis 
in Chapter Four will more concretely evaluate these two frameworks. 
If this alternative account of legitimacy seems too utopian, as Dewey's call for a 
more intelligent political practice appeared to many people, I would argue that it more 
accurately describes what we already do and could do better.  People do not construct 
hypothetical situations to judge the validity of their institutions except when problems are 
experienced.  The power of Locke's or Rawls's theories comes not primarily from the 
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arguments for them but the effects they have for people's problems.  Two of the greatest 
tasks in everyday political practices, then, are creating ways to make recognition of 
problems wide enough for their effective amelioration and providing means for their 
naming, framing, and solution to be open to contestation.  Since neither militant 
fundamentalists nor isolated academics can determine what our problems really are, any 
intolerable conditions experienced by anyone is a candidate for larger concern, and 
whether or not the need or resources for dealing with such issues exist is for future 
publics to judge.   
Whether or not people are intelligent enough to understand and evaluate such 
problems cannot be determined in the abstract from concrete conditions either.  If people 
are to have control over their lives, they should start by taking control over their lives—
according to need and ability, of course.  It is obviously the case that no human could be 
involved in understanding and evaluating every public problem that affects them, but this 
simply means that solutions will have to take this reality into account.  Experts will have 
increasingly important roles to play in political affairs, but the final arbiter of success or 
failure will have to come from people's lived experiences and needs.  That people are not 
transparent to themselves and require experts for this task as well simply adds another 
layer of complexity to the work of defining and solving problems, but there is no reason 
to despair of this task.  In fact, judging from the miserable conditions resulting from 
millenia of expert rule, there is good reason to think that more democratic practices will 
lead to more democratic results.  Usually when it is said that people are too stupid to 
understand the forces that determine their lives, the effect is to protect one of these very 
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forces.  Dewey's faith in human potential, rather than being naïve, is far from being 
disproved. 
It is true that the pragmatic approach I have outlined presents more difficult tasks 
for political practice than have been assumed by much political theory.  Like genealogy, 
the amelioration of shared problems is a “gray, meticulous, and patiently 
documentary”—as well as experimental and social—labor (Foucault 1980, 139).  
Answers are not given in advance, expert experience is not prioritized, and certainty is 
not an option.  Local knowledge, public discovery, transformative communication, 
growth, and hypothesis formation and testing characterize this approach.  The wasted 
resources of academic infighting spent on trying to solve insoluble problems may be 
better used in the imaginative reconstruction of problematic institutions, as they need all 
the help they can get.  Deweyans no less than other theorists have been guilty of ivory-
tower abstractionism, but I hope to have shown that Dewey provides resources for 
rethinking political theory and practice more radically than many have realized. 
Part of the revolutionary nature of this approach lies in its broadening of the scope 
of legitimacy and the space of public problems, though, due to the universal problematic 
of legitimacy's focus on the state, I have had to limit my examples.  However, it should 
be clear that any institution, action, belief, practice, or value could be subject to questions 
of legitimacy.  The state is just one of many structures that educate, control, and norm 
ways of life.  We do not consent to the state just as we do not consent to export 
processing zones or heteronormative practices, but there are ways to reconfigure these 
institutions in which we take part.  Just as it makes little sense to define the legitimate 
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state as such, there is no fair trade relation or non-violent gender/sex norm as such.  
These structures should be reconstructed according to the needs of particular peoples.  
Any number of relations or norms could be good, so it is only by concrete analysis that 
we might know which really are appropriate. 
An experimental account of legitimacy is not utopian in one final way.  The 
resources are already being spent, institutions are already being reconstructed, but it is 
narrow interests that are currently in control.  Dewey asks, “Is not the problem at the 
present time that of securing experts to manage administrative matters, other than the 
framing of policies?  It may be urged that the present confusion and apathy are due to the 
fact that the real energy of society is now directed in all non-political matters by trained 
specialists who manage things, while politics are carried on with a machinery and ideas 
formed in the past to deal with quite another sort of situation” (PP; LW 2:312).  If people 
are to have control over their lives, political theory will have to move from the nation 
state to the rhizomatic territory of multinational corporations, population flows, and 
cultural capitals.  This is not an impossible task—at the very least requiring an increase in 
interests represented—for, to a great extent, the means of more democratic control 
already exist. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CRITICISM AND THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL INQUIRY 
 
As we saw in Chapter One, the universal problematic of legitimacy that requires 
universal ends for the limitation and criticism of widespread institutions like the state 
risks resorting to experts to do the work of reconciling value conflicts.  Since there are no 
clear universal ends, experts need to invent them.  Moreover, because the goals and 
questions the universal framework asks are premised upon such a set of ends, theorists 
accepting this account rarely provide resources for asking for whom the set of ends 
invented by experts are actually legitimate, as Locke’s tacit consent and Rawls’s 
reflective equilibrium show.  To begin to find an alternative to this expert-centric 
framework of legitimacy, I have used Dewey to provide some suggestions of ways in 
which institutions could be evaluated that are attuned to plural purposes and interests.  If 
expert suggestions are judged by their use in reconstructing institutions to create more 
legitimate responses to public problems, the kinds of exclusions Locke’s human nature 
validated might be better avoided.  Since philosophers and other experts do not determine 
the ends of legitimate institutions on an experimental framework, in this chapter I will 
provide one suggestion for how their roles might be usefully understood.   
One way that the difference between practices of expertise bound up with the 
universal and experimental frameworks can be shown is through their differing practices 
of critique.  Though accounts of critique have varied widely, the universal framework 
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assumes that political problems can be solved hierarchically.  There is a division of labor 
between the theorist who demonstrates the validity of certain norms or procedures and 
the critic who actually applies them to specific institutions.  According to the 
experimental method, however, this account of theory and practice is misguided for two 
main reasons.  First, the plurality of possible ends suggests that their value cannot be 
determined in the abstract from their application.  Means need not determine ends, but a 
strict separation between conditions, effects, and ends cannot be assumed.  Second, if 
ends always determine means, practice has no way to revise theory on account of new 
situations and the results of previous experiments.  New events may require new theories, 
values, and procedures, yet the theorist, abstracted from all this, can only continue to 
trace out new ideals for “our” intuitions. 
An experimentalist, however, hopes to realize a different relation between theory 
and practice, a different kind of criticism.  If legitimacy is to be determined 
experimentally, experts are those who describe a public or problem in such a way that 
successful reconstructions can occur.  Accordingly, an experimental practice of criticism 
is not an application of known values undertaken by any one critic or group of activists, 
but is rather a public's identification, transformation, and evaluation of a problem in 
which a theorist takes part.  On the experimental account, theorists and activists 
participate on the same level, in a dynamic relation oriented to a public problem.  Who 
might be an expert will depend upon how their knowledge of past histories and present 
needs helps a public with future amelioration.  Since expert knowledge is functional and 
not definitional, the way experts use their knowledge ought to be attuned to these 
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concrete functions.  Theory should arise from and be tested in practices so that, instead of 
being prior to critique, theory is actually just one part of the work of criticism carried out 
by people.  Accordingly, I would like to suggest that widespread and extensive 
institutional reform may help theorists become more effective in helping publics deal 
with their problems, though it is not my place to say what these changes should be in any 
kind of detail.37 
Michel Foucault exemplifies an experimental expert, as he has always worked to 
deal with situations or problems that are “intolerable,”38 though the dominance of the 
hierarchical, one-directional understanding of political theory and practice has led to his 
being misunderstood in two ways.  Since many theorists believe that criticism is the 
application of universal values, they accuse Foucault of either surreptitiously importing 
some universal norms or of having no basis for criticism.39  Critics and activists, used to 
having certain criteria and courses of action, blame Foucault for not providing any 
answers to the questions he raises.  These charges presuppose a relation between theory 
and practice that Foucault explicitly rejects.  Whether or not a criticism is critical does 
not depend upon the correct deployment of a set of concept or values on the experimental 
model.  Instead, criticism is determined by the having of critical effects.  If, for instance, 
The Birth of the Clinic creates a new problem space in which reformers, doctors, patients, 
and administrators can create better medical practices, than it may be considered part of a 
                                                 
37 The reasons for this reticence should become clearer in the course of the chapter.  I hope to open up a 
different way of thinking about the institution of political theory, though the way to deal with this 
“problematization,” as Foucault would call it, cannot be answered by me or any other theorist without 
concrete dialog and experimentation by theorists and activists themselves.  Outreach programs at some 
land-grant universities and interdisciplinary centers at many universities are working through different 
ways of addressing these issues. 
38  See Glucksmann (1992, 336–339). 
39 See Habermas (1990), Walzer (1988), Fraser (1985), Rorty (1990). 
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critical enterprise.  If it fails to do anything like this, it is an instrument without a use.  
Abstract questions about how criticism is possible—Does it require an outside 
perspective?  Does it require a set of universal criteria?  Can it avoid relativism and 
essentialism?—are therefore only important to the extent that they aid in creating critical 
transformations. 
Foucault provides only a few examples of how intellectuals could take part in 
more effective criticism before he died, and he recognized that the solution to any given 
problem will not require the language of power or an archeology of epistemes.  
Nonetheless, his historical and differentiated approach attempts to realize an 
experimental relation of theory and practice wherein experts create new 
“problematizations” for publics to use and evaluate.  As the world is exceedingly 
complicated and growing more so every day, and as most problems are usually only 
vaguely or clumsily felt in the first instance, the main task of the intellectual is to help a 
public define itself and its problem.  This often involves helping to find ways for 
marginalized voices to be heard, inventing new frameworks or concepts, or showing the 
ways in which institutions block intelligent redirection.  Because successful criticism 
depends upon intelligent action directed toward particular purposes, an historical sense 
and an attunement to differences is often vital.  The conditions that now exist were 
themselves responses to past problems, so understanding what ways of life have been 
made possible by what relationships may be essential for reconstructing these inherited 
structures.  Legitimate situations are to be formed and evaluated through the 
transformation of previous solutions that were made possible by prior problematizations. 
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There are other roles experts can take to help publics deal with their problems 
besides problematization, though, on an experimental account, their expertise should be 
determined according to the conditions and effects they make possible for public action 
in addressing a problem.  Artists, psychoanalysts, journalists, bureaucrats, and educators 
might all have different positions to play given an experimental framework.  However, 
since publics need problematizations to understand themselves, their problems, and the 
possible ways things could be different, I will emphasize this role, which may have 
import for political philosophers in particular.  Since Foucault usually made assessments 
of his work in interviews instead of his books, I will have to draw heavily upon the 
former while making reference to the goals and effects of the latter.  I hope to show that it 
is useful to understand his work within a broadly experimental framework, though he 
adds much to a experimental relation of theory and practice by virtue of his own situated, 
local, and experimental practices.  Finally, like the previous chapter, I will set this 
account off from the universal understanding and practice of criticism, though I will not 
argue for it here.  Any reference to other theorists is simply to help characterize this 
experimental framework.  The use of this methodology will itself have to be proven by its 
effects, of which I will provide some indication in the next and final chapter. 
 
Specific and Universal Intellectuals: Problematization or Proximity to Truth 
 
To begin to see how Foucault experimentally reconfigures the practice of 
criticism, and, accordingly, one role of experts in creating more legitimate institutions, it 
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will be useful to start with his contrast between two norms of expertise: the expert as 
spokesperson for universal truth and the expert as  “specific intellectual.”  The former 
embodies a very different relationship between theory and practice than the latter in terms 
of her knowledge, actions, and goals.  The universal intellectual assumes that the validity 
of norms can be determined apart from their effects—either by analyzing intuitions, 
representing communities, or generating lists—so that criticism is the mere application of 
these ends to problematic institutions.  Given an experimental account of the evaluation 
of values, however, which does not assume that problems can be defined in the same 
ways or involve the same choices, the validity of any theoretical work cannot be assumed 
to be separated from its conditions, effects, and purposes.  Thus, the specific intellectual 
who hypothetically outlines possible ways of understanding a problem for a specific 
purpose should take the place of the universal theorist who provides a single program for 
dealing with all problems.  By working to help specific people understand certain 
problems better, a specific intellectual has a concrete purpose and context within which 
her theorization can be evaluated. 
Foucault contrasts the specific intellectual with the “universal intellectual,” the 
man of science born in the Enlightenment, whose proximity to truth provided technical 
and moral expertise.  Like the man of god, the universal intellectual had access to—or at 
least approached—natural laws; unlike the church fathers, however, he had a new kind of 
technical knowledge as well.  He “spoke, and was acknowledged the right of speaking, in 
the capacity of master of truth and justice” (“Truth and Power,” 126).  Truth and justice 
are represented by this persona as the domain of scientific knowledge, and the moral 
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validity of scientific knowledge was guaranteed by its status as natural law.  That is, the 
universal application of this knowledge could be assumed to be valid, because the 
scientific method guaranteed its truth, hiding behind this world of appearances.  Whether 
a Comtean social scientist or a Marxist historical materialist, the universal intellectual 
merely had to transcribe these universal laws, so that administrators and managers—the 
“merely competent instances in the service of the state or capital” (127)—could apply 
them.  On this “trickle down” model of expertise a select group of people have access to 
truth and justice, while others merely instantiate their universally valid knowledge.  
These applications have no bearing on the validity or formation of universal norms or 
procedures.   
Whether or not such expert knowledge has ever existed, the one-directional 
practice of universal expertise dangerously assumes that experts are universally 
representative.  Foucault affirms a different model of expertise that has arisen since 
terrifying scientific “advancements” like the atomic bomb have led many to question this 
belief.  If, according to an experimental methodology, the validity of scientific 
knowledge depends upon the purposes to which it is put, experts should be more attuned 
to the practices in which their work has meaning.  Not Marx but Oppenheimer 
exemplifies the “specific intellectual” who has “become used to working...  within 
specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate 
them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university, family and sexual 
relations)” (“Truth and Power,” 126).  Note that the specificity of the specific intellectual 
is not determined by the setting in which she works or the conceptual tools she uses but 
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by her participation in an experimental endeavor to ameliorate public problems.  These 
problems determine the specific intellectual’s purpose, which, rather than being the 
marker of contingency, is a condition for valid knowledge, for the value of any expertise 
depends upon the needs it is meant to satisfy.  The knowledge to create atomic bombs or 
incite proletarian revolution is valuable if one wants to kill millions of civilians, but this 
is likely to be a goal that few share.  
A specific intellectual's work, then, is engaged in a different set of practices than 
those of the universal expert.  Though it should respond to actual problems and needs and 
be evaluated by how she helps them be addressed, existing problems are often not clear 
or, what is more likely, are imperfectly problematized by conceptual apparatuses 
developed for prior situations—what Dewey called “cultural lag.”  Thus, a great deal of a 
specific intellectual’s work may be bringing new tools and new possibilities for publics 
dealing with these new felt problems, which Foucault calls “problematization.”  It is an 
expert’s “problematization that responds to these difficulties, but by doing something 
quite other than expressing them or manifesting them: in connection with them, it 
develops the conditions in which possible responses can be given; [problematization] 
defines the elements that will constitute what the different solutions attempt to respond 
to” (“Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,” 118).  As many public problems involve 
conflicting values, unrepresented voices, old vocabularies, or sedimented institutions, 
new problematizations may be needed to change the space of a problem as initially 
given.40 
                                                 
40  Only a few of Foucault’s readers prioritize his work on problematization (Rajchman 1984); Koopman 
forthcoming; see also Deleuze and Guattari 1994), many preferring to split his work into three parts and 
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The value of a problematization is not guaranteed by any institution of expertise, 
like the university, but is tested experimentally and with reference to concrete problems 
and points of view.  Whether or not an expert has usefully helped to name and frame a 
problem and its public—that is, whether or not she is an expert—can be shown by the 
transformations she makes possible.  Unlike the universal intellectual, whose work is 
legitimated by her proximity to truth, Foucault declares, “I am an experimenter and not a 
theorist....  What I've written is never prescriptive either for me or for others—at most it's 
instrumental and tentative”  (“Interview with Michel Foucault,” 240).  So-called 
“laypeople” might create useful problematizations, just as much as a natural event, new 
technology, or linguistic practice could.  And, of course, the already existing economic 
problematization an economist might provide, the rhetoric of human rights that an ethics 
professor brings, or the dichotomous picture a journalist portrays could be highly useful.  
As an expert in discourse analysis, Foucault's work is not essentially different from any 
of these practices.  He simply brings another set of tools to the reconstruction of 
problematic situations, though, unlike many problematizations, the specificity or 
purposiveness of his work should help prevent it from being universally applied. 
Thus, despite Foucault’s skepticism about expertise, he does not suggest that we 
                                                 
then trying to understand how all the pieces fit together (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, Han 2002, Oksala 
2005, Paras 2006).  As Foucault makes clear in interviews and lectures after Discipline and Punish, 
however, inquiries into knowledges, powers, and the ways of thinking and acting their interplays make 
possible—not simply upon ourselves—are simply different aspects of subjectivization/objectification 
(see also Deleuze 1984).  While his different books may emphasize certain facets of this unity, my 
emphasis on problematization and genealogy does not imply a deprecation of archaeology.  If I do not 
highlight this later term, it is because of the structuralist connotation it has unfairly been given, though 
problems and power cannot be completely separated from issues of discourse.  In the end, my purpose 
is not to argue for one reading over all others.  Rather than uncovering the true Foucault, I think it is 
more useful to ask what uses his ideas make possible (see Scott 1996; McWhorter 1999; Miller and 
Rose 2008; Rabinow 2003; Hacking 1998; Davidson 2001).   
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embrace or reject experts.  The task is to engage their problematizations in the right ways, 
by looking at the effects they make possible rather than assuming their universal validity.  
As he well recognized, institutional structures often make it difficult for anyone other 
than a handful of specialists to interpret and direct the amelioration of problems.  
Specialists then appear to be experts, as the problem space imposed on a public offers no 
alternative problematization.  On an experimentalist model, one cannot assume a specific 
problematization can be applied universally.  If “truth isn't outside power or lacking in 
power,” if it “is a thing of this world” (131)—that is, if it is often exclusionary, interested, 
purposeful—tempering the partial exclusions and values bound up with any specialist's 
position cannot be achieved by ignoring them but by paying attention to the specific ways 
that their knowledge structures the analysis and transformation of particular problems.  In 
part, this may be achieved by being as concrete as possible about the purposes one wishes 
to serve.  In part, institutions that maintain the domination of a particular discipline or 
problematization may need to be reconstructed so that other problematizations may be 
attempted.  
Foucault, of course, only provided a few ways for thinking about political 
problems beyond the state and its political parties, the economy and rights, and other 
entrenched problematizations.  Given the demands of effective problematization, it is 
staggering that he was able to become an expert on the many issues in which he was 
involved.  That he is so exceptional may show the problematic character of institutions of 
expertise that reproduce unimaginative and narrow ways of thinking and acting.  The fact 
that he hadn't “written a single book that was not inspired, at least in part, by a direct 
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personal experience,” lends plausibility to the possibility that it is because of Foucault's 
extra-academic experiences that he was able to move beyond many inherited 
problematizations.  If the “experience through which we grasp the intelligibility of certain 
mechanisms (for example, imprisonment, punishment, and so on) and the way in which 
we are enabled to detach ourselves from them by perceiving them differently will be, at 
best, one and the same thing” (“Interview with Michel Foucault,” 244), perhaps one 
should ask what sort of experiences the university, the academic journal, or the 
philosophy conference allow many theorists to have today.  Furthermore, what 
problematizations and what forms of expertise do they make possible?41 
 
Problematization as Effective History 
 
If, on the experimental account of legitimacy, the work of a specific intellectual 
may involve helping to define a possible problem space so that people can understand 
and address their felt needs, what, more positively, does it take to do so successfully?  
Foucault suggests that, above all, problematizations should be genealogical, i.e., 
perspectival and historical analyses of practices that are attuned to differences.  Avoiding 
the one-directional and non-genealogical work of universal intellectuals which ignores 
the differences between problems is both a negative and a positive task, and many of the 
terms Foucault employed show the nature of this move.  The concept of power, for 
example, does not require that it be the primary tool of analysis in every situation.  
Instead, it provides a way of analyzing specific situations by asking exactly how powers 
                                                 
41 See footnote 33. 
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are enacted in specific institutions and how these might be changed for certain purposes.  
Similarly, the language of events should help develop an attunement to the differences 
among and similarities between contexts that should help to understand what the present 
may require, rather than subsuming it under the language of the past.  The conceptual 
resources of power and events should assist specific intellectuals with their shared 
engagement in public problems, by attuning their work to the purposes it is meant to aid.  
There may be many other ways for intellectuals to help people engage their problems 
more effectively, but, by paying attention to the differences and similarities between 
previous situations and actions taken to address them will often be a part of successful 
problem amelioration. 
The ontology of events is the first way that Foucault breaks from universal 
problematization, as it requires an attention to discontinuities—not just continuities—as 
well as the plural causes that have formed the present.  Discontinuities have to be given a 
place in contextual analyses, because uncritically assumed continuities level the 
differences that face peoples and their problems.  This does not mean that institutions are 
discontinuous rather than continuous, but that careful analysis of the ways that practices 
are iterated and interrupted is often essential for understanding present relations (“Truth 
and Power,” 114).  Avoiding recourse to concepts that define an original and persevering 
power, such as “self-interest,” “class struggle,” “tradition,” “the great man,” or 
“oppression,” is difficult (see “On the Archaeology of the Sciences,” 302-20).  Foucault 
suggests that discourse analysis may be important to aid in this task, though describing 
the shifts in fields of knowledge [connaissance] is not the only way of understanding the 
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history of the present, as his later works show.  What is primary is developing an 
attunement to actual practices rather than assuming their continuity with past events.42 
Thus, instead of understanding present events via reference to some overarching 
unity—or embracing its absolute radicality—an experimentalist does not prioritize any 
relation between events.  This “pluralization of causes” (“Questions of Method,” 227) 
means that many factors may play a role in determining the shape of the present, so that 
deciding which are most important will often require difficult interpretive work.  One 
cannot assume that the occurrences of today have the same causes as those of the past.  
The problem, then, “is at once to distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks 
and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which they are 
connected and engender one another.”  From this understanding of events “follows a 
refusal of analyses couched in terms of the symbolic field or the domain of signifying 
structures, and a recourse to analyses in terms of the genealogy of relations of force, 
strategic developments, and tactics” (“Truth and Power,” 116).  Since many other events 
could usefully be related to a problematic situation, the selection of one or another is a 
strategic concern depending upon the purposes at hand. 
Like the ontology of events, the concept of power does not explain what has 
happened, is happening, or should happen but is meant to get at how occurrences 
                                                 
42 Though there are some temperamental differences between Deweyan reconstruction and Derridean 
deconstruction, the Jamesian emphasis on continuity and Foucaultian analyses of discontinuities, these 
two traditions share methodological commitments to asking “how” rather than “what” and provide ways 
of answering the value of this “how” through reference to past, present, and future “whats.”  Let us not 
forget that Foucault once said, however ironically, “As you know, no one is more of a continuist that I 
am: to recognize a discontinuity is never anything more than to register a problem that needs to be 
solved” (“Questions of Method,” 226).   
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happen.43  Though Foucault's constant use of the singular form of this term is 
problematic, he invites us to ask how power “operates on the field of possibilities in 
which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself.”  There are many possible 
answers.  For instance:  “It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it 
seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable 
or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting 
upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action” 
(“The Subject and Power,” 341).  In acting on actions, or defining the space of action, 
powers channel future events and are themselves shaped by previous powers, though the 
content of action is undetermined as yet.  Due to the historicity of powers, as well as the 
situatedness of any statements about it, it makes little sense to talk about power as such.  
The shape powers take, as well as the value of such definitions, thus has to be determined 
locally and from differential positions.   
Foucault did, of course, make many general statements about the shape of power 
as a tool of analysis, but he refused to call this a theory, or a unifying framework that 
                                                 
43 Foucault's use of “power” is similar to many pragmatic concepts like experience, education, or 
democracy in that it does not define any essential regularities of existence but is itself to be understood 
and evaluated in light of particular existences.  This, as Gilles Deleuze explains, is the empirical 
methodology: concepts do not explain anything but are themselves to be explained.  If this definition of 
empiricism is unfamiliar, this may be due, as James argues, to the fact that most empiricists have 
smuggled rationalism in through a priori concepts like “sense data” or “language games.”  Post-
Darwinian philosophers like Peirce, James, and Dewey as well as Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze 
emphasize the event—or, better, eventuation—to try to help make possible a new relation of theory and 
practice that attempts to let the latter determine the former rather than vice versa.  As James was well 
aware, however, a concept like power can always be interpreted by “vicious intellectuals” and “logic 
choppers” as just another definition of essential reality.  To convince others of the value of this move is 
not easy, for, “[a]s long as one continues talking, intellectualism remains in undisturbed possession of 
the field.  The return to life can't come about by talking.  It is an act; to make you return to life, I should 
set an example for your imitation, I should deafen you to talk, or to the importance of talk, by showing 
you, as Bergson does, that the concepts we talk with are made for purposes of practice and not for 
purposes of insight.  Or I should point, point to the mere that of life, and you by inner sympathy should 
fill out the what for yourselves” (1977, 131). 
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provides the key to understanding all events.  There are many other possible tools for 
addressing situations that are “intolerable.”  On an experimental model, whether or not 
power is useful for an inquiry depends on one’s purposes or present needs, which can be 
hypothesized via historical analysis.  As Foucault explains, “[w]e have to know the 
historical conditions that motivate our conceptualization.  We need a historical awareness 
of our present circumstance.”  Power’s use also depends upon the effects it makes 
possible for fulfilling such purposes: “The second thing to check is the type of reality 
with which we are dealing” (“The Subject and Power,” 327).  Can the events being 
analyzed be usefully described by the language of power?  Material, historical, and 
empirical factors take part in determining the answer to this.  In the institutional analyses 
he provided of penal reform and sexuality, Foucault clearly thought that power could be a 
useful tool.  But it is not the only one. 
Both the ontology of events and the conceptual framework of power are designed 
to help the specific intellectual be specific by attuning her problematizations to the 
problem she attempts to usefully characterize as well as the likely effects they make 
possible.  These tools are meant to provide an alternative to the practice of resorting to 
oracular concepts, though they also express the hypothesis that situated and experimental 
analysis will often be more effective than unifying concepts.  Together, they express the 
suggestion that problematizations should often be genealogical.  Genealogy is “a form of 
history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of 
objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental 
in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of 
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history” (“Truth and Power,” 119).44  The language of events, power, and genealogy are 
to help intellectuals avoid certain habits, but, more positively, a problematization as a 
tentative “history of the present” (DP 31) written for such an express purpose will often 
be an effective way of helping a public identify and transform problems.   
A history of a present, as a differential account of the eventuations that make 
certain contemporary conditions possible, often takes the shape of an analysis of 
institutions and practices, as these name the regularities that arise in experience.  If one 
does not assume that either ideal or material factors are essential, one should begin with 
concrete practices, or the “places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and 
reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet and interconnect.”  The 
analysis of practices should occur “with the aim of grasping the conditions that make 
these acceptable at a given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practice are 
not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic 
circumstances—whatever role these elements may actually play—but, up to a point, 
possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidences, and 'reason'” 
(“Questions of Method,” 225).  Given the pluralities of causes and multiplicity of 
relations between agents, environments, discourses, and practices, institutions, like 
concepts, cannot be assumed to control their effects completely.  Genealogically 
understanding just how practices determine and are determined by each other—how 
power occurs—is often key to defining attuned problematizations. 
Such historical and differential analysis of events is not just a recounting of facts, 
for these events are selected from a huge number of practices and causes for the purpose 
                                                 
44 See footnote 40 for my use of genealogy instead of archaeology. 
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of understanding and transforming the present in specific ways, and are effective to the 
extent that they do so.  Perspectival attunement to past eventuations and present needs 
create possibilities for shaping future practices and values in specific directions.  
Genealogy or “[h]istory becomes 'effective' to the degree that it introduces discontinuity 
into our very being.”  The right description can aid in the imagination of better futures.  
“This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting”  
(“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 88).  Cuts, breaks, and shifts from inherited and pre-
reflective activities could occur through a break, a revolution, or a completely new set of 
concepts, but it is likely that, without an historical attunement, such novelties will be 
subsumed into the machinery of the past.  Not only is effective history disruptive, but 
effective problematization is effective history.45 
Of course, a perspectival attunement to histories of practices cannot guarantee any 
effects.  Genealogical problematization also needs to be an experimentalism.  Foucault 
explains, “We should transform the field of social institutions into a field of 
experimentation, in order to determine which levers to turn and which bolts to loosen in 
order to bring about the desired effects.  It is indeed important to undertake a campaign of 
decentralization, for example, in order to bring the users closer to the decision-making 
centers on which they depend, and to tie them into the decision-making process, avoiding 
the type of great, globalizing integration that leaves people in complete ignorance about 
                                                 
45 Pragmatic experimentalism is often accused of being too rooted in the present, as “what works” may 
seem to be a matter of current affairs, and thus, the status quo.  Foucault hypothesizes that successful 
pragmatics is conditioned upon genealogical analysis, for if one wants to know what futures will 
“work,” one needs to understand the conditions that made such events possible and the interests thereby 
advanced and excluded.  One should remain aware of the selective interests that guide and determine 
one's inquiries. 
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the conditions of particular judgments.  We should then multiply these experiments 
wherever possible on the particularly important and interesting terrain of the social, 
considering that an entire institutional system, now fragile, will probably undergo a 
restructuring from top to bottom” (“The Risks of Security,” 370).  Genealogical 
problematization is part of a much larger practice of institutional transformation that 
determines the value and meaning of such intellectual work.  It is likely that, since they 
should avoid the practices of the universal intellectual, these conceptual constructions 
will provide more effective redirection of existing practices to the extent that they are 
attuned to their histories and differences.  Nonetheless, this has to be left to their results 
in helping people's struggles with concrete problems.   
 
An Experimental Account of Criticism 
 
Now that I have outlined one task of specific or experimental intellectuals—the 
creation of historically and differentially attuned problematizations—we can examine the 
larger practice of criticism in which experts should be engaged.  If, as on the 
experimental account of legitimacy, one assumes that the value of criticism is determined 
not by its appeal to expert-determined norms but by its effects in helping publics deal 
with problems, an intellectual's work is not critical unless it leads to critical effects—or, 
as Foucault aptly phrases it, “when critique has been played out in the real, not when 
reformers have realized their ideas” (“Questions of Method,” 236).  On this model, the 
specific intellectual is part of a whole body of inquiry and experimentation interested in 
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transforming problematic institutions, norms, and practices.  The expert task of 
reconstructing problems and their possible solutions is thus only one part of facilitating 
“a whole social project, a work within and upon the very body of society” (“Interview 
with Michel Foucault,” 288).  Criticism is not simply an action carried out by a subject, 
such as a critic or a community, upon a given object, such as a state or economy, on the 
basis of some universal norms.  It is instead constituted by the experimental response of a 
public to a problem and the results that arise.46  The value of this account, I hope to 
suggest, lies in its highlighting the conditions and tests of successful intellectual work and 
thus helping to better align theory and practice. 
Rather than providing a specific program of criticism, I will outline some 
consequences of seeing problematization as merely one part of experimental political 
inquiry.  First, a problematization is not a solution to be applied, but a space in which 
problems and solutions can arise and which themselves may need to be problematized.  
The problems made possible by intellectuals—such as the perception that reforming our 
food system is essential to reducing many kinds of pollution—“cannot easily be resolved.  
Years, decades, of work and political imagination will be necessary, work at the grass 
roots, with the people directly affected, restoring their right to speak....  It's a matter of 
working through things little by little, of introducing modifications that are able if not to 
find solutions, at least to change the given terms of the problem” (“Interview with Michel 
Foucault,” 288).  The effects of problematizations will depend upon material, social, 
                                                 
46 In this respect, I share Habermas's attempt to move past the philosophy of consciousness that attempts 
to base criticism in either the social body or the state.  See Between Facts and Norms (1996, 298-9).  I 
do not believe, however, that the way to undercut this dichotomy is via a universal demonstration of the 
presuppositions of discourse but rather through a radicalization the model of criticism Habermas 
assumes.   
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institutional, communicative, and imaginative factors, and it may take years for even 
small shifts to occur.  New roadblocks requiring new problematizations may spring up 
from any side, and the problems made possible by a new problematization will often 
require another one.  Though an attunement to histories and differences ought to aid in 
creating useful problematizations, no effects are guaranteed. 
Second, since publics have already understood themselves and their problems 
along the lines of conceptual apparatuses or problematizations formed in response to and 
made possible by prior situations, new problematizations should be attuned to these 
histories.  For instance, it is because of the tradition of rights, invented by the new 
bourgeoisie, that many contemporary problems occur within this framework; it is because 
of the history of economic theory and development that problems are seen in terms of the 
government’s role in markets.  Since every expert suggestion is bound up with a way of 
defining a problem and thus involves an exclusion of other problematizations, new 
problem spaces should be attuned to the effects of previous problematizations as well as 
the similarities and differences between past and present situations.  New 
problematizations are not formed ex nihilo but are rather reconstructions of past patterns 
of thought and action.  To successfully deal with the antinomy between reforming prisons 
or building new ones, for example, “there would be a considerable amount of work to do 
in order to renovate the conceptual categories that inspire our way of approaching all of 
these problems....  For the moment, we lack completely the intellectual instruments to 
envisage in new terms the framework within which we could achieve our goals” (“The 
Risks of Security,” 370).  The renovation of past categories should be attuned to present 
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conditions for the sake of effecting future transformations. 
Because various problematizations may allow vastly different treatments of “the 
same” problem, and because these effects cannot be completely predicted, it follows that, 
thirdly, intellectuals should multiply possible ways of thinking and acting.  Rather than 
trying to show that everyone could accept their point of view, specific intellectuals should 
create new possibilities for institutions to be evaluated and contemporary practices 
reconstructed.  This practice of criticism “would bear the lightning of possible storms...  
[It] would try not to judge but ...  would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the 
wind, and catch the sea foam in the breeze and scatter it.  It would multiply not 
judgments but signs of existence;  it would summon them, drag them from their sleep.  
Perhaps it would invent them sometimes—all the better” (“The Masked Philosopher,” 
323).  The multiplication of problematizations should often be useful for dealing with our 
felt problems, because, though we already have conceptual resources for understanding 
the present—such as utility, rights, community, difference—we frequently suffer from  
“inadequate means for thinking about everything that is happening” (325). 
Fourth, multiplying problematizations does not require experts to infinitely 
problematize and reproblematize contemporary situations, for, whether or not another 
round of problematization is necessary will depend upon the effects it would make 
possible.  Though almost anything could be better, a public will prioritize only certain 
issues.  Unlike the radical doubt of Descartes, the purpose of problematizing should 
depend upon felt problems.  Foucault explains that “for a domain of action, a behavior, to 
enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it 
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uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of 
difficulties around it.  These elements result from social, economic, or political 
processes” (“Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,” 117).  The point is that problems 
are neither given nor require constant production.  Sometimes a problem needs to be 
reproblematized so that more people can understand how they are implicated by it.  
Sometimes a situations needs to be reframed so that people can understand what should 
be done.  In short, the very determination that something counts as a problem requiring 
reproblematization is a contestable, experimental endeavor that cannot be determined by 
experts alone.  That this choice is itself mediated by expert suggestion and 
experimentation is simply part of the complexity of political inquiry. 
Fifth, rather than requiring the rejection of other problematizations, many political 
theories and moral philosophies could be understood on this model as possible ways of 
thinking and acting that do not claim to represent any universally valid knowledge.47  For 
instance, Habermas's ideal speech situation may be a useful tool for defining certain 
problems, but its concrete validity cannot be determined by his lengthy arguments for its 
universal validity.  They may form part of the account of why such an hypothesis might 
work, but material and historical explanations of a similar concept's use in a similar 
situation may be more important.  This methodological point is the greatest difference 
between Foucault and many contemporary theorists, for he rejects, not theory, but the 
                                                 
47 The experimental question about Rawls, then, would not be whether or not he gives self-contained or 
coherent arguments—though this may be important—but when and how the concepts he invents are 
useful.  We could then compare “the original position,” “reflective equilibrium,” or “the difference 
principle” with Deleuze and Guattari's “micropolitics,” “nomadology,” or “schizoanalysis,” for 
example, in ameliorating certain value conflicts.  Despite, or perhaps because of, the tremendous 
differences between these philosophers, they have all contributed to the conceptual frameworks of many 
different fields of inquiry. 
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one-directional, expert-directed practices in which much theory is bound.  It may appear 
as though he intends that “power” should take the place of the “ideal speech situation” as 
the essential way of understanding and criticizing institutions, particularly because he 
does not often spell out the interests or purposes for which his genealogies may be useful.  
But Foucault explains, “I've never claimed that power was going to explain everything....  
For me, power is what needs to be explained” (“Interview with Michel Foucault,” 284).  
The meaning of power, just like the ideal speech situation, should be determined by its 
concrete effects for specific problems. 
Finally, an experimental account of criticism allows institutions of expertise to be 
evaluated according to their use in helping publics understand and transform their 
problems, and not, as the universal framework requires, whether or not they effectively 
translate ends into means.  The complexity of the modern world would be intractable 
without institutions of expertise like universities and colleges, professional organizations, 
and bureaucracies.  Yet such institutions may easily reproduce the practices of what 
Foucault calls the universal intellectual.  For instance, political parties are an institution 
of expertise that severely limits the possibilities for understanding political problems due 
to their rigid problematizations.  “One may wonder whether the political parties are not 
the most stultifying political inventions since the nineteenth century.  Intellectual political 
sterility appears ...  to be one of the salient facts of our time” (“Interview with Actes,” 
396).  An experimental account of criticism allows one to ask whose goals are advanced 
when such institutions limit problems to being named in terms of individual freedom, 
nostalgia, meritocracy, and limited government or social determination, utopia, equal 
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opportunity, and revolution.  As a powerful historical and contemporary factor, the state 
will loom large in many problematizations, yet what may be most needed today “is a 
political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore 
around the problems of law and prohibition.  We need to cut off the King's head: in 
political theory that still has to be done” (“Truth and Power,” 122). 
 
Effective Histories 
 
On an experimental account of expertise, or relationship between theory and 
practice, the King's head may be cut off by re-imagining criticism as a social process 
carried out by specific publics dealing with problematic situations and requiring a 
multiplicity of courses of action and ways of thinking.  Foucault accordingly pluralized 
his own interventions into institutions, norms, and practices without giving any certain 
answers regarding what should be done.  I would like to highlight three institutions in 
which he attempted to create avenues for increasing legitimacy by expanding possibilities 
for communication, imagination, and transformation: the penal system, political 
philosophy, and sexuality, respectively.  These three institutions require dissimilar 
analyses, are aimed at different audiences, and might require a variety of problems and 
reforms.  In every case, Foucault does not prescribe what should be done, nor does he 
delegate any particular peoples to do it.  This is a virtue, as he and Dewey would argue, 
because what will count as a critical analysis of a situation—what is “effective history” or 
problematization—is to be determined by the effects of peoples' dealings with public 
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problems for specific purposes.   
Discipline and Punish, like many of Foucault's works, cannot be summarized 
easily, as it extends into many different fields, histories, powers, and problems.  One of 
its most powerful contributions to ways of understanding penality, however, is its 
suggestion that both penal reform and prison proliferation are two sides of the same coin.  
Though both positions assume that the prison is a necessary institution for contemporary 
society, only a modus vivendi between the two is possible due to their vastly different 
ends.  The former, believing that the prison should correct people, seeks to remove 
obstacles to this goal, such as cruel and unusual punishment; the latter, concerned not 
with correction but with deterrence, wants to multiply deterrents.  The popularity of these 
problematizations has waxed and waned throughout the years, but their shared premise 
that the prison system is problematic—though for different reasons—has remained 
unchanged.  Whichever of the two points of view wins out for a time will have more to 
do with external factors than with intelligent communication and experimentation.  There 
are no means in sight for resolving this situation, though this is not a problem in itself 
unless either of the two groups understand the conflict in this way. 
To provide the possibility that problematizations of the prison system are not 
working well, and thus perhaps create a new point of shared communication, Foucault 
attempts to form a new problem space wherein these different groups may be 
transformed.  This is done in two ways: first, by looking to the effects of the actual 
institutions and thus turning an interminable debate about ends into an analysis of effects; 
and second, by showing how, on these grounds, prisons are not failures at all but are 
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actually legitimate for certain purposes.  He suggests, “For the observation that prison 
fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute the hypothesis that prison has 
succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency, a specific type ...  of illegality” (DP, 
277).  Rather than assuming that discussion about prisons should be organized around 
one set of ends or another, Foucault proposes that those involved first ask what its effects 
are.  They might then find that “penality does not simply 'check' illegalities; it 
'differentiates' them, it provides them with a general 'economy'” (272).  Foucault suggests 
that prisons have been exceptionally good at producing a group of people that are 
potential delinquents, “a relatively small and enclosed group of individuals on whom a 
constant surveillance may be kept” (278). 
By turning to the effects of the prison system and introducing a new framework 
for understanding them, Foucault opens up the possibility for a reconciliation and 
transformation of these historically divided positions.  Real communication and actual 
prison reform may now be undertaken for a broader set of needs, instead of polarized 
posturing and the continuation of old practices under a parade of new names.  
Nonetheless, it is not up to Foucault to decide whether or not this framework is helpful 
for those affected by prisons nor what the future of penality will look like.  “If prisons 
and punitive mechanisms are transformed, it won't be because a plan of reform has found 
its way into the heads of the social workers; it will be when those who have a stake in 
that reality, all those people, have come into collision with each other and with 
themselves, run into dead ends, problems, and impossibilities, been through conflicts and 
confrontations” (“Questions of Method,” 236).  Though the specific intellectual cannot 
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determine how critique will be played out in the real, she is not thereby absolved of 
concern for people and their problems.  Rather, she should be attuned to the nuances, 
valences, differences, and histories that structure the potential effects of her interventions. 
Foucault's transactions with the prison system shows the kind of work in which a 
specific intellectual might take part in order to bridge communicative dissonances.  
Rather than inventing one set of criteria to be applied to all institutions, she would 
multiply the possibilities for communication, criticism, and evaluation by imagining new 
frameworks for recognizing problems.  Unless some common, perhaps longterm, ground 
can be found that transforms the narrow interests currently allowed expression, the most 
legitimate option for a group of people may be a modus vivendi or tyranny of the 
majority.  It is likely that not everyone will find a voice nor will everyone be satisfied by 
the effects of a new problem space, but this simply requires new problematizations and 
new possibilities for amelioration.  Despite Foucault's careful and enlightening work, it is 
clear that many illegitimacies are still produced by penality.  This is to be expected, as 
true reform will require a great deal of work by everyone involved.  It is always easier to 
maintain the status quo. 
Like his engagements with penality in France, Foucault's remarks about and 
interventions with political theorists attempt to help imagine a different set of questions 
than those defined by the tradition from Locke to Marx.  The state-centered political 
problematizations in France in the late middle half of the last century admitted few 
possibilities for thinking about new political problems.  Unlike the traditional questions 
of the state and its sovereignty, these novel situations seemed related to “a developing 
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crisis of government” more generally (“Interview with Michel Foucault,” 295).  “To pose 
the problem in terms of the State means to continue posing it in terms of sovereign and 
sovereignty, that is to say in terms of law.”  Foucault does not mean to suggest that the 
state is not important, but that “relations of power, and hence the analysis that should be 
made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State.  In two senses: first of all 
because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to 
occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only 
operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations”  (“Truth and Power,” 122-
3).  Understanding political problems in terms of the law and the police may not always 
be legitimate.  For example, to address the questions being raised in education, medicine, 
and family structures, Foucault suggests that we think in terms of institutions and power, 
but not necessarily those of the state.   
The hope is not just that this framework will help describe current problems but 
that political problematizations and the institutions that help to maintain them, such as the 
PCF, will broaden the ways in which practices may be interpreted and effected.  The 
framework of power “implies that there are many different kinds of revolution, roughly 
speaking as many kinds as there are possible subversive recodifications of power 
relations, and further that one can perfectly well conceive of revolutions which leave 
essentially untouched the power relations which form the basis for the functioning of the 
State”  (“Truth and Power,” 123).  Instead of leaving us with few options for solving 
legitimation crises—such as widening the limits of the state, broadening the moral 
obligation of citizens to it, or coup d'etat—the framework of power should help multiply 
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possibilities for revolution and reform.  Though there are, of course, many different state 
models, power seems able to take a wide variety of forms and thus makes possible a large 
number of analyses and interventions. 
The rigidity of state-centered political problematizations can be seen in how many 
theorists have simply appropriated Foucault's language of power by the dichotomy 
between coercion and legitimate political power, such as is manifested in the universal 
framework of legitimacy.  Power is read as coercion—an unconsented act done by one 
body and affecting another.  Understood in this light, Foucault seems to be trying to 
prove that legitimate power is impossible.48  Foucault himself admits that some of his 
earlier writings may have been unclear on this point,49 yet it should be clear that he uses 
“power” in a much broader sense.  As explained above, it is a matter of structurings and 
destructurings, sometimes happening at non-conscious and non-individual levels, in 
which many people and no one in particular take part.  It is meant to draw our attention to 
the plurality of ways in which institutions arise and are transformed, and so it cannot be 
assumed that these will take the forms of coercion or consent, let alone a sovereign and a 
                                                 
48 Walzer thus understands Foucault as a pluralist Hobbesian who sees coercion everywhere.  “Foucault 
believes that discipline is a literal necessity; he abhors all its forms, every sort of confinement and 
control; liberalism for him is nothing more than discipline concealed.  Since he cannot point to an 
alternative and better discipline, social criticism must always be a futile enterprise” (1988, 204). 
 
Rorty echoes Walzer, saying that, against the Platonic project to ground just politics in some ahistorical 
fact of human nature, “Foucault inverts this attempt.  Since he sees human subjectivity as a contingent 
product of contingently existing forces, he does not believe that there is any such ahistorical 
noncontingent core.  So he concludes, at least in his anarchist moments, that every social institution is 
equally unjustifiable, that all of them are on a par.  All of them exert 'normalizing power'” (“Moral 
Identity and Private Autonomy: The Case of Foucault”, 197).   
49 In later interviews, Foucault often remarked that discipline, for example, is only one aspect of 
assujettissment and that Discipline and Punish may have been too one-sided on this issue.  In describing 
the four technologies of subjectivization/objectivization—those of objects, sign systems, domination, 
and selves—he remarks, “Perhaps I've insisted too much on the technology of domination and power” 
(“Technologies of the Self,” 225; see also “Sexuality and Solitude,” 177).  See also footnote 40. 
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subject.  Accordingly, power is much closer to what James means by experience, Dewey 
by education, or Nietzsche by will to power than Locke or Hobbe's understanding of the 
term.   
Finally, Foucault tried to aid in the transformation of the institutions of sex and 
gender that have become rigidified around certain images, norms, and practices.  His 
works on sexuality50 try to show, above all, the specific ways in which our relationships 
to ourselves are mediated by social and political institutions and transactions.  Since so 
much of what makes a life recognizable today is tied to sexuality, the transformation of 
sexuality will require, in sum, new ways of life.  This is shown in the fact that gay 
relationships have been able to find recognition—even by gays themselves—not in terms 
of overdetermined courting rituals and marriage but by less proscribed sex acts.  Foucault 
explains, “Homosexuals were not allowed to elaborate a system of courtship because the 
cultural expression necessary for such an elaboration was denied them....  So when a 
homosexual culture and literature began to develop it was natural for it to focus on the 
most ardent and heated aspect of homosexual relations.”  Cocteau, Genet, and Burroughs, 
for instance, have focused on sexual acts because “the homosexual imagination is for the 
most part concerned with reminiscing about the act rather than anticipating it....  [T]his is 
all due to very concrete and practical considerations and says nothing about the intrinsic 
nature of homosexuality” (“Sexual Choice, Sexual Act,” 150).51  As the possibilities for 
                                                 
50 I do not want to get into the debates between sex and gender here and will accordingly use the term 
“sexuality” to stand in for the complicated ways that sex and gender occur. 
51 Foucault may be criticized for himself reifying “the homosexual imaginary.”  However, on an 
experimental account of criticism, the validity of this concern depends on the differential effects of 
Foucault's work.  At least one result is his massive contribution to Queer Theory.  The Foucaultian, 
experimental question about generalizations like “the homosexual imaginary,” just like “power” or 
“discursive regimes,” is: for what purposes are the effects it makes possible valid? 
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changing the institutions of sexuality have been narrow, homosexuals have experimented 
where they could, developing entirely new ways of experience pleasure, as in S&M 
practices (“Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity,” 165).  
Nonetheless, these experiments should carry out “the prospect that gays will 
create as yet unforeseen kinds of relationships that many people cannot tolerate” (“Sexual 
Choice, Sexual Act,” 153) if they are to interrupt the widespread and rigid relations of 
sexuality.  Transformation of such institutions cannot come about without major 
reconstruction.  To this end, Foucault tries to help create a new problem space wherein 
the imperative of self-knowledge and self-renunciation of sexual desire—exemplified in 
the Christian confessional—is juxtaposed with the Greek care of oneself, in which 
sexuality is only one aspect of a individual's health.  By providing people with 
possibilities for new experiences of themselves, through interviews and his histories of 
sexuality, Foucault aids the transformation of these institutions simply by showing the 
events that produced the singularity of contemporary forms of sexuality and that could 
have been otherwise.  Even when people like homosexuals know perfectly well how 
oppressive sexual institutions are, it cannot simply be through conscious acts of will that 
conditions change.  The “matter of constructing cultural forms” (“The Social Triumph of 
the Sexual Will,” 157) will require new ways of thinking, new modes of experimentation, 
new languages and voices, and new pleasures and desires which may then add up to a 
new way of life.52 
These interventions into the problematizations of the penal system, the theory and 
practice of political philosophy, and the norms of sexuality demonstrate three concrete 
                                                 
52 See McWhorter (1999) on the uses of Foucault's genealogy for queer transformations. 
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ways that a specific intellectual could aid people in the experimental reconstruction of 
more legitimate institutions.  Though problematizations can take many forms, their 
formulation will often need to be directed towards ways of creating new possibilities for 
communication, imagination, or transformation.  In these examples, the role of the 
specific intellectual is roughly the same: instead of telling people what their desires are or 
defining a program for action, Foucault provides new ways of thinking and acting in 
regard to specific problems with which people themselves can experiment.  For “the 
masses no longer need [the intellectual] to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, 
without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly capable of expressing 
themselves.  But there exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates 
this discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in the manifest authority of 
censorship, but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire societal network.  
Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of power—the idea of their 
responsibility for 'consciousness' and discourse forms part of the system” (“Intellectuals 
and Power,” 207).  In order for intellectuals to create problematizations that help people 
frame and deal with the problems that they already “know,” rather than taking part in 
practices of universal expertise, great institutional reform may be necessary.  Foucault 
himself shows how difficult such institutional shifts can be, but there is no reason to be 
pessimistic that such changes cannot occur.  Analysis into the reasons why certain 
specialists exclusively legitimate some courses of action, for instance, may be a start to 
putting attuned problematizations into effect. 
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The Value of Criticism: Representativeness vs. Transformative Effects 
 
Having provided a few examples of Foucault's attempts to aid in the criticism of 
institutions in a manner more aligned with practices, I can now show the ways in which 
this account deals with the questions the universal understanding of critique tries to 
answer.  If we are concerned with defining a set of ends which can be used by politicians, 
public intellectuals, and activists to make more legitimate or valid institutions, we will 
mostly be interested in discovering the source of the authority to represent people.  
Accordingly, there are those who believe that such authority comes from argumentative 
ability, such as Rawls and Habermas, and those who believe that it comes from a certain 
connection to a community, like Walzer and Rorty.  If, on an experimental account, we 
are interested in what problematizations might transform the ends and means of a public 
so that they can more effectively deal with present problems, we will be interested in 
understanding the context in which attuned reproblematizations could be made.  Debates 
about the representativeness of one set of experts/ends are undercut by attempts to create 
a space in which publics can decide how to better represent themselves.  Though I will 
make reference to some of these theorists in this section, my purpose is not to refute them 
but to juxtapose the practices of criticism they share with those of an experimental 
account. 
The first way to define a set of representative ends is by appeal to reasons that 
others could be shown to accept.  John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas are the most well-
known examples of this kind of argumentation.  For example, Rawls argues that “the 
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principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of [a hypothetical] 
original agreement.  They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to 
further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality” (1999 [1971], 
10).  In Between Facts and Norms Habermas makes the case that “the legitimating force 
of a discursive process of opinion- and will-formation, in which the illocutionary binding 
forces of a use of language oriented to mutual understanding serve[s] to bring reason and 
will together—and lead[s] to convincing positions to which all individuals can agree 
without coercion” (1996, 103).  Despite the differences between these thinkers, they 
share the assumption that the philosopher's task is to define common ends so that 
institutions can be criticized and reformed according to them.  Specific concerns do not 
come into such ends' formation or validation but are, at most, concrete instantiations of 
them. 
As Rawls later realized, this account has to deal with the fact that there are many 
kinds of reasons that appear to be rational, though, as I suggested in Chapter One, he says 
little about how the reasonable reasons defined by experts can be evaluated.  Foucault 
rejects such expert-centric definitions of the rational, though not because he is a relativist 
or irrationalist.  He explains, “I think the blackmail that has very often been at work in 
every critique of reason or every critical inquiry into the history of rationality (either you 
accept rationality or you fall prey to the irrational) operates as though a rational critique 
of rationality were impossible, or as though a rational history of all the ramifications and 
all the bifurcations, a contingent history of reason, were impossible” (“Structuralism and 
Post-structuralism,” 441).  Instead of uncovering reasonable reasons to which all 
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reasonable people could reasonably assent or the pragmatic-ideal presuppositions of a 
rational society, Foucault affirms the possibility of experimentally determining the 
rationality of specific ends and means in reference to public problems.  His 
problematizations make possible different reasons, though whether or not these are 
irrational or arbitrary depends upon the purposes for which they were created.  As 
Foucault never tires of saying, his problematizations often attempt to show how power 
produces and is produced by certain reasons.  Instead of asking how “we” can put power 
to work, he asks for whom the concept of power works. 
The second common way to define the values that are to be applied is by appeal to 
the norms of a community or language game.  Richard Rorty and Michael Walzer 
exemplify this approach.  Recognizing that different people hold different beliefs, they 
try to avoid the debates over “reason” by grounding their ends in inherited norms.  For 
instance, Rorty argues that, rather than justifying anything, political philosophers are 
simply trading idealizations.  Rejecting truth for description, he claims that it is 
“impossible to say that one language of moral and political deliberation, and the set of 
social practices intertwined with that language, is more rational than another” (1996, 
334).  Instead of being more rational, his account of justice simply “seem[s] to cohere 
better with the institutions of a liberal democracy than the available alternative do” (1989, 
197).  Walzer gives a more nuanced account of the differences among communities and 
experts, though he still defines the ends of criticism with the beliefs of the experts of a 
community: “There is a tradition, a body of moral knowledge; and there is this group of 
sages, arguing.  There isn't anything else.  No discovery or invention can end the 
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argument; no 'proof' takes precedence over the (temporary) majority of sages” (1987, 32).  
If asked why a certain critique is valid, Rorty and Walzer respond: because it represents 
the ends we share—or, rather, those that the experts tell us we share.   
This approach must face difficult questions about how a community could come 
to share the same beliefs, how a critic could become representative of those values, and 
how it could be known that their application to a problem would have the same validity 
for everyone in “the community.”  In response to Rorty, Foucault argues that “the 
problem is, precisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within a 'we' in 
order to assert the principles one recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is not, 
rather, necessary to make the future formation of a 'we' possible by elaborating the 
question.  Because it seems to me that the 'we' should not be previous to the question; it 
can only be the result—and the necessarily temporary result—of the question as it is 
posed in the new terms in which one formulates it” (“Polemics, Politics, and 
Problematizations,” 114-5).  Foucault does not claim to represent any community, 
because, on an experimental framework, the value of any criticism or transformation 
based upon even shared values cannot be assumed to have valid consequences for the 
entire community.  If, for instance, Madness and Civilization allowed for effective 
criticism—that is, it allowed psychiatric institutions to be successfully reconfigured 
according to certain points of view—the validity of such purposes or ends is a product, 
not a postulate. 
Despite the different ends defined by Rawls, Habermas, Rorty, and Walzer, they 
share a division of labor between expert and laypeople that results from trying to find a 
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standpoint that guarantees the value of the application of such norms.  On an 
experimental account, however, the validity of realizing a set of values cannot be 
assumed to be determined by the fact that people hold them or could be shown to hold 
them.  Accordingly, Foucault suggests that one-directional theorization and application 
could be replaced by experimentation in which expert problematization—which is not 
always necessary—plays only one part.  Criticism might then describe the whole process 
beginning with a people's felt problem, an expert's hypothetical problematization, and the 
public's experimentation, transformation, and evaluation of the situation.  The specific 
intellectual's task is not to discover what people universally believe but to define spaces 
in which beliefs could be experimentally tested and revised.  Rather than trying to 
guarantee the validity of certain criticisms or reforms, the expert hypothesizes ways of 
understanding and experimenting upon a problem.  The work of specific intellectuals is 
not to differentiate between the true or false, the valid or invalid, but to provide 
experiences that make possible the transformation of institutions so that means and ends 
can be determined to be true or false, valid or invalid (“Interview with Michel Foucault,” 
242-3).  The validity of means and ends, criticisms and values, courses of action and 
reasons, depend upon their conditions and effects in ameliorating a public's problem, all 
of which take place in a space made possible by certain problematizations. 
On an experimental framework, then, successful criticism will involve the 
transformative work of a social body on itself, in which intellectuals are co-actors.  Of 
course, whether or not such transformations are critical will depend upon purposes, 
conditions, and effects.  In a conversation with Foucault, Gilles Deleuze explains, “A 
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theorizing intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or representative 
consciousness.  Those who act and struggle are no longer represented, either by a group 
or a union that appropriates the right to stand as their conscience”  (“Intellectuals and 
Power,” 208).  Rather than concerning herself with how she represents the people—via a 
claim to which all rational people could agree, the values of a community, human nature, 
an economic history, or an empirically-generated list—the specific intellectual does not 
claim to represent peoples or points of view.  She instead attempts to engage in the 
practices in which people are already struggling by providing provisional and tailored 
tools for understanding them.  The one-directional division of labor associated with the 
traditional problematic of legitimacy wherein theorists validate values and critics apply 
them—wherein the people's representation is guaranteed by experts—is replaced with a 
more complicated relationship in which the work of publics, problems, and experts is 
judged by all three in the effects they produce.  Deleuze summarizes, “A theory [or 
problematization, in our terms] does not totalize; it is an instrument for multiplication and 
it also multiplies itself” (208). 
Because theorists who require ends to be validated before their application are 
united in their practice if not the ends they endorse, they misunderstand Foucault in 
similar ways.  For instance, Gayatri Spivak worries about according too much truth to 
people's desires (1988).  Isn't it the case, she asks, that people's economic interests 
represent (darstellen) their true desires more than their political interests do (vertreten) 
(276)?  If Foucault and Deleuze do not provide a set of ends to ground ideology critique, 
such as is provided by the economy, then they cannot provide a conception of false 
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consciousness and thus cannot provide a basis for criticism: “In the name of desire, they 
reintroduce the undivided subject into the discourse of power” (274).  According to 
Spivak, Foucault's books can only be used as tools to forward given ends while providing 
no means for inquiring into the validity of those ends, for “representing [the masses], the 
intellectuals represent themselves as transparent” (275).  As I have tried to show, 
however, Foucault is not rejecting criticism in favor of a relativist affirmation of the 
status quo; he is instead sidestepping the question of representation undergirding the 
conception of criticism that Spivak uncritically accepts.  If his genealogies are not critical 
themselves, can they not be understood as being part of a project of criticism undertaken 
by publics themselves? 
I hope to have clarified the ways in which an experimental practice of criticism 
undercuts the concern to show the validity of a standpoint, i.e., the authority of the expert, 
before the critic, politician, or activist can do her work.  Foucault suggests that the 
purposes, conditions, and effects of the social work of criticism can determine its validity.  
The representativeness of “reason” or the “norms of a community” should not be 
assumed on the experimental framework.  In fact, the language of representation is not 
even appropriate, as Deleuze succinctly states: “Representation no longer exists; there's 
only action—universal action and practical action which serve as relays and form 
networks” (“Intellectuals and Power,” 206-7).  Though political theory has moved 
beyond groundings in the natural light, many of its practices have not.  Representation 
continues to be the goal of experts who represent the truth and thus the people as well.  
Yet if the meaning of values, concepts, and norms are determined by the practices which 
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structure and are made possible by them, problematization and critical transformation 
should be grounded in such practices and effects and not by any expert's claim to 
authority.  I would now like to begin to show more concretely what this understanding of 
criticism might mean for the practice of political theory. 
 
Criticism and the Practices of Political Theory 
 
I have shown that an experimental practice of expertise is designed to avoid 
expert-centric practices by aiding in the transformative work people undertake on their 
institutions, norms, and practices.  Rather than trying to demonstrate the universal 
validity of a particular problematization, experts should aim to be co-investigators of 
public problems by helping people find valid ways to ameliorate situations.  That is, they 
should be specific, not universal.  One way to do so is by providing new ways for 
thinking about and acting upon problems, but this is not the only way to align theory and 
practice.  Most important is the recognition that the ways problems are understood will 
affect action taken to deal with them, as well as the means by which the latter will be 
judged.  Since a problematization, like the environment, the economy, or justice, allow 
problems to be seen as environmental, economic, or judicial, the actions it makes possible 
in relation to a public problem provides a point of view from which it can be judged.  
New problems may be sufficiently ameliorated by use of inherited problematizations, 
though Foucault suggests that genealogical—that is, historically and differentially 
attuned—reproblematizations may often be necessary.  
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This framework of criticism highlights the fact that experts often affect how 
problems are named and framed.  Since on an experimental account, no problems, 
interests, or solutions can be assumed, the ways in which intellectuals shape them should 
be explicitly recognized and evaluated.  If the purposes for which problematizations are 
invented, such as the amelioration of a public problem, are not stated, the result is likely 
to be an endless debate over possible ways of seeing and acting.  Since many 
problematizations may be useful, it is important to ask for whom the effects they make 
possible are actually legitimate.  For this reason, an experimental framework of criticism 
and expertise should have a better chance of letting people themselves determine the 
value of a way of naming and transforming a problem than a universal account criticism, 
the value of which is guaranteed by expert knowledge.  Dewey and Foucault suggest that 
any and all of the many problematizations intellectuals like political philosophers have 
suggested could be right, depending upon the needs of a specific public and its problem.  
Which norms or procedures are correct should be empirically determined in their use for 
ameliorating practices by people themselves. 
Another consequence of this account is that it suggests that problematizations 
should be multiplied rather than unified.  Though shared problematizations, ends, or 
means may often be useful, as universal theorists well realize, it is sometimes important 
to pluralize possible ways of understanding or responding to a problem.  To distinguish 
between these two needs, Foucault suggests that problematizations be understood in 
terms of the effects they make possible for certain purposes.  Accordingly, he does not 
suggest that every problem requires reproblematization so that nothing ever gets done.  
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Since many old problematizations will be appropriate for new situations, what is most 
important is recognizing when a new way of thinking and acting might be useful.  There 
is no certain test of this, but it might be useful to attempt conceptual reconstruction: when 
problematizations are irreconcilable regarding a certain issue, when problematizations 
seem disconnected from their purposes, or when situations have become intolerable for 
large numbers of people, as Foucault’s forays into penality, political theory, and sexuality 
suggest. 
An experimental account of expertise may also provide reason for transforming 
institutions, norms, and practices that produce and reproduce the activities of the 
universal intellectual.  If these structures take part in expert-centric practices by 
promulgating certain problematizations regardless of the problems at hand, they risk 
limiting the kind of action that could be taken and the interests that may be served.  If 
such practices are to be replaced by historically attuned problematizations that are 
genealogically grounded in practices having differential effects, widespread change may 
be required, for not only might the kinds of questions and the answers given have to be 
different, but the ways theorists' work originates and is evaluated may require 
transformation as well. Insofar as they create exclusionary and rigid problematizations, 
experimental criticism might have implications for institutions like the university, the 
media, or the government; as well as the practices of grocery stores, employers, and 
religious groups; or the norms of greeting, sexuality, or athletic groups.  These structures 
need not all be problematized, except as according to need and ability.  An experimental 
framework of criticism merely provides a way in which norms, practices, and institutions 
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could be evaluated. 
I have tried to show how the Deweyan framework for the evaluation of values and 
the Foucaultian practice of criticism undercut many of the questions and concerns of 
universal theory and practice, though, again, I have not yet provided an argument in favor 
of experimentalism.  The experimental modes of inquiry they attempt to make possible 
are neither essentialist nor relativist, universal nor arbitrary.  Generalizations are 
necessary for even recognizing a problem as a problem, but their validity is provided by 
the effects they make possible.  Purposive inquiry is neither necessarily arbitrary nor 
embedded in incommensurable language games, for its “objectivity” is shown by its 
consequences.  Even though reason or the values of one's community cannot guarantee 
the validity of the effects they make possible, criticism is still possible on this model.  In 
fact, the assumption that ends must be defined prior to the problems they are meant to 
solve is likely to uncritically occlude the needs of the singular situations publics face.  
Universal problematizations may be useful, but, as their value is actually determined by 
the practices in which they come to bear, the ways in which they are deployed may often 
need to change. 
Finally, I should say a few words to head off the criticism that I am taking part in 
the very kind of theory that I deprecate.  Like Dewey and Foucault, my quarrel is not 
with theory in general but with certain kinds of theorizing that could be better aligned 
with the problems theory is supposed to help address.  Most theorists begin with actual 
problems or hope that their work will better the common good.  The question is: do they 
avoid the expert-centric practice of telling people what their own good is or what they 
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must do to realize it?  Do they theorize in a way attuned to the changing needs, 
technologies, interests, relations, and goals of changing peoples?  The experimental 
hypothesis is that theory that defines its purposes—to the extent that this is possible—has 
the best chance of avoiding being a dogma to be applied at whim or an ideology affirmed 
by whomever its effects best serve.  Problem-centered theory is likely to be attuned to its 
purposes and can be evaluated against other theories made to address the same goals.  My 
experimental account of political inquiry, including the language of publics and 
problems, specific intellectuals and problematizations, is no different and should be 
evaluated by its use in ameliorating public problems by those working to improve their 
lives—specifically, as I will soon show in more detail, in reference to global institutions 
like the World Bank.  Some problematizations will have better effects than mine and 
other theories and practices will have other uses.  
Now that the theory and practice of an alternative framework of political 
engagement has been sufficiently outlined with the help of Dewey and Foucault, it is 
possible to begin to indicate its value with respect to the universal model.  To do this, I 
will turn to the problematizations of global political theory.  There we will see that the 
practices of the universal framework are, as it were, writ large, for much of the research 
in this field is involved in finding the one norm or procedure to which the entire world 
could agree.  The same questions and problems arise:  What ends would limit a global 
“state,” and how would we know when it expresses them?  Instead of these efforts to 
reduce global problems to one problematization, Dewey and Foucault provide resources 
for multiplying ways of acting globally.  While the importance of international 
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institutions, like the United Nations, the World Bank, and Human Rights Watch cannot 
be doubted, perhaps the role of the global political theorist should be to create additional 
possibilities for dealing with concrete problems rather than attempting to limit ends to 
one. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
GLOBAL LEGITIMACIES AND MULTIPLE PROBLEMATIZATIONS 
 
In Chapter One, I showed how attempts to define an account of the legitimate 
state or structure of society that represents all its constituents often leads to expert-
directed practices.  Though Rawls takes himself to be radicalizing the Lockean project of 
defining justice by appealing to procedures rather than contestable norms, he does not 
explain in any detail how people could actually evaluate the legitimacy of institutions or 
what they should do when differences occurs.  The vagueness of reflective equilibrium 
leaves a great deal of the difficult work of ameliorating value conflict to philosophers.  
Expert centered practices may be better avoided, as I suggest in Chapter Two, by letting 
publics determine legitimate courses of action in their dealings with shared problems.  On 
this experimental account, legitimacy is reconstructed plurally, contextually, and 
experimentally, so that it may be better to speak of “legitimacies” which are defined in 
the context of problems from the concrete point of view of publics rather than by 
theorists alone.  In Chapter Three, I suggested that this alternative framework of 
legitimacy requires changes to the practices in which intellectuals are embedded.  Instead 
of trying to define universal ends or programs for action, experts could create 
genealogical problematizations with which publics themselves could experiment in 
working upon their problems.  Criticism would then be thought of as an act carried out by 
a social body upon itself in which intellectuals take part, rather than the mere application 
 144 
of values whose value is guaranteed by them. 
Now that I have outlined the theories and likely practices of the universal and 
experimental frameworks of legitimacy, we can return to the motivation for this project: 
how can global institutions be best criticized and transformed?  To provide a space for a 
comparative analysis, and to ensure that the contextual account I have developed is tested 
contextually, I will examine the theory and practice made possible by each paradigm.  
Because many global democratic theorists do not engage in the kinds of public-driven 
inquiry developed in Chapter Two, they often become entangled in endless universal 
disputes over the intuitions or procedures that define legitimate global politics.  Instead of 
creating historically and differentially attuned problematizations whose value is 
determined by experimental transformations of shared problems carried out by publics, as 
developed in Chapter Three, they are likely to repeat the practices of universal 
intellectuals in which the legitimacy of global institutions is defined by experts and 
applied by laypeople.  The radical potential of global democratic theory to transform the 
practices of the universal framework is thus often attenuated by attempts to define global 
legitimacy universally.53 
                                                 
53 This is true of many other fields, in particular deliberative democracy, feminism, and 
communitarianism.  For instance, much of the radicality of feminism is lost when feminists accept the 
universal framework of legitimacy, either to attempt to communicate new insights to other theorists or 
to understand the meaning of their own work.  Because this paradigm seeks a definition of legitimate 
politics to which all could, in theory, consent, it requires pluralism, difference, and context to be 
unexperimentally subsumed by the values of communities, the histories of  institutions, or even human 
nature.  Inquiry into ameliorating problematic situations for women and other historically oppressed 
peoples is replaced by universal arguments for the conditions of the legitimacy of such inquiries.  
Though, as I hope should be clear by now, I do not at all disparage reflection into the methodologies or 
values used to help ameliorate conflicts, the value of such considerations should be provided by their 
effects.  The universal framework of legitimacy, which ignores effects, has often lead to endless debates 
about methodologies and values with no clear way to arbitrate them.  This is particularly clear in 
feminism. 
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For instance, when Iris Young defines justice as “the elimination of institutionalized domination and 
oppression” (Young 15), she means to combat the effects of distributive accounts, which turn our 
attention to static material goods instead of social systems with differential histories (15-16).  If Justice 
and the Politics of Difference helped to effect such a shift, however, it was likely to be spite of this 
universal account of justice which is grounded in the very  paradigm of distributive justice from which 
she wants to distance herself.  For, in providing a new way of saying “justice is ___,” Young helps fill 
academic journals with debates over which intuitions really define justice.  Must it stem from a 
communicative ethic (34)?  Does it require a division between the right and the good (35)?  Must 
democracy be the opposite of domination (38)?  Young has clearly helped to change the kinds of things 
that theorists talk about, but to what extent does her formulation actually help practices become more 
intelligent?  It is far from clear that the abstract debates with which she takes part actually help any 
people better determine their own fates.  This is the danger in trying to change practices universally—a 
danger my dissertation faces as well.  One can simply try to effect new practices and risk reverting back 
to old habits, because the vocabulary for describing such work is lacking.  Or one can try to create 
universal tools for new practices, which other theorists will try to subsume under pre-existing models.  I 
take my project to follow this second alternative and take up the torch that Young and others have 
carried, though  it too is likely to just provide more fodder for abstract debate. 
  
Carol Gould faces similar difficulties in defining justice as the realization of human capacities for self-
development in Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights—even as she makes a highly effective 
criticism of the methodology of much political theory.  If we ground democratic decisions on rights, she 
explains, “the constitution-making decision should itself involve some democratic or consensual 
procedure.”  If we found rights on a democratic procedure, we have failed to understand that “the very 
idea of consensus implies the free and equal status of those who entered into the agreement....  Thus it 
would seem to presuppose the very rights that it would authorize.”  Gould correctly shows the question-
begging shape of much political justification, though the shape of political thinking can take many other 
forms than a circle and can be grounded in many other contents than justice and democracy—such as 
the move to communities and inheritances that Rorty takes.  Nonetheless, Gould makes the same move 
as Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Marx in positing a universal starting point in human nature, arguing that it 
would only be circular “if the rights that were instituted by the constitutional convention were the same 
rights that authorize the process of constitution making.  The regress ends and the circularity is avoided, 
however, if we take the democratic or consensual determination of constitutionally guaranteed rights as 
a recognition of those rights that are ingredient in human action and, more specifically here, as a 
recognition that it is these rights that are at the basis both of the authority of the democratic or 
consensual procedure that sets constitutional guarantees and of the democratic structures of self-
governance that the constitution itself establishes” (39-40).  The regress is supposed to end at a social 
ontology of humans as freely self-developing, yet no explanation is given as to why this basis should be 
consented to prior to the consent of democratic procedures or constitutional conventions rather than 
some other ground.  Again, without an experimental account of when, where, or how such an account of 
human nature is effective, Gould opens the door to interminable argument about the norms or 
procedures of legitimate politics while practices can continue to be dealt with arbitrarily. 
 
The move to the “concrete universal” that many feminist theorists have recently made is another step 
towards contextual politics while speaking the language of the universal tradition—perhaps another 
indication of how needed an experimental conception of legitimacy is.  For instance, Martha Nussbaum 
outlines a set of universal rights which will have particular instantiations in many of her works (1992, 
2000).  Yet without making the further experimental move wherein the particular practices determine 
the value of such “universals,” Nussbaum and others face insoluble difficulties in justifying one set of 
universals over another.  In some ways, Young's attempt to replace notions like “reasonableness” in 
favor of values like “the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression” without falling 
back on human nature and the semi-empirical foundation of Nussbaum's lists are steps in an 
experimental direction.  Nonetheless, because these formulations accept the framework of the universal 
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The universal framework of legitimacy funds roughly two positions in global 
democratic theory.  The first, while apparently containing two very different approaches, 
seeks philosophical justification of a universal definition of legitimate global politics via 
a particular set of norms or procedures.  David Held tries to extend liberalism beyond the 
state, while James Bohman represents the communitarian attempt to do the same.  
Though both provide different arguments and arrive at different norms and global 
institutions, their shared methodology is characterized by an appeal to intuitions.  Given a 
certain intuition, they say, global democracy is legitimate if and only if it forwards certain 
related norms.  John Rawls and Seyla Benhabib attempt to move beyond these 
substantive arguments in favor of a proceduralism that could delimit substantive 
disagreement.  Differing, again, in form and content, Rawls and Benhabib share the 
methodology of Held and Bohman by trying to define a procedure that could provide a 
single criterion for evaluating global institutions without concrete inquiry into the shifting 
and plural needs of publics or the problems these institutions are meant to solve. 
On the universal framework of legitimacy, the only alternative to substantive and 
procedural argumentation is skepticism or realism, as exemplified by Robert Dahl.  This 
standpoint argues that intuitions and procedures beg the question and cannot garner 
universal consent.  Thus, global legitimacy is a contradiction in terms.  As I will argue, 
however, this approach carries out the same methodology of its alternative, for Dahl must 
also provide a question-begging argument for delimiting his account of democracy 
                                                 
framework of legitimacy, they can just as easily reinscribe non-pluralist politics if they do not help lead 
to changed practices.  It is possible that these works may be strategic assets for transforming dominant 
discourses, but, a more effective way of undercutting these arguments and of making “universals” 
attuned to their effects may be by beginning and ending with concrete problems and experimental 
efforts to address them. 
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without concretely determining the ways in which consensus occurs or does not occur.  
Whether Held, Bohman, Rawls, Benhabib, or Dahl take part in such definitions or try to 
show that there is no such thing,54 they exemplify the universal framework of legitimacy 
in assuming that a universally valid definition of global democracy ought to define the 
space of legitimate politics and that, once such a criterion is found, criticizing and 
transforming global institutions accordingly will make them more legitimate.  The 
plurality of these approaches gives good reason to think that the value of a universal 
definition of legitimacy cannot be assumed or that, in other words, a different 
methodology may often create more legitimacies. 
John Dewey and Michel Foucault help to define a different account of legitimacy 
and an alternative practice of transformation and criticism that should help better align 
theory with the problem-amelioration with which people are already involved and could 
do better.  Rather than trying to demonstrate the value of any particular set of ends or 
means, Dewey and Foucault propose that political theorists help people themselves 
problematize, experiment upon, and evaluate global institutions.  The question-begging 
nature of political theory should be embraced, not denied.  It is meant to help actual 
people, not delimit the space in which “people” and “help” are defined.  Even if everyone 
agreed in the abstract that the United Nations or the World Bank should promote human 
rights or some other end, experimental inquiry would have to occur into its successes and 
failures in so doing, as well as the ways in which—and the people for whom—these 
                                                 
54 Like the epistemological problem of knowing the thing-in-itself, which leads to rationalist attempts to 
define the conditions for the possibility of truth and skeptical denials of it, the universal framework of 
legitimacy has led to attempts to define universal ends or to deny their possibility.  To dissolve these 
dichotomies it may be necessary to engage in inquiry that is not based upon the will-in-itself. 
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effects were actually valid.  In other words, unless the UN's effects are the same for all 
people, they do not, in fact, agree about what kinds of rights should be protected, in what 
ways, and by whom.  This will require plural, contextual, and empirical work, for, on an 
experimental model, the value of a human right is inseparable from the conditions and 
effects of promoting it.  Consequently, Dewey and Foucault suggest that, rather than 
trying to narrow down our options for dealing with problems to one criterion of 
legitimacy, theorists should multiply the possibilities for criticizing and transforming 
institutions and for creating new legitimacies. 
I would like to emphasize that much of the work done by Rawls, Held, or others 
working within the universal framework may be extremely useful, though not because of 
the arguments they provide or the self-evidence of any intuitions.  If, as Dewey and 
Foucault suggest, the value of even the most abstract theory should be determined by its 
effects, there can be no purely universal demonstration of the value of a norm or 
procedure.  This is not cause for despair, however, for the experimental approach allows 
ends to be evaluated by their concrete effects for particular purposes.  For instance, 
though Rawls may not be able to defeat all comers in theory, a combination of some of 
his insights with those of Bohman, for example, might help some people deal with a 
particular problem, even though they seem to be universally incompatible.  In this way, 
many of the debates of political theory could be dissolved via an experimental point of 
view, for the differences between competing definitions of legitimacy would be 
determined by their effects, not their premises. 
Since I argue that particular purposes define the value of even universal attempts 
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to define legitimacy, I will not try to prove—via self-evident intuitions or the coherence 
of my account—that the experimental framework of legitimacy is correct in every case or 
for every public problem.  I will not even argue that global democratic theory should 
become more experimental.  I only hope to provide a space in which the universal and 
experimental approaches could be evaluated, though the actual judgment of either will 
have to come from their use in solving concrete public problems.  I will show that, given 
certain purposes, the experimental framework should lead to better consequences in 
certain cases, and I will try to give some indication of what these cases might be.  On the 
experimental account, there is no proof of its superiority to any other framework in 
general.  The question is of when, where, how, and for whom it helps create more 
legitimate institutions.  If the problems, actions, or criticisms that the experimental 
framework makes possible are not useful for any particular purpose, there is no 
fundamental argument I could provide for it. 
 
The Universal Framework 
 
Before defining a space in which the universal framework and the experimental 
alternative might be judged, it will be useful to bring together some of the main points 
made in this dissertation thus far.  In particular, the experimental framework I have 
developed over the last two chapters should be summarized, though I would first like to 
summarize the universal framework outlined in Chapter One.  This approach should be 
more familiar than the experimental alternative, though my abstract treatment of a broad 
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spectrum of political philosophers may have seemed unfair.  I have painted this 
framework in such broad strokes in order to distinguish certain tendencies, rather than 
specific philosophers or even schools, from those of the alternative I have tried to trace.  
For instance, the later Rawls may very well have more to say in his defense against my 
characterization of him, yet the value of this picture of a set of concerns and problems in 
political philosophy should not be determined primarily by whether or not it can 
successfully portray every philosopher.  Since it would be worthless if no set of questions 
or issues could be characterized by it, I have tried to show how Locke and Rawls can be 
thought of along these lines and have indicated in footnotes how other thinkers and 
schools of thought might as well.  But, in the end, the value of this picture is in how it 
helps to juxtapose an alternative that better ameliorates public problems. 
I have tried to outline the universal account through a set of goals, problems, and 
assumptions.  No one of these is primary, as, for example, a set of assumptions funds the 
goals and problems that make those assumptions useful.  For this reason, I have tried to 
describe a set of practices and ways of thinking that forms a coherent whole.  Philosophy 
done within this framework, I argue, is not simply mistaken and does not commit a 
logical fallacy.  Given certain assumptions and goals, it is perfectly reasonable to be 
committed to the projects this framework makes possible.  However, it does not easily 
allow questioning about its assumptions and goals and, thus, its own value.  In assuming 
legitimacy must be universal, it often does not make it clear how actual people with 
conflicting values could contest the definition of justice or even what should be done 
when people do not agree.  Even on its own terms, there are good reasons to think that 
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this framework is not as useful as it may seem, as the sheer plurality of answers to this 
problem over the years give no reason to think that the right set of norms or procedures 
are around the corner.  For this reason, a great deal of my work has been to show that 
another set of goals, problems, and assumptions is not only possible but may be useful as 
well. 
The universal framework of legitimacy has the following primary goal.  It seeks 
to define just coercion, legitimate rule, or “right power,” in Locke’s terms by reference to 
a common good or conception of justice which a legitimate state must express.  In a 
complex modern society, where many different values vie for expression, one set of 
interests should not be able to trump another and direct the coercive power of the state 
without appeal to ends that all share.  A rule must therefore be found for discriminating 
between coercion that is illegitimate and that which could, at least in theory, be justified.  
The alternative to such a rule is exemplified by Hobbes, the sworn enemy of this 
framework.  He believed that there was no way to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate 
coercion and that the best solution to a bad situation was a balance of power in which no 
interest trumped any other absolutely.  Such a modus vivendi, however, is unstable and 
may lead to injustices, e.g., against minorities.  In order to avoid such politics as 
repressed war, many subsequent theorists have attempt to find a rule, a set of norms, or a 
procedure that could gain widespread consensus by transcending individual differences.  
The rule often takes the following form: If legitimate coercion is that to which all people 
could consent, it must express the universal value X (rights, utility, deliberation, etc.).  
However, the rule can take other, less ostensibly democratic forms: If legitimate coercion 
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must be done in people's best interests, the group of experts who might know these 
interests are Y (Gods, political philosophers, scientists, etc.).   
A series of questions are bound up with this goal, though they are generally 
oriented by the concern of coercion.  The same rules, norms, or procedures that would, if 
institutionalized, eliminate unjust coercion from the practices of widespread institutions 
are also likely to both prevent modus vivendi and foster stability.  Since everyone could 
be shown to agree upon such rules, they would have no reason to revolt against 
institutions that expressed them, for, despite what they may think or feel, such institutions 
are just.  If a rebellion against such institutions did occur, it could be quelled legitimately, 
for people are morally obligated by the universal norms or procedures.  This, of course, is 
only on the assumption that widespread institutions, like the state, do express such rules 
and do not overstep their boundaries.  People should not be obligated to obey any 
intrusion into their lives which is not in their true interests.  However, it is not only 
institutions, but the plurality of people's beliefs that may be limited as well.  Whether it 
concerns the beliefs fostered by educational practices or the kinds of argument that may 
be heard in public discourse, there is a limit to pluralism.  In short, questions concerning 
the limits of the state and the obligations of the people fund and are funded by the goal of 
finding a rule determining just and unjust rule.  Both largely define the space of 
legitimate politics. 
The questions and goal of the universal framework of legitimacy are funded by a 
number of assumptions, though one in particular lends credence to the others.  Simply 
stated, the universal framework assumes that ends cannot be evaluated by reference to 
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experience.  Values are understood as beliefs that people hold, and since there is no 
empirical justification of a value, there is no way to falsify or corroborate a moral belief 
other than by reference to other beliefs.  The very fact that someone holds a value makes 
it valid unless it contradicts other values, whether it be Locke's natural law or Rawls's 
comprehensive doctrines.  The task of the political philosopher is thus limited in two 
ways.  First, she can only examine how a value coheres with other values, and, 
consequently, she does not have to look to the consequences of a value in order to 
determine its value.  Finding a rule to which all people could in theory assent is then a 
matter of finding a norm or procedure that is both coherent with other values and could 
be said to transcend or ground them.  Whether or not institutionalizing such a norm or 
procedure leads to valid consequences—such as whether it reduces coercion or instances 
of rebellion—is not taken into account at all, for such questions do not even make sense 
on this account.  Instead, universal questions about the state, the people, and legitimacy 
are asked and answered apart from any contextual analysis into how states occur, what 
people are affected, or the ways in which legitimacies and illegitimacies happen. 
Because of these goals, questions, and assumptions, the universal framework 
makes possible a set of practices—though, of course, these practices reinforce the 
universal apparatus.  Most importantly, the understanding of values as divided from facts 
creates a division between theory and application wherein theorists determine correct 
values and critics apply them to institutions.  The value of these applications is 
determined by the value of the norms or procedures used, and this is defined by a 
theorist’s ability to argue for the coherence or self-evidence of a certain set of intuitions.  
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The unexpected or undesirable effects of an application, and thus a theory, are seen as 
contingencies and not as constituents of its true value.  Application is divided from 
theorization such that the former can neither reform nor determine the applicability of the 
latter.  Of course, on the experimental framework, this division between theory and 
practice cannot be assumed, for experience has provided many cases where good theory 
makes for bad practice. 
This attempted separation between theory and practice has the further 
consequence that arguments for certain norms or procedures are replayed again and again 
with no means of resolving them.  For instance, the purely universal debate between 
liberalism and communitarianism is a conflict between intuitions: freedom from 
constraint or autonomy via constraints.  The continuance of these positions is due to their 
ability to help us interpret and control our lives, but they are not universal solutions.  
Since these two intuitions are useful in certain circumstances, it is unlikely that any 
unempirical argument will lead one to categorically trump the other.  Thus, if carried out 
in abstraction from effects, these debates will continue, much like the larger question of 
reconciling the plurality of beliefs with the unity of the state via a universal rule.  The 
plurality of answers to these questions—rights, utility, autonomy, virtue, rational 
behavior, fairness, self-actualization, self-determination, non-domination, the 
requirements of communication—are perhaps due to the multitude of ways that the 
problems facing publics might be ameliorated.  For this reason, the experimental 
framework suggests a turn to concrete contexts to determine when, where, why, how and 
for whom such an answer is valid. 
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In sum, the universal framework of legitimacy requires a universal criterion of the 
ends that  limit the coercive power of a legitimate state and the obligations of people.  
Because effects do not determine the value of these ends, it is often through an appeal to 
intuitions or the norms of a community that such criteria are defined.  Political theory 
has, accordingly, become much less deductive and much more hermeneutic.  This 
represents a step in the right direction, as I hope to show, yet it is one that has not yet 
taken seriously the pluralistic criticisms of Marxists, feminists, communitarians, critical 
race theorists, deliberative democrats or global democratic theorists.  Indeed, many of 
these theorists have not been able to capitalize on the radicality of their own views.55  If 
                                                 
55 Communitarianism, like feminism and deliberative democracy, has many resources to provide new 
ways of thinking about political problems.  However, the framework of legitimacy has limited the 
effectiveness of its criticisms.  For instance, Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice (1983) is a refreshing 
response to John Rawls' A Theory of Justice and other similar works.  Unlike Rawls' attempt to find a 
basic structure of society that is legitimate universally, Walzer argues that “the principles of justice are 
themselves pluralistic in form; that different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in 
accordance with different procedures, by different agents, and that all these differences derive from 
different understandings of the social goods themselves—the inevitable product of historical and 
cultural particularism” (6).  He invites us to examine the possibility that justice is meaningless without 
investigation into context.  Yet, at the very same moment, he suggests a non-contextual understanding 
of justice, which he calls complex equality: “complex equality means that no citizen's standing in one 
sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with 
regard to some other good” (19).  The different spheres of justice are all to be ordered by the threat of 
tyranny, so that no person or group can gain dominance in too great a number of contexts.  This 
definition, which sounds like a return to a Hobbesian balance of powers, simply makes liberals think 
that their suspicions of pluralism were right, for Walzer cannot provide an answer to concerns about 
modus vivendi, moral obligation, or coercion.  Rather than trying to address these issues, 
communitarians might do a better job of avoiding them by changing the problems and practices with 
which philosophers are concerned, instead of trying to fit new ways of thinking into old terms, 
arguments, and methodologies. 
 
Communitarian thought has also allowed for a powerful criticism of Rawlsian and Post-Rawlsian theory 
due to its focus on substantive moral claims.  In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), Michael 
Sandel argues that a single definition of justice cannot be found, because people are unable to step 
outside of their particular values, histories, and communities to determine justice as such (see Taylor 
1992).  This line of thinking has led to the criticism of substantive accounts based on the fact of 
reasonable pluralism as well as to a distinction between procedural and substantive definitions of 
legitimacy and justice.  However, the communitarian alternative has itself been forced to accept the 
position of either substantive moral philosophy or grounding thick, community-based politics on more 
neutral norms, such as autonomy or self-determination.  Neither of these options is particularly 
appealing, yet communitarianism could take a third path if it commits itself to concrete analyses into 
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one wants to take the “fact of reasonable pluralism” seriously, is it not reasonable to 
reconfigure legitimacy in a pluralistic, contextualist, and experimental manner—that is, 
according to the effects of actual people dealing with concrete problems? 
 
The Experimental Framework 
 
Dewey and Foucault provide resources for reconstructing legitimacy and for 
developing an alternative model of political inquiry.  Like the universal point of view, the 
experimental framework is defined by a set of goals, questions, assumptions, and 
practices, and, similarly, no one of these can be said to be primary; each aspect is 
mutually reinforcing and helps constitute a coherent framework.  By making reference to 
Dewey’s reflections on pluralism and the evaluation of values, I outlined a different 
account of how the validity of political theories and values could be defined, that is, by 
their effects for particular peoples working through concrete problems.  Though I have 
used the same word, it may best on this model to speak of legitimacies that are produced 
by experimental transformations rather than legitimacy.  On this framework, a universal 
definition of legitimacy is merely one way of creating more legitimate institutions.  
Similarly, its often unreflectively exclusionary results are not limited to attempts to 
divide theory from application; all theory risks being unattuned to its conditions and 
effects.  Since it the conditions and effects of the transformations a theory makes possible 
                                                 
problems in which issues of community are primary.  It does not have to show that communities are the 
site of politics that trumps all others.  If communitarians want to avoid interminable debates with 
liberals, they will have to change the terms of this debate.  The experimental framework may help do 
so. 
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are always practices related to some one, Dewey suggests that political theory might 
often be more effective if it begins and ends with publics and their problems.  Foucault 
provides a few examples of how theorists might work with people to critically transform 
institutions instead of defining legitimacy for them.  Both help rethink how theory might 
answer to practice and try to theorize in a way that encourages practical inquiry. 
The goal of the experimental framework is to help people more effectively 
reconstruct the institutions, situations, environments, or any other problematic structure 
that impacts their lives.  Because there are many problems, institutions, peoples, and 
values, the experimentalist puts the concrete problem first rather than trying to 
universally narrow the number of tools available to a set of universally valid norms or 
procedures.  Certain regularities will, of course, arise, as the effects of rights discourse 
make clear; yet the use of these tools should ultimately depend on the task at hand, as the 
application of such tools to new problems also shows, e.g., the attempts to think of health 
care as a human right, housing as a human right, etc.  Because problems are problems for 
people, the test of their amelioration should be determined by people, not by an arbitrarily 
selected group of people or a rule known in advance to be correct.  Thus, in many ways, 
the goals of this framework are negative: not to assume that the state is the site of politics, 
not to assume that people might be represented by one norm for all purposes, not to 
assume that the existence of a belief determines its value.  More positively, however, the 
goal is to allow legitimacies to be defined in as many ways as is necessary, and this 
requires concrete analysis into the ways that institutions structure different peoples' lives.  
Instead of assuming that an institution’s validity is determined by the values it is 
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supposed to express—and which in turn are supposed to be validated by the intuitions of 
experts—the experimental framework tries to foster concrete inquiry into the ways in 
which institutions are or are not actually legitimate. 
Accordingly, this account of legitimacy is bound up with a number of questions.  
Rather than prioritizing concerns about moral obligation, modus vivendi, or coercion—
that is, of the relationship between the state as such and the people as such—the 
experimental framework makes more situated, local, and experimental questions possible.  
Dewey and Foucault suggest that experimentalists keep three related concerns in view.  
1) An empirical question: For whom is an institution, norm, procedure, or practice 
legitimate? What interests are served? What are the effects?  2) A comparative question: 
How do these effects compare with those of other institutions, norms, procedures, or 
practices? What other interests might be served? What other effects could be produced?  
3) A genealogical question: What power structures and values make these institutions 
possible?  What institutions, norms, procedures, or practices are at the root of current 
situations?  What other frameworks might be possible?  These concerns should help carry 
out experimental, concrete, and differential analyses of values, institutions, and practices, 
in which effects should form a large part. 
The experimental framework has two important assumptions.  First, it assumes 
that values are experientially grounded and can be experimentally evaluated.  Values are 
not simply valid because people hold them, but because of the conditions and effects they 
have for them.  Value judgment thus requires some kind of action and an analysis of 
effects with reference to other values or previous effects; it cannot simply involve 
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reflection or analysis.  Unlike the realist presupposition that values are somehow 
objective—either ontologically or as necessary features of human experience—the 
experimentalist thinks that values are produced in certain contexts.  Unlike the skeptical 
assumption that values are just the sediment of certain histories that “we” happen to 
share, the experimentalist assumes that these values are effects—in part caused by 
historical institutions, but in part caused by the work that they do for people.  The 
experimentalist thus believes that values are objective and subjective, since they are 
objectively produced, though such effects are not assumed to be universal.  Accordingly, 
they should be both objectively and subjectively evaluated—that is, contextually, 
plurally, and empirically.  The experimental framework assumes, second, that the 
evaluation of widespread values should be connected to publics working through 
problems.  These two terms (publics and problems) name the "subjective" and "objective" 
poles of political inquiry and reconstruction.  There are other ways for people to 
transform their institutions and there may be other ways to evaluate them, though, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, I have focused on publics and problems as a  plausible way 
of doing so.   
These assumptions may seem too great, but, if one is trying to move past 
dichotomies between facts and values, as it seems that many are, the experimental 
approach is a powerful way of doing so.  Realist and skeptical approaches, in rejecting 
the pre-Enlightenment assumption that facts and values are the same—that the value of 
science is provided by its proximity to God's mind—simply split facts and values and 
provide no way to reconcile them.  Facts then become subject to moral judgments that 
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appeal to grounds for which no reasons can be given, other than coherence, self-evidence, 
inheritance, etc.  Instead, the experimental approach simply assumes that no particular 
relationship between facts and values can be assumed.  The question is to understand the 
particular ways that concrete facts condition certain values or that specific values help 
produce a set of facts.  These assumptions about value are then lent plausibility, or shown 
to be implausible, by their effects in solving political problems.  In fact, these and similar 
effects are the only things that could, on experimental terms, judge the validity of such 
assumptions.  I hope that the questions and effects made possible by this framework in 
the field of global democratic theory might begin to do so. 
One major consequence of this approach is that it requires legitimacy to be 
determined with reference to particular peoples.  Rather than assuming that the 
institutionalization of certain values will have valid consequences, the experimental 
framework calls for attuned experimentation and analysis into differential consequences.  
It is possible that such local, differential, and experimental work will not be more 
effective than universal approaches, but it is the only way that might allow one to tell.  
Though it is not possible to predict with any certainty what the effects of the 
problematizations made according to the experimental framework might be, it is likely 
that those made genealogically—that is, those attuned to histories and differences—will 
take seriously the singularity of a problem while making reference to its similarity to 
previous situations.  This approach does not express a metaphysical assumption about the 
nature of experience.  Rather, it stems from a commitment to empirical method that 
James called "radical empiricism."  One cannot assume, experimentally, that new 
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situations have any particular relationship with past events.  Accordingly, as Foucault 
suggests, it is necessary to pay attention to how these events occur. 
In avoiding the extremes of subsuming a political problem to previous results or 
despairing of its radical difference from past events, it can be difficult to find a helpful 
middle ground.  Though every situation will have habitual responses of varying 
usefulness, Dewey and Foucault suggest three possible avenues of inquiry for 
(re)constructing a problematization.  In what ways do existing institutions produce 
possibilities for communication? What forms of imagination of alternatives do they make 
possible? How do they provide resources for flexible transformation? Though these three 
questions are not necessary for providing a new understanding of every problem, they 
provide a set of tools for genealogically analyzing the conditions of the present.  It is 
through these problematizations that current situations can be understood by reference to 
the past as well as to the future courses of action they allow.  Theory is not then 
connected to practice in any kind of top-down manner, but is rather a part of the entire 
process of public-formation, problem-recognition, experimentation, and evaluation, or 
what I have called criticism. 
In sum, the experimental framework demands concrete analysis into the ways that 
certain interests are served by certain institutions and suggests means of evaluating and 
transforming those values.  It suggests that effects will be best when we know what 
interests are actually served by institutionalized values, rather than assuming that their 
effects would be universally valid if only the right values were found.  It provides a way 
of evaluating and transforming these institutions experimentally, not by reference to a 
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value known to be valid because it is presumed to represent a community.  Of course, the 
intuitions and values that universal theorists attempt to demonstrate un-experimentally 
may be lead to legitimate effects—and, in fact, they are held to be valid because this is 
the case.  On the experimental framework, however, they represent only a beginning, as 
universal constructs should be oriented by the effects they are meant to produce.  I have 
suggested that, in political issues, the experimental test should be oriented by a public 
problem, where people's experiences are the basis for their evaluation.  Of course, the 
difficulties in accurately judging effects are great, especially when people are rarely 
experts on the topic at hand, when they disagree, when they live on different continents, 
or when they speak different languages.  Yet one has to address these empirical problems 
if people are to be masters of their own fate.  Leaving matters wholly up to experts is 
likely to exclude many of the interests that may be affected, as contemporary global 
democratic theory done on the universal framework will show. 
 
Legitimacy Writ Large 
 
Now that I have summarized the two frameworks outlined in this dissertation, I 
can begin to show the ways that global democratic theory has been dominated by a 
universal approach as well as some of the effects that this has in transforming and 
criticizing global institutions like the World Bank.  Despite many exciting and 
imaginative developments in this field, however, much of the literature is concerned with 
philosophically demonstrating the validity of one form of global politics over another, so 
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that inquiry into particular institutions first requires knowledge of the universal ends they 
are to express.56 Here, the problems of the universal framework of legitimacy are, as it 
were, writ large, for demonstrations of universal validity must show that one value or 
procedure grounding such politics is more valid than all others for all humans—despite 
cultural, historical, economic, social, gender, class, race, and personal differences.  
Unsurprisingly, there is a great deal of skepticism about attempts to extend the non-
universal values of liberalism or communitarianism, for example, to global politics.  Even 
the recent attempts to argue for historical universals or value-neutral procedures must 
prove that such grounds are shared by all peoples and trump all other values.  Given such 
                                                 
56 Deliberative democracy, like feminism, communitarianism, and global democracy, has resources for 
dealing with problems experimentally.  However, instead of concrete investigation into institutions that 
thwart intelligent inquiry or suggesting specific ways for making deliberation possible, much 
deliberative democratic literature has been concerned with universally demonstrating that it is more 
legitimate than other accounts of democracy.  For example, Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson's Why 
Deliberative Democracy (2004) aims to “provide the most justifiable conception for dealing with moral 
disagreement in politics” (10) via a second order theory.  Moral pluralism shows that a procedure must 
be found that can adjudicate moral debates.  Deliberative democracy fits such a need, and is able to 
order these other debates (56), producing decisions that are binding (5).  Deliberative democracy trumps 
rights or aggregation because it expresses the value of “mutual respect” (79) and thus creates the 
conditions in which the kinds of rights a public needs could be determined and the space in which 
aggregation could be legitimate.  Yet David Estlund argues that deliberation is not the legitimate form 
of democracy because it is grounded upon a contestable value like “mutual respect” but because it is 
most likely to produce correct answers.  This epistemic defense of deliberative democracy tries to 
undercut any normative grounding for deliberation and appeals to value-neutral norms like truth or 
inquiry (see also Misak 2000; Talisse 2004). 
 
What unites these very different theorists is their attempts to ground deliberative democracy universally 
via a shared norm that trumps and orders moral conflict.  Once the right grounding is found, decisions 
made deliberatively can be known to be legitimate, and those who, unreasonably, do not agree with its 
outcomes can be coerced.  Instead of such arguments, the experimental framework suggests that the 
legitimacy of deliberation be determined by its effects.  When and where does it actually help create 
moral obligations in concrete situations?  For whom does it help create lasting solutions to problems?  
How does it reduce instances of coercion?  Furthermore, by asking these questions with reference to 
particular peoples and problems, it provides means of asking which of these, or other goals, are to be 
most prioritized.  Appeals to “mutual respect” or “truth” may provide indications of the value of certain 
forms of deliberation, but it is likely that more genealogical problematization and experimentation will 
help to provide better ways of showing how certain kinds of deliberation could help ameliorate specific 
problems.  Deliberative democracy could become experimental if it sidestepped the universal 
framework of legitimacy, made concrete suggestions for increasing deliberation, and provided reasons 
for why this would be useful for solving particular problems.  In this way, the value of deliberation 
could be determined and other approaches could be weighed against it. 
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difficulties, global democratic theory has become stuck on the issue of legitimacy.  Either 
a universally valid set of norms or procedures can define legitimate global institutions, or 
global politics is a reversion to the Hobbesian or anarchic war of all against all.  In order 
to show how a number of the pivotal discussions of legitimacy in global democratic 
theory are based upon universal assumptions, I will categorize three approaches to the 
debate: substantive/historical, procedural, and skeptical.  Because I will show that 
theorists grouped under these fields share one methodology, rather than a definite content 
or argumentative form, these designations are rough, though not without their use. 
In David Held's important Democracy and the Global Order, he argues that, 
though the nation state has dominated democratic theory and practice, new developments 
in global complexity undermine one of its essential assumptions.  In a world where an 
earthquake in Indonesian may disrupt stock markets in Europe, or where population 
flows in North America blur any stable characterization of citizens or borders, one can no 
longer presuppose that there is a “'symmetrical' and 'congruent' relationship between 
political decision-makers and the recipients of political decisions” (1995, 16).  That is, 
since it is no longer clear that citizens can hold their representatives accountable nor that 
representatives may be able to enact satisfactory policies for their citizens, Held argues 
that we must both rethink and extend democracy globally.  The erosion of state 
sovereignty means that legitimate global power ought to marry the resurgence of the 
decentered form of power most apparent in Medieval Europe with state-centered 
constitutional structures (140).  Held finds the conceptual resources for reconstructing 
democracy in the liberal principle of autonomy, “a principle embedded in the public 
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political culture of a democratic society” (148). 
Rights need not be understood as the domain of nation states but can be 
understood as conditions for the possibility of autonomy—or as entitlement capacities.  
He writes, “The autonomy of the citizen can be represented by that bundle of rights 
which people can enjoy as a result of their status as free and equal members of particular 
communities” (150).  If people are to be truly autonomous—and this has become more 
and more difficult in a globalized world due to the limitations of state sovereignty—the 
purpose of global institutions must be to protect such entitlement capacities or rights.  
However, recognizing that “endless abstract debates” may follow from such a purely 
conceptual analysis, Held understands that the “meaning of the principle of autonomy 
must be further unfolded in the context of an examination of the conditions of its 
entrenchment” (159).  This is undertaken as a thought experiment of the ways that global 
institutions might forward autonomy.  Though it must be recognized that “if one stands 
outside the liberal democratic tradition, then the acceptance of the premise, let alone the 
result, would be in doubt” (160), the thought experiment shows the conditions for the 
possibility of disagreement: “the conditions of democratic dialogue” (167).  One can then 
see seven sites of power, or seven areas in which rights must be realized, which global 
institutions must address in order to entrench autonomy. 
The implementation of these rights requires international law.  Held argues that 
“the establishment of a cosmopolitan community—a community of all democratic 
communities—must become an obligation for democrats” (232).  Though sovereignty 
would no longer be directly tied to states, “networks of states,” “sub-national entities,” or 
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“transnational communities, organizations, and agencies” might allow sovereignty “to be 
stripped away from the idea of fixed borders and territories and thought of as, in 
principle, malleable time-space clusters” (234).  By grounding the principle of legitimacy 
in autonomy, and because of the subsequent reconstruction of rights, sovereignty can be 
rethought of as people taking control of their rights without the intermediaries of states.  
Still, Held suggests that international law must itself be ratified by individual states (270-
3).  Extending the United Nations' constitutional structures is the framework of the new 
global order, a global "state" with legislative and coercive power, though taking a quite 
different form from what is traditionally understood as a state. 
Though there is much worthy of analysis in Held's book, I will focus on his 
argument for autonomy.  At the very moment that he locates a new grounding for 
legitimate cosmopolitan governance, he admits that “the principle of autonomy can only 
be fully traced to one of the core traditions of Western democracy—the liberal 
democratic tradition” (149).  And, as we have seen, when further tracing out the meaning 
of autonomy, he says that one must stand inside the tradition to agree with the results of 
the thought experiment he runs.  At the same time, however, the thought experiment 
shows the conditions for the possibility of agreement and disagreement and provides a 
universally valid understanding of autonomy.  In short, by attempting to avoid an account 
of rights that appeals to human nature or natural law, Held's historical grounding of rights 
in the liberal tradition raises important questions about the ways in which arguments for 
legitimate cosmopolitan democracy should be made.  Many theorists since Held have 
expanded upon and refined the principles that define sovereignty and rights, and they 
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have contested the shape of new institutions of sovereignty, yet, in sharing Held's project 
of conceptually grounding a new understanding of the structure of sovereignty, they face 
the same problems. 
For instance, while communitarianism has often appeared antithetical to 
cosmopolitanism, a few theorists have taken up the challenge to provide a set of 
communitarian norms to define global democracy.  James Bohman has recently argued 
that the republican principle of self-determination, unlike the liberal emphasis on 
noninterference, can provide a basis for human rights that is not proscribed by the state 
(2008, 4-5).  All rights are then grounded in the primary right to initiate deliberation.  
Once self-determination has been shown to trump other norms, cosmopolitanism should 
be rethought transnationally, as one global government is unable to take seriously the 
diversity of peoples determining their own fates (44).  Though not requiring a single state 
with coercive authority, the community of humanity should be united by plural public 
spheres which, though particular, are forums that “manifest the commitment of 
participants to freedom and equality” and “address an indefinite audience” (60).  Thus, 
despite having a very different picture of legitimate global politics, Bohman's 
methodology is quite similar to Held's.  He provides few reasons for why self-
determination should trump autonomy or any other value in all cases, yet this should be 
an essential step in any such argument for universal government.  For this reason, it is 
hard not to see these historical or substantive arguments as anything but idiosyncratic. 
Theorists have tried many paths to solve the tension between universal 
justification and particular argumentation evidenced in Held's and Bohman's works, and 
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the problem can be stated in various ways.57  How can one provide a universal definition 
of human rights or legitimate global institutions without being subject to one's particular 
beliefs or, what is more, a cultural imperialist? What values do all people hold, and how 
could this be demonstrated? On what basis can we criticize the governments of others 
when their peoples hold radically different values than we do? Without universally valid 
norms or procedures, a universally legitimate form of global politics is not possible.  Still, 
the two common options of appealing to human nature or to a contingent historical 
institution are not satisfactory to many.  While it is true that simply because something is 
discovered in a particular time and place does not mean that it does not have wider 
application, arguments like Held's fail to explain why those who do not hold liberal 
values should do so.  Nor does he tell us what to do with those who do not.  Are they 
relegated outside the cosmopolitan order? Is there no way to criticize those who do not 
hold our values? Must cosmopolitan governance await universal consensus? 
To address these and other questions raised by substantive projects like Held's, 
some theorists have attempted to develop a basis for legitimate global politics not through 
                                                 
57 This question is at the root of a long-standing debate within feminist  theory in particular (see Dietz 
2003 for an apt summary).  How can women raise consciousness about human rights violations 
throughout  the world when there is no consensus about what constitutes a human  right violation—even 
in extreme cases like female circumcision?   How can one even use a category like “women” when 
“women” are always differently empowered and disempowered?  Should “women” refer to the 
possession of a chromosome, a position in a hierarchy,  or solidarity in a movement?  Historically, 
feminists have had two choices when dealing with such problems of naming.  They can work within 
existing categories, such as by extending rights that men have traditionally had to women, as seen  in 
equal pay for equal  work movements.  Or they can “deconstruct” categories and show how terms like 
“women” are always mapped in relation to other  structures like race, class, and sexual orientation.  
Leslie McCall suggests a third, experimental alternative, which she calls an  “intercategorial approach,” 
wherein the value of categories is not simply assumed or rejected but is determined by their effects  
(2005, 1784-5).  Due to her social-scientific background, she examines the meaning of such terms via 
statistical analysis, but she points towards a critical use of categories that is much more broadly 
experimental.  Statistical analysis is only one way in which a problem may be experimentally 
ameliorated. 
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an appeal to historical institutions or intuitions but by reference to hypothetical 
procedures.  John Rawls epitomizes this approach.  In The Law of Peoples, he argues that 
the proceduralism developed in A Theory of Justice and characterized by both the original 
position and reflective equilibrium can be extended to international justice.  It is not 
states but representatives of peoples that are parties of the international original position, 
because, while people can be reasonable, states are “moved solely by their prudent or 
rational pursuit interests” (27).  That people are able to give and take reasons and act 
upon such reasons is one of the conditions for the possibility for global justice, because 
only people can act out of moral obligation to principles they themselves have chosen.  
Without such moral consensus, it is only by modus vivendi that states could avoid war, 
and that would not be lasting.  Stability for the right reasons, unlike an unstable balance 
of powers, “describes a situation in which, over the course of time, citizens acquire a 
sense of justice that inclines them not only to accept but to act upon the principles of 
justice” (45). 
There is no deductive argument that could demonstrate the shape of a just global 
order, and so it is essential to understand “whether a realistic utopia is possible, and the 
conditions under which it might obtain” (1999, 5-6).  If it is reasonable to think that 
liberal peoples could agree to a set of international principles (such as the eight listed on 
page 37), and that non-liberal states could accept them, then a law of peoples is a 
reasonable utopia.  Unlike A Theory of Justice, in which parties in the original position 
were allowed to choose from various comprehensive doctrines, “the representatives of 
well-ordered peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these principles of equality 
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among peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose alternatives” (41).  
Rawls is careful to say that the law of peoples is not simply a justification of liberal 
manifest destiny, because we cannot assume that moral obligation to such law requires 
that people live in liberal states (60).  “The reason we go on to consider the point of view 
of decent peoples is not to prescribe principles of justice for them, but to assure ourselves 
that the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a liberal people are also reasonable 
from a decent nonliberal point of view” (10).  Once such a list is generated, we can be 
sure that international relations do not have to be reduced to the war of all states against 
all others, and “our hope becomes reasonable hope” (23).   
Though the law of peoples is made by convening imagined representatives of 
people who are ignorant of the state to which they will belong, it does not require a global 
cosmopolitanism.  Taking people as they are and laws as they might be, as Rawls, 
echoing Rousseau, asserts, a realistic utopia must respect the existence of states.  At some 
later date, a global cosmopolitanism may succeed, but, for now, we must deal with the 
possibility of forming a law of peoples from liberal and decent states (83).  One should 
bear the goal of the law of peoples in mind: to eliminate gross human rights violations, 
genocide, and other crimes against humanity.  “[O]nce the gravest forms of political 
injustice are eliminated...  these great evils will eventually disappear” (7).  The law of 
peoples is a moral idea for peace and has no larger goal, such as a comprehensive 
doctrine may have, to restructure political orders.  Decent and “liberal peoples have 
nothing to go to war about” (47), Rawls argues.  If this is not true, a global 
cosmopolitanism would not be able to save us. 
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By stepping back from cosmopolitan aims, Rawls avoids the danger of 
universalizing the particular that Held faces in delineating a universally valid norm to 
ground global politics.  His proceduralism is not rooted in any particular historical beliefs 
or contingent institutions.  Though the account he gives is liberal, it is politically liberal, 
for nonliberal states could endorse it.  He is right to point out that, “[t]o the objection that 
to proceed thus is ethnocentric or merely western, the reply is: no, not necessarily.  
Whether it is so turns on the content of the Law of Peoples that liberal societies embrace” 
(121).  In other words, one must look to the effects of a Law of Peoples to decide upon 
the legitimacy of its exclusions.  Nonetheless, like his Political Liberalism, analyzed in 
Chapter One, who gets to decide upon what principles and how reflective equilibrium 
should occur is far from clear, especially in a global context.  Rawls again asserts that 
“[w]hether our conjecture is borne out will depend on whether you and I, here and now, 
can, on due reflection, endorse the principles adopted” (30), yet he gives no indication of 
what to do when people disagree—in reflection, or, what is more likely, in the effects 
produced by the institutionalization of the values supposed to be agreed upon.  How do 
we know when we agree, who can dissent, and what structures exist to make and institute 
these decisions? Instead of providing means to answer these difficult, empirical 
questions, Rawls provides resources for a one-directional model of theory and practice, 
such as when he suggests, “It is the task of the student of philosophy to articulate and 
express the permanent conditions and the real interests of a well-ordered society.  It is the 
task of the statesman, however, to discern these conditions and interests in practice” (97). 
Rawls does not even answer the basic question of why one should use the 
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framework of the original position and reflective equilibrium to determine international 
law, except that it might seem right to some people.  Reflective equilibrium does not 
explain how his proceduralism could be evaluated, and there are plenty of other paths one 
could take.  Seyla Benhabib, for example, describes a different proceduralism in her 
Tanner Lectures published as Another Cosmopolitanism (2006).  In her investigations 
into "the scarf affair” in France and debates over immigration and citizenship in 
Germany, she finds that the validity of cosmopolitan norms is not dependent upon any 
particular deployment of a democratic norm—an “iteration” in her language—which may 
lead to good or bad consequences, but on the process of iterating a universal norm (47-9).  
To bridge the gap between universal norms and particular cultures, what is needed are 
“multiple iterations” (70).  These iteration are given authority by “the power of 
democratic forces within a global civil society” (71, deemphasis mine).  That is, the 
already iterated instantiations of global justice grant the basis for the authority for future 
iterations, and “such norms and principles are morally constructive” (72).  They create a 
new order.  In short, Benhabib suggests that, rather than any particular global institutions 
being legitimate, the process of contestation and deliberation, the iteration of universal 
norms in multiple ways, is itself legitimate.  Neither federalism nor a cosmopolitan state 
is necessary.  The ways the new global order will be produced are multiple. 
Like Rawls, Benhabib provides few resources for determining which iterations 
are better than others or for explaining why her proceduralism trumps others.  These 
examples indicate that, though proceduralism seems to offer a way to obviate some of the 
problems of using a substantive doctrine to describe global legitimacy, it too may import 
 173 
substantive criteria or lead to substantively different effects.  Rawls is, after all, 
describing global justice based upon liberalism, political or not, and Benhabib is drawing 
upon controversial post-modern philosophy.  The lack of any way to arbitrate the 
differences between these two theorists raises the question of whether or not 
proceduralism is any less particular than substantive theories of global justice.  Because 
of this worry, some theorists have taken a skeptical turn, arguing that the language of 
legitimacy simply does not apply to global politics.  It is not simply the realist school of 
international relations that puts this assumption at its heart, but, surprisingly, democratic 
theorists like Robert Dahl as well. 
Dahl argues that, despite the many difficulties facing attempts to define 
democracy—such as deciding whether it is a system of popular sovereignty or a way to 
preserve rights, knowing at which point on the spectrum democracy becomes 
undemocratic, and agreeing upon how much delegation should be allowed—we should be 
able to agree that democracy involves some amount of participation (1999, 20-22).  Since 
individual input decreases the greater the number of people brought together to decide 
upon an issue, “global democracy” will decrease an individual's say to virtual 
insignificance, and, consequently, is a contradiction in terms.  Dahl argues that “we 
should openly recognize that international decision-making will not be democratic” (23).  
Nonetheless, he continues, this is “not to say that [international organizations] are 
undesirable...  I see no reason to clothe international organizations in the mantle of 
democracy simply in order to provide them with greater legitimacy” (32).  Since the 
participation that the meaning of democracy requires can be realized only on a small 
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scale, global institutions may be useful, but the language of justice or legitimacy should 
not apply to them. 
Though Dahl does take a very different position from those of Held or Rawls, he 
shares the same methodology.  For, though Dahl highlights some of the difficulties in 
defining democracy, his argument against global democracy requires that one accept a 
definition very close to that developed in Democracy and its Critics (1989).  Yet other 
definitions of democracy, and of global democracy, have been offered.  If we define 
democracy iteratively, as does Benhabib, cosmopolitan iterations are legitimate.  If we 
believe that justice is grounded in autonomy and the right to initiate deliberation, as does 
Bohman, then many structures of the EU should be extended.  These examples show to 
what extent global democratic theory has been dominated by the universal framework of 
legitimacy which requires theorists to deny the concrete reasons that would show when 
anyone would want to accept any of these assumptions.  But, rather than doing the work 
of finding out when, where, why, how, and for whom such theories work Held, Bohman, 
Rawls, Benhabib, and Dahl attempt to demonstrate the validity of their claims in theory.  
In theory, however, any of these plans might work.  For this reason, in global democratic 
theory, much like democratic theory that accepts the universal framework of legitimacy, 
endless universal debates between universalized particulars—including the rejection of 
any universal—have been the rule. 
These theorists show the kinds of questions and practices that arise when the 
universal framework is applied to global institutions.  Though motivated by a desire to 
criticize and transform widespread institutions, they do not look into the ways that the 
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criticisms and transformations they make possible actually lead to more legitimate 
institutions.  They separate questions of ends from inquiry into conditions and effects, 
assuming that a universal norm is universally valid.  Coercion will be decreased, stability 
will be ensured, and people will be morally obligated by some cosmopolitan ethics once a 
set of universal ends is found.  If laypeople want to transform the World Bank, experts 
only tell them the ends such an institution is supposed to serve.  Politicians, policy-
makers, and peoples can criticize it for forwarding free market values instead of 
autonomy, rights, or the ends found by democratic iterations or a law of peoples.  But it 
does not make sense on this framework to ask for whom transforming the World Bank on 
the basis of such ends is actually more legitimate.  Rather than providing evidence that I 
am making a straw man argument, the tenuous link between universal global democratic 
theory and institutions like the World Bank shows how much the universal framework 
assumes.  The dangers of requiring universal agreement become all the greater in global 
affairs as the need for expert-centered practices becomes all the greater. 
 
Experimental Global Legitimacies 
 
Despite their differences, Held, Bohman, Rawls, Benhabib, and Dahl share a 
methodology that attempts to ignore the particular reasons actual people might have for 
making use of their theories.  None of this means, of course, that their work may not be 
useful.  They are important thinkers exactly because they provide problematizations that 
can lead to legitimate social changes, but they may be even more useful if one does not 
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assume that such theories must be legitimate for all peoples in all places.  For this reason, 
I suggest that global democratic theory may be helpfully reconstructed experimentally.  
On an experimental account, this means that theory about the ends international 
institutions like the World Bank should express or the means of reforming them should 
not begin with questions about international institutions in general.  Nor should they 
assume the validity of such ends or means prior to their conditions and effects for certain 
purposes.  Instead, theoretical work should be part of certain people's struggles to make 
the World Bank work for them.   
Beyond this bare sketch, I cannot say in detail what a legitimate experimental 
transformation of an institution like the World Bank should look like. Different publics 
and their problems will require different forms of inquiry and different institutions, 
norms, and practices.  This does not mean that anything goes but, on the contrary, 
provides a way of showing when certain institutional designs or actions are illegitimate—
that is, with reference to their conditions and effects for certain interests.  It is important 
to understand what has worked for which publics and problems so that institutions can be 
prepared for similar situations that arise in the future.  Rather than being solely a matter 
of the ends institutions like the World Bank should express, its legitimacy should be 
determined by publics working through certain problems.  I can provide some schematic 
recommendations for theorists based on a contrived example, but they should remain 
hypotheses to be revised by others. 
The first thing, then, is to begin with actual people who experience the World 
Bank as problematic because it does not help them successfully deal with the problems 
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they are trying to address.  Let's say the people of North Cambia, a fictitious country in 
the South, are facing famine and hunger strikes.  Clearly this is something international 
aid organizations should be able to do something about.  Yet we should first ask if is it 
correct to say that the problem is one of famine?  Or is the famine a result of the changing 
price of food in the international market, perhaps because of the increased use of corn for 
biofuel?  Maybe land distribution as a result of colonial times keeps many on bad land 
while a corrupt post-independence government distributes aid to a few cronies?  Perhaps 
it is not an issue of a food deficit but a population surplus, and famine is the natural result 
of human overextension on a planet with scarce resources?  Is North Cambia simply 
stuck in a vicious cycle of poverty, having no prospects due to a lack of investors and no 
investors because there are no prospects?  Perhaps the strikes are a threat to public safety 
and are the immediate issue?  Did global warming cause drought and a poor crop yield?  
Or was it simply bad luck? 
One obvious way of understanding the connection between the World Bank and 
North Cambia's famine is in terms of the growth of Gross Domestic Product.  Since 
standards of living increase, on average, with rising GDP, the World Bank could try to 
make loans or investments into key areas of the economy to “jump start” growth, such as 
by calculating the “financing gap.”   Given its near total failure in helping developing 
countries develop (Easterly 2001, 2006), however, this may not be a useful way to 
problematize the issue.  In fact, it may be the case that the World Bank will be unable to 
do anything to stop famine or prevent future famines.  If it were possible, however, it 
cannot be assumed that GDP should trump other considerations, such as human rights, 
 178 
the environment, or political stability.  For example, if increasing output would require 
child labor or a loss of women's rights, due to the level of technology in a country, it may 
not be in their interests to do so.  The Industrial Revolution did exactly this in the West.  
Increasing GDP might mean increasing pollution and threaten, water supplies, as melting 
glaciers in India are today.  Increasing output may require political change, which, if 
requiring violent revolution, may be worse than the alternatives.  “Growth” can take 
many forms, few of which the people of North Cambia may want. 
Because of trade-offs such as these, experimental inquiry is often an uncertain and 
messy affair.  Not only can “the” problem be named in many ways, but the resulting 
choices and implied actors vary widely as a result.  “It” is not something that can be 
defined and addressed by experts, because each point of view involves exclusions that 
should be accepted by the people involved—and this also involves determining who the 
people involved are.  Action determined solely by experts is likely to make exclusions 
that are not legitimate, since it is unclear what a legitimate course of action would be 
without the relevant choicework.  Equally important is the fact that expert action taken on 
behalf of others excludes the possibility that people can act for themselves and thus 
reinforces passive behavior (McKnight and Kretzman 1993).  Despite the many 
problematizations listed above, most of them do not involve action undertaken by North 
Cambians themselves.  But is it the case that they must wait around for someone else to 
solve their problems? 
Often what is needed are new ways of thinking about and dealing with problems, 
either because existing choices do not work or do not work for the right people.  Finding 
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ways to address problems that are more inclusive may often involve increasing 
possibilities of communication, imagination, or transformation, as we have seen Dewey 
and Foucault suggest.  For instance, though people need not consent on the definition of 
an issue, they may not be able to communicate enough to work complimentarily, due to 
religious or racial conflict.  Reconstructing racial or religious institutions, norms, or 
practices might thus be necessary to deal with problems like famine.  Sometimes new 
ways of understanding problems need to be imagined, as, for example, when cash crop 
systems, thought to be a poor country’s comparative advantage in a global market, keep 
many impoverished and hungry or are environmentally destructive.  Are there other 
models for escaping famine and poverty that also forward other interests, such as the 
environment or political stability?  Finally, long histories of colonization or dependence 
on foreign investment and aid may have led many North Cambians to be unable to be 
actors themselves.  New institutions, norms, or practices may be necessary for their issues 
to be best addressed, as some experiments in deliberation as a process the educate agency 
have shown (Nemeroff 2008). 
These suggestions show that intellectual work to help the North Cambians deal 
with their problems should often be genealogical problematizations, that is, historically 
and contextually-attuned suggestions for thinking about and addressing problems that the 
North Cambians themselves weigh and choose.  The suggestions of global democratic 
theorists like Held or Rawls may be useful, but this should be up to the conditions and 
effects they make possible for the North Cambians.  A framework of human rights, for 
instance, could put blame on the government, which either ignores the history of 
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international relations that have led to bad governments (Felice 1999) or requires political 
instability at the wrong time.  A law of peoples designed to rule out gross political 
injustices and foster peace may not be able to explain what the World Bank or other 
international institutions could do.  Theorists who understand the singularity of the 
present problem and similarities to other problems should be able to help suggest the 
pro’s and con’s of certain problematizations and courses of action, as well as to help 
imagine new ones. 
Experts can only provide possibilities and cannot make the actual exclusionary 
choices in experimental inquiry.  This is a point Jane Addams well recognized in 
connection with the changes brought about by industrialization.  Without detailing any 
necessary forms, she explains that what is often needed in response to new situations is “a 
new line of conduct” (2002, 9).  That is, without people themselves making choices and 
changing conduct, there is no experimental inquiry.  The social ethic Addams calls for is 
not a new standard by which all people should judge their actions.  It involves new 
experiments in ethoi or habits of living in response to novel problems, of which no 
expert—such as George Pullman—can be the sole arbiter.  Accordingly, the North 
Cambians, in their attempts to deal with the problems they face, should experiment with 
different solutions—one of which may be action on the part of the World Bank. 
As these intricacies show, experimental inquiries will result in a plurality of 
legitimacies, though they are likely to share a few characteristics.  First, people’s 
experiences define the problem and the correctness of the relevant courses of action, not 
experts.  It is quite possible that no course of action is legitimate because, for example, 
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people have not taken upon the requisite work building communicative links between 
divided groups, or are unable to make changes themselves due to depoliticizing 
educations.  Second, inquiry into what should be done involves both ends and means, not 
simply a discussion of values to be implemented.   If people themselves have not weighed 
their priorities based upon the consequences experts have hypothesized on the basis of 
certain problematizations, it is hard to see what might count as a legitimate course of 
action.  Third, the results of any action taken have no guarantee.  Inquiry that presupposes 
any ends or means is likely to illegitimately narrow possibilities for thought and action.  
In the international arena, this usually means that things are often done to or for people, 
but not by people themselves.  Fourth, possible problematizations, means, and ends are 
based in past experience.  Rather than being anti-theoretical, experimental inquiry may 
require more theory or more categorization of previous problems and courses of action to 
help deal with new ones.  Finally, institutions, norms, and practices which arise on the 
basis of similar problems and public choices are necessary, but their value is something 
to be shown rather than assumed.  It is hard to hypothesize what new structure will form 
in response to new developments across the globe, but it is certain that their tenure has a 
limit. 
What all this means for the World Bank will vary greatly depending upon publics 
and problems.  To the extent that it can forward ends that people have chosen or make 
possible new lines of communication or transformation, it may be highly legitimate.  If, 
as David Ellerman claims, it is highly unlikely that the Bank can help people help 
themselves, rather than imposing a certain kind of help upon them (2005), new 
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international institutions, norms, or practices may need to be created.  The value of the 
Bank or the ends it is meant to forward ultimately depend upon people’s choices—or lack 
thereof—regarding the definition of a problem and the action taken to ameliorate it.  
People may decide to understand and deal with a problem in many ways.  The theorist 
should try to help multiply their ability to do so, but there are many limits to such work.  
The difference in methodology between this account and the practices of universal global 
theorists should now be clear.  Though there is no guarantee that the experimental 
framework will be more successful in helping people deal with their problems than the 
universal account, it should be useful in the cases in which: the definition of a problem is 
contestable; the courses of action are exclusionary; people’s interests are not fully-
formed; previous problematizations have failed; or people need to be actors. 
 
Objections to Experimental Global Legitimacies 
 
Having shown some of the ways in which an experimental approach may provide 
a way of adjudicating the plurality of definitions of global legitimacy and of taking the 
plurality of different interests and power structures seriously, I must answer some 
theoretical and practical objections.  First, it may appear as though I am simply 
suggesting yet one more proceduralism that will solve all the world's problems if only 
instantiated in the right ways.  Like the expert-centered proceduralisms of Rawls or 
Benhabib, I am open to attacks of cultural imperialism, gender bias, universal certainty, 
and armchair philosophy.  It is true that, like other political theorists, I am supplying a 
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theory of how to conceptually and practically deal with political problems, and I am the 
last to deny the importance of theory.  Nevertheless, there are two, predominantly 
practical, differences between this approach and the universal framework.  First, the 
practical value of this framework is to be shown on its own terms and not by any 
universal appeal.  It is certain that it will not be useful for all cases, and it shows the 
means for deciding when it is and when not—that is, through its use in helping people 
ameliorate concrete problems.  I cannot predict its successes or failures to any degree of 
certainty, though I have provided some indication of its use in dealing with international 
affairs.  In many ways, this dissertation's goal is simply to aid in the opening of many 
new sites of inquiry.  Second, and relatedly, this framework is different from what has 
been called “proceduralism” because it does not attempt to guarantee any effects, such as 
the discovery of morally obligatory norms, the avoidance of modus vivendis, or an end to 
illegitimate coercion.  Its effects will be multiple and should be dealt with in multiple 
manners. 
Since an experimental framework should help make practices more intelligent by 
providing ways to make theory more attuned to its conditions and effects, it faces 
roadblocks that are both theoretical and practical.  Because I am interested in engaging 
with institutions of expertise like political theory, I have focused on universal habits that 
have blocked plural, contextual, and empirical inquiry into the effects of such institutions.  
To help create possibilities for a more intelligent relation between theory and practice, I 
have attempted both to characterize a framework for such thinking, which I have called 
"universal," as well as to offer an alternative set of questions, goals, and assumptions.  If 
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one remains within the universal framework, however, this attempt will be judged by 
how it theoretically answers universal problems of moral obligation, coercion, or modus 
vivendi.  Yet, on the experimental account, these are useful problematizations only to the 
extent that they help solve real problems.  While the experimental framework has been 
framed in theory, i.e., in a dissertation, it provides no universal answers and instead 
suggests a few revisable ways for evaluating institutions and problematizations 
empirically.  Taking cues from pragmatist concepts like "experience" or "logic" and post-
structuralist concepts like "event" or "power,"  which are all meant to direct inquiry into 
exactly how experience, logic, events, or power occur, this framework requires 
investigation into how legitimacy happens rather than validating the merely universal 
musings of what I think should be legitimate. 
In this way, rather than allowing for an infinite number of injustices because 
genocide "works" for a group of people, as may be objected, the experimental account 
requires honesty about the people for whom a set of norms or procedures are legitimate in 
practice.  It maintains that we cannot assume that a set of norms or procedures, developed 
entirely in theory, will have legitimate consequences.  Even if there was consensus 
among theorists about which norms or procedures could order others and form a basis for 
the construction and criticism of global institutions—and, as we have seen, this is far 
from the case—the experimentalist suggests that the universal coherence or 
representativeness of a belief is not the only determinant of its value.  For this reason, it is 
not the experimentalist who allows for unlimited atrocities by "letting a thousand flowers 
bloom."  On the contrary, it is the universal theorist who risks making all manner of 
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violence and exclusion possible by eschewing the evaluation of the differential effects 
that “universal” norms and procedures have.  The experimentalist suggests that the 
creation of more legitimate institutions will come from an attention to the ways that 
contemporary situations are problematic for some and not for others—not by relegating 
such matters to questions of application. 
It is true that many things that are legitimate for some people are not legitimate 
for others.  An experimental framework’s focus on such differences is a strength, not a 
weakness, for a clash of legitimacies points to a problem to be ameliorated.  Rather than 
glossing over such differences, as the universalists do, or throwing up one’s hands in the 
face of irreconcilable language games, as the skeptics do, Dewey and Foucault suggest 
that attuned experimentation is the one way that a norm transcending the situation or 
ironic resignation might be legitimated.  There may be no legitimate solution to a 
problem as it now stands, but the only way to find out is through experimentation—in 
values, practices, institutions, media, educations, etc.  The flight to theory is likely to 
ignore the difficult work required to transform the interests, habits, or problematizations 
at hand, though, of course, it may still work.  On the experimental framework, one cannot 
assume that the solutions to problems are all waiting to be discovered in theory. 
But, it may finally be objected, legitimacy cannot be determined by practices 
because the current state of affairs is not legitimate.  How could we know what is just by 
looking at injustices?  Again, an experimental framework would answer that any way of 
thinking about current politics, such as that it is all unjust, should be judged by its effects.  
It is likely that more attuned questions about exactly how the world is legitimate for some 
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and illegitimate for others will be more useful.  A more legitimate state of affairs may 
arise through the effects of universal efforts, but whether or not this is the case will 
require the kind of concrete and experimental inquiry that the universal framework tries 
to avoid.  One should not ignore the complexities of the world or the differential effects 
of global institutions.  Rather, these should form the beginning and end of universal 
work.   
Despite these theoretical objections, there are just as many practical difficulties in 
implementing the experimental framework of legitimacy.  First and foremost, social 
inquiry is difficult enough in small communities; global social inquiry is near impossible.  
It is certainly the case that cultural, linguistic, historical, spatial, and temporal factors 
complicate global experimentalism more so than in smaller groups of affected peoples.  
Yet there is no clear alternative or escape from this difficulty if people are to take part in 
creating legitimate global institutions without resorting to expert rule.  This difficulty 
may point to a way of criticizing such structures, if practical concerns thwart meaningful 
participation to such an extent that a lack of accountability overrides the other benefits 
such institutions may provide.  In other words, Dahl may often be right that legitimacy 
decreases as the population involved increases and participation decreases, though what 
participation means—and what it means in relations to other values—for which 
institutions will vary. 
The experimental framework accordingly provides means for criticizing existing 
institutions—not only by means of their effects for concrete peoples, but, more 
specifically, by the ways that they structure inquiry into themselves or other institutions.  
 187 
In what ways do global economies, mass media, consumption habits, cultural norms, or 
ways of speaking allow for useful reconstructions of institutions and in what ways do 
they lend to unintelligent or manipulative practices?  These questions require concrete 
analyses and do not allow any easy answers regarding the viability or value of global 
institutions as such.  For this reason, I cannot supply any concrete suggestions about 
whether or not the United Nations is legitimate nor can I make any recommendations for 
the ways in which the global economy should be restructured.  Instead, the experimental 
framework suggests a methodology for finding answers to these questions: plural, 
contextual, and empirical inquiry oriented by public problems.  It is through such 
experimental analysis that the meaning of institutions could be determined so that they 
can be intelligently reconstructed. 
 
Multiplications 
 
The experimental framework has great promise for taking the pluralism of values 
and the differential effects of global institutions seriously, since it encourages questions 
like, “What are the ends, means, and effects of certain practices of the World Bank, and 
for whom are they legitimate?”  It does not assume that experts best understand peoples’ 
interests, the problems they face, or the differential effects of transforming institutions.  
The universal framework, on the other hand, limits action by a particular set of norms or 
procedures that are then to be applied to global institutions.  The largest possible problem 
of the universal framework is that it limits possibilities for effective action, and this often 
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means that people are not seen as actors themselves.  Of course, the transformations and 
criticisms made possible by ends determined by experts will be legitimate for some 
people, but, as the experimental framework suggests, they should be tested with reference 
to concrete problems and people's attempts to deal with them.  To this end, this 
framework encourages a methodological pluralism.  What are the legitimate ways of 
ameliorating a problem, and how can the number of interests served be increased?  This 
may require concrete inquiry into the ways old answers actually work, but new 
problematizations may often be needed. 
Global experimentation and institutional reconstruction is already occurring in 
multiple ways, though the interests constructing and evaluating such projects are often 
narrow.  I hope to help make these practices more intelligent and less exclusionary by 
providing one way for rethinking the theory that describes and directs them.  The 
evaluation and transformation of global institutions should be oriented by publics’ 
attempts to work through shared problems, not by expert determination of universal ends.  
That is, on the experimental framework, one should not simply construct a theory so that 
one can hope that legitimacy might one day be possible.  One should inquire into the 
ways in which a set of ends and means that actually helps create peaceful conditions 
could be invented.  This requires more than an analysis of ends, even if carried out by 
large numbers of people.  It may involve expanding the number of interests that can be 
communicated and recognized, as many theorists who emphasize recognition have 
realized.  New ways of thinking and acting may need to be invented, as many post-
modernists and post-structuralists have attempted.  Different transformative possibilities 
 189 
made possible by new educations may be required, as many identity theorists have 
understood.  Many people are trying to democratize political theory, and I hope to have 
made some small contribution to these endeavors. 
Because there are so many and such wide-spanning problems facing people today, 
an experimental framework of global legitimacy would suggest that intellectuals should 
help multiply new problematizations with which various peoples can experiment.  
Universal global democratic theorists have done much to decouple questions of 
legitimacy, justice, and democracy from the necessity of a sovereign state, yet much more 
has to be done to pluralize possibilities for transforming potentially problematic 
institutions like the World Bank and inventing better ones.  No one can predict the new 
forms by which peoples will better control their world, and so, rather than trying to 
justify one form of such control in advance of future problems, political theorists should 
try to make genealogical shifts in the ways of conceptualizing and controlling the most 
important events of people's lives.  It is because neither experts nor people know what 
will be most important for them without concrete experimentation that the plans for such 
experiments should be attuned to the power structures, histories, differences, and the past 
successes and failures of similar institutions. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I developed what I call an “experimental” methodology for 
political inquiry and show its probable effects when compared to the kinds of practices 
made possible by the questions global democratic theorists often ask.  The framework of 
universal legitimacy is designed to help create more legitimate institutions, yet, since no 
clear universal ends exist, experts are needed to determine which are truly universal.  
Global democratic theory thus becomes a series of endless debates about ends and their 
philosophical justification.  The validity of the ends such theorists suggest is not 
determined by the context or effects of their application, but is assumed to be a result of 
the fact that all people share them.  An experimental methodology, which does not 
assume that legitimacy must be universal nor that ends have any necessary validity, may 
better help align global democratic theory and global institutions, norms, and practices.  
This is because such an approach would try to concretely determine for whom institutions 
and their reconstructions are valid by looking to their conditions and effects.  The 
expertise of any intellectuals who help transform and evaluate global institutions, norms, 
and practices—such as by creating new problematizations that create new possibilities for 
communication, imagination, and transformation—is determined by their contribution to 
the amelioration of specific public problems.  For this reason, global democratic theorists 
might do better to help create multiple problematizations for specific purposes than to try 
to invent a set of ends by which all problems should be named and solved. 
In Chapter One, I outlined the goals, questions, and assumptions of the universal 
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framework of legitimacy through reference to John Locke.  To define a set of ends that 
set limits to the state such that any coercion on its part is justified, stability is ensured, 
and obligation is compelled, he takes recourse to an account of human nature.  As Karl 
Marx, Carole Pateman, and Michael Sandel show, however, ends that seem universal 
may not actually be so for all peoples.  According to John Rawls, this “fact of reasonable 
pluralism” shows that, if a set of ends is going to be found, it will only occur through the 
overlap of political reasons made in abstraction from plural comprehensive doctrines.  
Rawls thus changes the basis upon which the ends of the state are determined, though he 
does not substantially alter the project of universal legitimacy that the Second Treatise 
exemplifies.  For this reason, Rawls needs experts to decide which reasons are reasonable 
and which are substantive as well as to reconcile different reasons into one political 
conception.  That actual people have little role to play in determining the legitimacy of 
institutions that affect them is hinted at by the ambiguities inherent in reflective 
equilibrium, for it is far from clear, for example, who is to judge when experts and 
laypeople disagree or what is to be done when our only options are “mad” comprehensive 
doctrines.  The difficulties Locke and Rawls face in showing how one set of ends 
represents all people’s real interests may be undercut, I suggest, by reconstructing the 
framework of legitimacy itself. 
In Chapter Two, I suggested that a pluralist conception of legitimacy that would 
not leave the fact of reasonable pluralism to be solved by experts might require an 
alternative methodology for political inquiry.  To develop this new framework of 
legitimacy, I drew upon John Dewey’s reflections into political, social, and scientific 
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inquiry, rather than any of his specific interventions into politics.  For Dewey, 
experimental inquiry into the validity of ends pays attention to the conditions and effects 
of realizing them for specific purposes, such that, for example, the validity of applying 
human rights to the global economy will depend upon the conditions and effects they 
make possible for certain interests.  Dewey proposes that one way to help make political 
inquiry experimental is to ground it in public problems.  These help provide the purpose 
for attempting to transform norms, institutions, or practices, and they make possible 
concrete ways of determining the effectiveness of any action taken.  There is no reason to 
assume, on an experimental model of political inquiry, that a set of universal norms or 
concerns about coercion, modus vivendi, or moral obligation will actually help create 
more legitimate institutions.  Instead, the legitimacy of situations should be judged by 
their conditions and effects for specific publics and purposes.  The central question of this 
framework is: for whom is an institution, norm, or practice legitimate? 
In Chapter Three, I proposed a different model of expertise based upon Foucault’s 
distinction between the universal and specific intellectual.  Rather than determining ends 
which are to be applied by laypeople, as is often the case with theorists working within 
the universal framework of legitimacy, a specific intellectual affirms the purposes for 
which she works and for which any ends she proposes should be judged.  Her specificity 
is not a function any particular position in a social group, methodology, or set of ends, 
but by the specification of her goals and the ways in which people could evaluate her 
success in so doing.  There are many ways that intellectuals could be co-actors rather than 
unaccountable directors of public action, though I focused here on how political 
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philosophers might situate their work.  If public problems could be defined and solved in 
many ways for many purposes, one way intellectuals could help is to create different 
ways of thinking about and acting upon problems, or what Foucault calls 
“problematization.”  Natural events, communicative media, or new technologies might 
re-problematize situations, but intellectuals may often be best situated to create problem 
spaces that are attuned to the history of problematizations and their differential effects so 
that present needs might be best addressed.  Problematizations are not programs which 
should be carried out by politicians and activists; rather, they produce problems.  Like 
human rights or GDP, they create possibilities for thinking and acting with which publics 
working through problems can experiment. 
Though chapters One through Three were motivated by a possible misalignment 
between the realities of global institutions like the World Bank and the rhetoric of some 
global democratic theorists, it was only in Chapter Four that I gave any kind of indication 
of its possible value in ameliorating problems with global impact.  Instead of trying to tell 
world leaders what to do to fix the World Bank, this dissertation has attempted to re-
problematize the ways in which inquiries into such global institutions might be carried 
out.  Rather than engage in the endless debates about which ends, if any, the World Bank 
should express, as do Held, Bohman, Rawls, Benhabib, and Dahl, experimental inquiry 
into global institutions might multiply ways of communication, imagination, and 
transformation regarding global problems that the Bank tries to ameliorate.  What 
structural factors make public evaluation of the Bank difficult or impossible?  What 
institutions of expertise prevent different namings of public problems other than, for 
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example, capital accumulation?  Which sedimented norms and practices hinder public 
direction of the Bank’s resources?  These questions may not lead to any better effects on 
the part of the World Bank, but they are likely to help deal with problems with no clear 
answer and aid peoples who need to act to solve them. 
A theorist 
who takes the betterment of humanity for his aim and end must also take the daily 
experiences of humanity for the constant correction of his process. He must not 
only test and guide his achievement by human experience, but he must succeed or 
fail in proportion as he has incorporated that experience with his own. Otherwise 
his own achievements become his stumbling-block, and he comes to believe in his 
own goodness as something outside of himself. He makes an exception of 
himself, and thinks that he is different from the rank and file of his fellows. He 
forgets that it is necessary to know of the lives of our contemporaries, not only in 
order to believe in their integrity, which is after all but the first beginnings of 
social morality, but in order to attain to any mental or moral integrity for 
ourselves or any such hope for society.58  (Addams 2002, 78-9) 
  
 
                                                 
58 Please forgive the gender of this passage, but it becomes quite unwieldy otherwise.  I do not think it 
unfair to assume that Addams would share my belief that the passage should hold for women and 
transgenders as well as men.   
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